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NOTE TO OUR PATRONS.—We regret to issue another short number of this Review. This is occasioned, in part, by the short period allowed for getting up this number, in consequence of the unavoidable delay in issuing the previous one, and, in part, by the desire to get the contents of this number before the public as promptly as possible.

We would remind our patrons that the prices of printing and materials used by publishers have advanced to about double former rates, and that we have to pay cash. In this connection it is proper to state, that not one-fourth of our subscribers have paid for this year, and not the half of them for last. The delay in paying may be owing to the fact that we did not send our bills earlier; but as they will be found in this number, we request that all arrears be paid immediately.



DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. III.

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ART. I.—*Conflicts of Revelation and Science—The Science of the Bible Phenomenal.*

WHETHER the last battle, which the friends of Revelation will wage in its defense, will be fought mainly on the fields of Science, can not now be certainly known. Error, in order to deceive, always associates with truth. It hopes to escape detection by being found in good company. Science and the Word must necessarily be the principal theaters of conflict. They are the chief sources of truth, moral and physical; and while the intense anxieties of the human heart in reference to the remote future find relief in one, any advance in material interests is sought in the other. Those who cultivate exclusively either department, obtain imperfect views of the other; false deductions are made from scanty premises; discrepancies and contradictions arise; and great truths, which are really harmonious, are set sharply at variance. Any sneering by scientific men against the Bible, or by theologians against Science, is unseemly, and can alarm only the thoughtless. The more important and extended the relations of any truth may be, the more likely is the human mind to mingle error with it. It is the vast fathomless ocean that rocks under the rough handling of the tempest; pools and puddles remain quiet. The terrible blows which have been struck at Revelation and Science, and the fierceness of the recoil, but show the amazing reserved force inherent in both. The truth in either can not be set in array against the other. False interpretations of both may clash; true ones never. It is not designed in the present article to attempt a reconciliation of the apparent discrepancies, which may have arisen in the progress of Science between it and

Revelation. Every year removes some difficulties, but introduces others; and such probably will be the case while our knowledge of Science and Moral Truth remains imperfect. We regret the discrepancies, inasmuch as they indicate our ignorance; we rejoice in them as showing that the subjects between which they arise originated in the Divine Mind, and therefore extend beyond the reach of human thought. If the Bible be true, and Science be true—and both *are* true if there be a God, and if there be none, the existence of both is the most inconceivable of all things—if they be true, then there is some mode of viewing their relations which will satisfy any reasonable mind. The statements in the Bible, involving scientific facts and allusions, must be in accordance with some law that commends itself to sound reason. The harmony of God's truths are not always to go begging for credence. They shall yet sweep the field of thought of every obstruction; and sweetly command, by their beauty and glory, the loving confidence of every soul of man. And surely we are not debarred from getting glimpses of this glorious vision now.

In our search for the law, which controls the use of scientific language in the Bible, we shall assume, as proved in a preceding article, that the Word of God is not a text book on Natural Science; that it is not intended to explain its facts and phenomena; that its references to Science are incidental and subordinate to its one great purpose—the restoration, through a mediator, of fallen man to the image of God, and to communion with him.

The true position which, it is believed, the Bible holds in its relations to Science, may be presented under two heads:

1st. Its scientific language is phenomenal. It enters into no details, and no explanations of the facts or laws of any Science, but *states them as they would appear to an observer.*

2d. This mode of statement is not merely admissible, but, under the circumstances, is *the only possible mode; and is eminently fit and proper, and in entire harmony with the design of the Bible.*

There are two aspects in which almost every scientific occurrence may be contemplated, and consequently two modes of stating such occurrence. 1st. It may be stated *phenomenally*, that is, just as it would appear to any one who saw the occur-

rence, and without any reference to the causes concerned in its production. 2d. By going back of the mere appearance and stating the law or the causes of the occurrence. In some cases, the appearance and the law are the same, and of course but one statement can then be made.

The sun rises in the east, passes across the heavens, and sets in the west. This is the phenomenal aspect; as the thing appears to us. But by a process of reasoning and an effort of the imagination, we resolve this appearance into a higher law, *i. e.*, the rotation of the earth on its axis. And here with our present knowledge the explanation ends. A light from a pool of water flashes on our eyes: that is the appearance. We examine and find that it comes from the window of a neighboring house, and falling upon the water is reflected from it. Here is a second appearance, light from the window. A further examination, and it is found that sun light falls upon the window and is reflected from it. This is the third appearance. Now it is true that the light does come from the water and the window, but from neither in the sense of originating in them. To say that the light comes from the water expresses a part of the truth, though not the previous steps by which that part is accomplished. To refer it to the sun even, does not give the whole truth. To make the explanation complete, it would be necessary to state the nature of light, its motion, how bodies can reflect it from their surfaces, how the sun produces light, the kinds of matter of which the sun is composed: indeed, a little deeper inquiry would be necessary—what, after all, *is matter*, and how was it made, and who made the Maker of matter? and if He was not made, how can that exist which never was made! Explanation would not stop here. There are side issues which need elucidation quite as much as the direct ones, and are connected quite as intimately with the subject. How is light refracted by the humors of the eye; what is the precise effect produced upon the retina; what is transmitted along the optic nerve; what change takes place in the brain; how the mind becomes cognizant of that change; and how that results in what we call sight! An answer to all these queries would not exhaust the subject. Each collateral question has its own collaterals, and these still others; all of which must be expounded in order to answer fully the first. Relations upon relations

multiply at every step; the farther the advance, the more remote seems the end. And truly so; for that which is boundless lies before us. We are getting entangled among the infinite lines along which God works.

That the scientific language of the Bible is phenomenal, will be admitted by most. The complaint is, that it states scientific facts as they appear, and therefore does not state the truth.

Joshua spoke phenomenally when he said, "Sun, stand thou still on Gibeon, and thou moon over the Valley of Ajalon." And the fulfillment is expressed in the same manner. "So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day." Whatever may have been the mode by which this miracle was performed—whether by stopping the rotation of the earth; or by some change in the optical properties of the atmosphere; or by hanging out another light in the heavens as the sun departed; or by some mode inconceivable to us—the language is still phenomenal and describes the appearance.

Any number of like cases might be cited, were it necessary, from the Bible to show the phenomenal character of its language upon scientific subjects. Let any one read the Book with reference to this point, and he will find that, right or wrong, it is wonderfully consistent in this respect. A careful analysis of either the preceding or any other like case, will show that *no scientific fact can be stated without involving phenomenal language.* The statement that the light comes from the water to the eye is phenomenal, and can not be divested of that aspect, except by explaining that light from the window falls upon the water, and is reflected by the latter to the eye. But the phenomenal still lurks in the proposition; it has only been removed one step farther back by the explanation. Another would remove it to the sun; another still would show how the light is produced on that body. And so we might proceed back, step by step, casting off the phenomenal and putting on the scientific dress. But the last step would always be phenomenal in aspect to that which preceded it in the order of causation. And we might as well expect to separate the shadow from its substance, as to divest entirely any scientific fact of its phenomenal character; unless the explanation has swept the whole field of related truths, direct and collateral, and penetrated to the profoundest

depths of the Infinite Mind. Whether, in expressing a scientific fact, the phenomenal shall be retained at the very threshold, or thrown back as far as our knowledge will permit, depends entirely upon the object the writer has in view. If that object be scientific explanation, then let him unravel the interminable web of dependence and causation till the whole subject stands, like a miracle of beauty, before the mind. Still the phenomenal will linger around the outskirts of his field of thought, and amid the thousand avenues radiating from it, which his investigations have opened up. But if his object be merely to make known the event—such, for example, as the miracle of Joshua—good taste and common sense would force him to describe it as it would appear to any beholder. Any attempt to unfold the laws which control the event, would be out of place in such a narrative. Especially so, since the attempt could progress but a few steps along a pathway without end; and the same condition of things, the same necessity for explanation, would exist at the end of that progress as at the beginning; and the same clamor would be raised there, either now or in the future, by other minds. At the same time, the Author of the work would be exposed to the suspicion that he had attempted what he was unable to carry out.

The idea has somehow taken strong hold of many good minds, that it is improper for the Bible to use phenomenal language, though not objectionable in other works. And tender Christian hearts are often shocked and their faith perplexed by intimations from grave philosophers that the Bible is rather loose, to say the least, in its assertions when it says, "The sun stood still in the midst of heaven;" for the sun has no motion the stopping of which could prolong the day. The same objection is urged against the account of creation in the first chapter of Genesis. The third verse asserts the creation of light on the first day, the sixteenth that of the sun on the fourth day. These passages are not quoted for the purpose of explaining them. The principles of this article will, it is believed, apply to them and all other like cases.

To charge that the Bible utters falsehood when it speaks of the sun as rising or standing still, and the earth as fixed, is mere subterfuge. The appearance of a thing—its phenomenal aspect—is just as truly a fact as the means which cause the fact.

The appearance of a thing may or may not give the true state of the case as to the *causes* of that appearance. Whether it does or not, depends very much upon our stand-point. Nevertheless, that appearance is a fact, and it is adhering to truth most rigidly to describe it as it appears.

Did it never occur to these objectors that most of our scientific laws are appearances—things seen? We call them laws because they uniformly precede certain occurrences; and because no higher law, inclusive of them, has yet been discovered. It is quite possible that some of these will hereafter be found to be appearances expressed by some higher law; just as the rising of the sun is expressed by the rotation of the earth. The attraction of bodies for each other and their consequent motion when free to move, is an appearance—phenomenal. It is also a law; for none has been discovered more general in its nature into which gravitation can be resolved. The statement of a fact as it appears, may usually be separated from the explanation of the fact. By doing this, all difficulties between the phenomenal and scientific forms of expression vanish. The difficulties are not really in the thing itself, but in our modes of thinking. The Bible then, when it describes a scientific occurrence phenomenally, does state the truth; and the only fault, if any, which can be found with it is, that it does not explain the occurrence. But suppose an attempt is made to explain it. It will be acknowledged that an explanation coming from the Divine Mind must be worthy of its source. It must be thorough, complete, and without a trace of error. Those who ask this from the Author of the Bible, may not have duly considered what such a request involves.

Every truth, whether relating to matter or mind, has God for its author. It can not stand isolated—cut off from all relation to other truths. Were it so, it would be something without aim or end, having no antecedent or consequent, and no possible connection with any thing else. It would be an utterly forlorn and unrelated thing in God's great system of truths. It could do nothing, neither could any thing be done with it. It could not be created or destroyed; for that would establish a relation between it and its author or destroyer. Some relation must exist between every thing established by a Being infinitely wise; for the whole must be combined into some general plan;

and that plan will consist of all the parts in their appropriate relations. The relations of a truth really form a part of it, and no truth can be perfectly comprehended till all its relations are known. To understand fully a single star in the grandeur of its influence, the mind must, step by step, trace its effects upon the millions of other stars, and indeed upon all other bodies in the universe; its attractions upon them, and theirs upon it; and then, with a gigantic effort, must group the whole together, and gather into one result their amazingly complex motions and reactions. Could the human mind accomplish this task, it might comprehend the physical truth in reference to one star.

So, in general, no truth can be understood in all its fullness, till all other truths and their actions and interactions are known; or in other words, till they have been traced up in all their complex adjustments to the mind of God. It is no exaggeration to say that the boundaries, where a truth ceases to be influenced by any other, can never be reached by a finite mind; for that would require it to know all that God knows. Hence, perfect knowledge upon any subject is impossible to man. He may approach it, but the infinite unknown still lies beyond. *Into it he may pass; through it, never!*

If the Divine Being were to offer in the Bible an explanation of any scientific event, it must take in all its relations and trace them through every step to their origin in His own nature, or it would be condemned as partial and imperfect. To stop anywhere in the series would be to stop with an appearance; and just at that point the same complaint would arise as now. To state a scientific fact as it appears, is objected to; to explain it partially, only removes the difficulty a little farther off; to give a perfect elucidation, is impossible. This leaves to the Author of the Bible the privilege of—silence! For this, doubtless, we should be thankful.

But there is another principle involved in this discussion, which shows still more clearly, if possible, the impossibility of using any other than phenomenal language upon scientific topics, in a book claiming to be Divine; restricted in its very nature to great moral questions; and designed to give instruction to all times and all classes of people. *It is impossible, while the human mind remains as it is, to reveal to it, by means of language, any truth not intimately related to other truths already known.*

There would be on hand *no language, no terms* constructed to describe such a truth. To reveal it, it must have so close a resemblance to something previously known and described, that the language in use can be applied, by accommodation, to express it. Otherwise, it must remain undescribed; and no idea of it could be communicated to another, unless by exhibiting it to the senses. Words, prior to association with the things they are intended to signify, have no meaning. They are arbitrary signs used to express ideas. Of course, the idea must first exist, and then certain sounds or letters are adopted to represent it.

After the two have been associated frequently, then the word will recall the idea. The human mind constructs language because it has ideas, and finds it necessary to express them. The language of a nation grows in fullness, variety and accuracy, just as fast as its knowledge advances in the same directions. Language originates from the high claims which our nature imposes on us. The law of association gives to it meaning, and clothes it in all its beautiful and sublime drapery. As association is an act which the mind must perform for itself, therefore the human race must have constructed its own languages. The work of any one person in representing sounds by letters, and combining the latter into words, may be used by others, but they can be to no one a vehicle of his thoughts unless he himself has associated ideas with the words. Language never precedes thought, but is forced into existence by the necessities of thought; and when the latter has breathed its own melodious voices through sounds and syllables, they seem instinct with life and harmony, and it is hard to believe that they are, in themselves, but abstract and unmeaning forms. Throughout the history of the race, every shade of thought in advance or decline, every throbbing of the emotions, has mirrored itself in language. The languages of the Greeks and Romans are sacred ceremonies of the dead past. They lie in mournful state, because the cast of thought which they represented have passed away. Thus it is that no human works so truly and beautifully record man's progress as his languages. Those little sounds which quiver on tongues of flame, and their representatives in letters, do set forth the spirituality, the beauty and grandeur of man's nature, more certainly than the Pyramids of Egypt, the Parthenon of the Greeks, the Coliseum of

the Romans, or the steam engines, steam ships, railroads and telegraphs of the moderns. If all this be true, then to speak of 'constructing language to describe a thing before it is known is simply absurd. Indeed it is impossible; it would not be language. The Divine Being could make a language to express any truth, because He knows all truth; but it would be His language, not ours, and could be of no possible use to us, unless we were first taught the truth some other way, and then we might gradually associate the language with it. Nothing is more certain than this: that language can reveal no truth to us far in advance of our present knowledge, or which has only an obscure relation to something already known. Hence, it is very unreasonable to require the Bible to explain in language scientific facts, through all their relations, up to God their Author, or even through all the steps which the human mind can hereafter reach.

It is not irreverent to say that God can do no such thing without working a constant miracle, or making the mind something else than what it is. Even in revealing the mysteries of Redemption, God did not set aside the laws of human thought; terms already in use for other purposes were carefully selected and adjusted to express the great truths essential for man to know. Obligation, disobedience, repentance, pardon, mediation, substitution, vicarious, Father, Son, Spirit, rewards, punishments, all express known things and relations among men, and God presents His arrangements and requisitions through them to us. After all the labor expended by ourselves or for us by the Divine Being, owing to poverty of language, or rather of thought, many of the Bible subjects, comprised in these terms, are very imperfectly comprehended; but, fortunately for us, belief is not dependent upon a perfect understanding of a subject.

An unwavering confidence may exist in regard to great points, while much involved in them is doubtful and obscure. Doubtful regions will remain in things best known, and for this there is no remedy. Man knows but in part, and thus it ever will be. This charge will stand good against him after the lapse of untold ages, and after progress inconceivable in extent and rapidity. Nay, no one will then say this of him so truthfully and feelingly as he of himself.

Humility and modesty are characteristic of great minds, and it would be strange were it otherwise. He who knows but little, can not conceive there is much more to be known; he thinks himself learned because he has not knowledge enough to teach him his ignorance. New truths become a part of man's mental furniture only as they find truths within to which they stand related. Every truth is accompanied by a thousand smiling faces, diffusing light and joy through the obscurities of ignorance. As the Prophet saw the mountain filled with chariots and horsemen for his defense, so shall these glorious visions of truth shed their hallowed light along the darkened pathway of life, revealing to him, who seeks for them, the nature of God more and more clearly, begetting humility and confidence, and giving an earnest of the ineffable glory that shall greet him hereafter. Surely it would be unnatural that a mind, seeing through the known, dimly it may be, the exhaustless unknown, should be otherwise than modest and humble. Those who carp at the Bible because it gives no elaborate explanation of scientific or other great truths, have very inadequate ideas of what that word *explain* means. They tax Omnipotence with a work which is unnecessary for Himself, and which He can not do for a finite being. Facts necessary for man to know are stated; explanations impossible to make are not attempted. The Bible seems to have understood the capacities and proprieties of human thought far better than does the mind itself. It has not yielded to any of its follies, nor made any special provision against anticipated captious criticisms. It has not escaped entirely the errors of copyists or the glosses of interpolators, but that is simply admitting that its Author has not seen fit to preserve it by miracle from every contingency to which other writings are exposed. Its general purity is unquestioned; its preservation amid all assaults unparalleled in literary history. It comes forth from every conflict with increased strength; it arises from the flames tested, not consumed. Every blow aimed at it has recoiled with deadly effect upon him who wielded it. Like the anvil, it rings clearer under repeated strokes, and its polished face flings back the light of heaven unharmed by the shock.

If the Author of the Bible has not made it the treasury of scientific laws and explanations, He has not left Himself with-

out witness of His kindness in this respect. He has done far better than to record them, by means of language, in the Bible or any other book, even if such a record were possible. Instead of attempting a verbal description and explanation of scientific facts, which at the best would be imperfect and encumbered with all the defects of language, and could never extend much beyond our present knowledge, He exhibits to the mind the *very things themselves*. Instead of word-pictures, there is given us the substance; instead of shadows, the reality; instead of descriptions, things, facts and laws, in their beautiful workings, are spread before us.

The superiority of this mode of communicating truth, is constantly recognized by men and put in practice wherever possible. Diagrams, and still better, models are employed to relieve the ambiguities of mere verbal descriptions; and the natural philosopher thinks he has come nearest to Divine perfection in the art of instruction, when he can lay hold of the forces of Nature and make them work out their problems under his control and at his bidding. In accordance with this law of our being has God arranged His mode of instruction. Every kind of matter is placed within reach, and no restriction laid upon the most searching examination. Its forces are ready to spring into action under proper adjustments. The light of millions of suns is pouring, like gushing cataracts, upon great globes, and flaunting its gorgeous colors in every dewdrop and flower. This earth pursues its wonted rounds, giving day and night and seasons, and bearing its precious burden of forests and fruits and flowers for sustenance and beauty. The winds go and come on their circuits, and let fall the pattering rain drops. The rivers ever flow onward to the deep, and return again to water the earth.

The physical history of the earth—back, back, Oh! how far?—is written on the rocks; and these leaves of Nature's great volume enwrap the earth like a robe of light, and quietly repose beneath for perusal; and life is ever covering its surface with beautiful forms, ministering joy and gladness. The ocean heaves ceaselessly under planetary attraction, and joins its deep music in Nature's grand chorus. The earth's crust, beat upon beneath by internal fires, rises into rocky billows, making channels for the waters below, and elevating mountain peaks to

catch the snows and vapors above—and all over this globe, within and around it, out into the depths of space, does God flash the laws of Science and their explanations in our faces, thunders them in our ears, and pours them affectionately into our hearts.

"The sun is fixed,
And the infinite magnificence of heaven
Fixed within the reach of every human eye;
The sleepless ocean murmurs for all ears;
The vernal field infuses fresh delights
Into all hearts."

What estimate now shall be placed upon the sincerity and good sense of that class of objectors who complain, because in the Bible God speaks of scientific facts as they appear to every one; complain that He has not done for man what can not be done for any created being, viz.: explain every law and fact in Science through all its interminable series of relations till you reach the mind of the Lawgiver; complain, because these laws and facts are not recorded in language, which, if done, would be inexplicable and useless to us; complain, notwithstanding He has written their past operations on the face of the universe and exposes the present to the gaze of every one? Can more be done than has been to reveal the mysteries of Science to man? Nature's operations are not carried on in secret. She courts inquiry. But many things are beyond man's comprehension? True; and what shall be done about it? Why, he may let such things alone, or he may, if he chooses, ask the Divine Being to repeal all those scientific operations which tower so magnificently above the reach of the human intellect, or restrict them to his limited capacity, lest he should be overburdened with knowledge, or be tempted to fly so high as to melt the wax off his wings.

It is unfortunate for some souls that God has placed before them, in Revelation and Science, subjects whose relations are lost in the dazzling brightness of His throne. The tension thus produced in such is likely to injure their mental health, and they should be advised immediately to abstain from the use of such stimulating mental diet. Let them be saved by all means from entire solution in intense thinking.

It may not be amiss, just at this point, to gratify those who object to the phenomenal language of the Bible, by changing it

into a scientific form. Men are often frightened at ghosts of their own raising, and those who have clamored for this change must not blame us if it looks any thing but comely. Let us modestly state that we do not hope to satisfy their high wrought expectations in this effort, for we have not yet reached the extreme limits of human, much less of Divine knowledge, upon any scientific subject, and must be pardoned for not attempting what at present is a little beyond our power.

It is to be hoped, too, that no reader will be so hypercritical and uncivil as to suggest that a scientific dress for the language of the Bible, suited to the present, might not have been in fashion fifty years ago, and may be out of fashion fifty years hence. But to our task.

Joshua said, "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon over the valley of Ajalon." Some of us have been foolish enough to think this passage very beautiful and sublime. But, it seems, we were mistaken. Joshua knew almost nothing of astronomy, and his language falls far behind the present demands of Science. This would have been better: Earth, cease rotating on thy imaginary axis, that the sun and moon may appear to our visual organs to stand still, and thus the day be prolonged.

Longinus, a celebrated Grecian philosopher and critic, pronounced the command, "Let there be light, and there was light," a fine specimen of the sublime; but he did not anticipate the vast progress of Science in our day. Let us improve this sentence in accordance with the modern theory of light: "Let the various physical, perhaps chemical, operations necessary to produce light, now take place on the sun, and let the undulations thus produced in the ether, filling all space, be transmitted to the earth, thus giving it light." This improvement on the language of Moses, it is confessed, falls far short of what a scientific explanation requires. To fill out the idea completely, it should state the precise mode by which the light of the sun is caused, the nature of the ether and its undulations, refraction by the atmosphere, reflection from the surface of bodies, and the production of colors. The laws of these and many other phenomena should be explained and demonstrated. In the siege of Jericho, it is said that "The wall fell down flat" at the sounding of the trumpet and the shouting of the people.

This statement is very faulty, both in logic and science. The relation of cause and effect is not preserved, and the physical cause of the fall is not even mentioned. The writer ascribes the action of falling to the *wall*, whereas it was the attraction of the earth which *drew* it down. Another fact should have been at least hinted at, *i. e.*, that the wall tried to draw the earth to itself, but succeeded only in a very slight degree; besides, it should have been explained that the cohesion of the materials composing it was destroyed, or the whole so tilted over that the center of gravity was left unsupported. To decorate this occurrence in scientific dress is left to others. The materials for that purpose have been pointed out, and it is easy to see what fashion it would assume. The attention of these correctors of the Bible is called to an event in the history of the prophet Elijah, which needs revision.

The land of Israel had been scorched with drought for three years and six months; the prophets of Baal had fallen before the avenging sword of Elijah, and the assembled multitude acknowledged Jehovah to be the true God. On the hoary top of Carmel, overlooking the Mediterranean, the prophet bowed in prayer, and invoked a blessing on disobedient but stricken Israel. Again and again he sent his servant to look out on the sea for indications of rain, but there lay the waters, like molten silver, under the fiery sun. The seventh time the servant hastened back with the joyful tidings: "Behold, there ariseth a little cloud out of the sea like a man's hand." We have been accustomed to consider this whole scene, and especially the last simple announcement, as exquisitely, touchingly beautiful; yet, it seems, we must mend even this gem of beauty. Clouds did not rise out of the sea. They are formed by the condensation of vapor, which is evaporated from sea and land; besides, the cloud must have been larger than a man's hand, or it could not have been seen so far. This want of scientific accuracy might have been avoided if the servant had said: "Mr. Elijah, the vapor in the atmosphere over the sea begins to condense into a visible form; the wind is blowing toward us from the sea, and may be brought over the land and precipitated in the form of rain." All this is fine—twaddle—and let those who think it a caricature, recollect that it is not an exaggerated picture of the insufferably pedantic and conceited aspect, which would be

given to much in the Bible that is exceedingly beautiful by substituting scientific for phenomenal language. Nonsense in principle always leads to nonsense in practice, and at times no resource is left in dealing with captious objectors than to "answer a fool according to his folly." If any refined mind could be forced to execute so ungracious and irreverent a task, this work of emendation might be applied to another passage, one of the shortest and most touching in the Bible, "Jesus wept!" It is the description of an emotion by its physical signs, and a strict application of the rule—*i. e.*, to explain, in accordance with scientific laws, all that admits of it—would require a revision of this precious passage. While every correct not to say Christian mind, would shudder at the idea of clothing this beautiful thought in scientific dress, yet the enormous folly of those who find fault with the Bible because it is not done, is best seen in just such sentences.

We will not shock the sensibilities of ourselves, or our readers, by indulging in ridicule on a subject so sacred. Any one may, if he chooses, imagine—and that is quite enough—how a scientific description of the act of weeping would appear in connection with that scene of unutterable tenderness, where the great Saviour stood with the bereaved sisters around the grave of a brother, and mingled His gushing human sympathies with theirs. This manifestation was rendered more surprising from the fact that the Saviour knew that in a few minutes the cold ear of death would be pierced by the Omnipotent words, "Lazarus, come forth." We dare not change a thought in that brief sentence of two words—"Jesus wept." We dare not mar the most tender, affectionate, and touchingly beautiful scene this sin-stricken world ever witnessed. Let it remain without a shadow to dim this vision of beauty. The world has seen too few such to make us willing to part with this. Let him who would lay violent hands on it, beware! The anathemas of a world would rest on him. And may God forgive those who would darken the precious light of His Word by their wickedness and folly. Let the phenomenal language of Revelation be changed into the scientific form demanded by our times, and caricatures, absurdities, grotesque figures and thoughts would stare frightfully upon us from every page. The feeling excited in every mind which loves the true and beautiful,

would be as shocking and repulsive, as if some pretended friend should take the portrait of a dead mother, whose last tears were wept out on your neck, and whose last kiss lingered the brightest spot on memory's waste; and while that image lay treasured up in your heart the dearest thing of earth, he should distort every feature, change the smile of affection, which had so often enticed you to her bosom, into a sardonic grin, and then place it before you in sheer mockery. A like shock would be given to every mind, gifted with refined taste, and possessed of a sound understanding, by changing the beautiful simplicity of the phenomenal dress with which scientific subjects are clothed in the Bible, into an ill-fitting and uncouth scientific costume.

Thus far we have endeavored, in this discussion, to establish the following point, viz.: *That the use in the Bible of phenomenal language on scientific subjects, is a necessity from which there is no possible escape.* Because, 1st. Scientific explanations in a work professing to be Divine, must, in order to accord with its claims, be perfect and complete. But such explanations, embodying, as they must, all that God knows, could neither be expressed in language, nor communicated in any way to finite minds. 2d. The constitution of the human mind and its law of progress are such, that it can advance in knowledge only by its own acts, and by means of the relations which one truth bears to another. Hence, human progress can not be *per saltum*, but along the successive steps of related truths. Hence, also the attempt to teach, at any time, truths much beyond the boundaries of the knowledge then existing, is absurd. Such communications, were it possible to make them, would lie beyond the horizon of our mental vision, and would be utterly unintelligible and useless. 3d. It is impossible to reveal truths, which have no striking resemblance to what is already known, by means of language; for there would be no language by which to express the truths. The truth is first in order of time, and the language then follows. 4th. Any attempt to explain scientific allusions in the Bible, even if carried no farther than the probable advance of the human mind in this life, would be out of place in a work not intended to be a "Text Book on Science."

Here we might rest the argument, believing there can be no escape from its toils. But some, while admitting its force, may,

nevertheless, think that the use of phenomenal language is, upon the whole, a disagreeable necessity, and needs apology rather than deserves commendation. We now propose to show briefly that phenomenal language is altogether most appropriate and befitting the Bible, even if the scientific form were not encumbered with insurmountable difficulties.

Few persons have the ability or the taste to peruse explanations of scientific phenomena in detail. A single branch of Natural Science would require a volume to discuss and explain its laws no farther than our present knowledge extends. The various treatises upon Science now extant make quite a library; and their careful study is the work of a lifetime. If the Bible had been made an encyclopedia of Natural and Moral Science, the brief truths of the latter, which man must learn in preference to all else, would be lost in the mass, like stray pearls amid the sands of the ocean. The great truths essential to salvation, however extensive their relations, fortunately for us, are comprised within a small compass. God has wisely arranged them in the most condensed form. They flash upon the darkened soul like gleams of lightning. They come to us divested of all that can conceal their naked power, or obstruct their terrific force. For beauty, terseness, accuracy and generalization, there is nothing in mere human composition to compare with the ten commandments and our Saviour's comment on them. These and all the cardinal truths embodying man's relations to God and a Saviour, could be written on a single page; and a cordial acceptance of them would save the soul. And yet who does not know that these, when spread out in all their connection, constitute an ocean absolutely boundless: for that ocean is God's Nature. Now, if it was wise in the Divine Being to condense the highest and most important of all known truths into so small a space, it would seem very inconsistent to have enlarged upon scientific facts, a knowledge of which, though necessary to our progress, is not essential to the highest act of one's life, viz.: restoration to the favor of God. By limiting its moral truths to great facts and principles, and its history to what is just sufficient to show the grand features of Divine Providence in dealing with man; by confining its scientific statements to the phenomenal form; the Bible, though a small book, is made to contain an inexhaustible fund of matter.

While, from the nature and subjects of the Book, it must have its unfathomed depths, there must also be pure surface waters, life-giving, needing no deep sounding line to reach; and which will mirror every face and form that looks into them. The ignorant and feeble in intellect must comprehend enough to satisfy their wants. What could accomplish these purposes but unadorned simplicity in all its parts, moral and scientific?

But, besides the simplicity and brevity of phenomenal language, it makes the Bible intelligible in its scientific statements to all men of all ages. The criterion of its scientific facts are the senses of the observer, and ordinary cultivation of these is quite sufficient. Little room is left for dispute, and should any occur the settlement is speedy and decisive. The Israelites and Amorites alike saw the sun smitten to rest in the heavens at the command of Joshua; and we, in imagination at least, can contemplate it now as they did on that eventful day. The learned and unlearned, we who now know so much and those who shall yet know more of that strange arch which spans the cloud, can all stand side by side with Noah and be made parties to that covenant which secured the safety of the world. So he who has no conception of the structure of the earth, except from the appearance merely of its surface, and he who understands in some degree the extent and operations of the struggling fires beneath, can read with an entire agreement, as to the main facts, the declaration, "When the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven." One may have no idea of the origin of that sulphurous shower which swept with fierce flames the doomed city; while the other may speculate upon the melted masses beneath the earth's crust, or upon volcanic vents which spouted jets of liquid fire high into the air, to fall again upon the devoted plain. The faith of both accepts alike the great fact expressed in phenomenal language. The explanation is left to Science, and we are free to accept any one which will agree with the record. The astronomers of the present, with their profound knowledge of planetary laws and relations, are not thereby disqualified from appreciating the sublime astronomical allusions of Job and David.

The Chaldean Shepherd who watched and mapped the stars as they passed nightly over him, may have penetrated very

little beyond the mere appearance ; while those who now observe the same phenomena, have a much deeper insight into their real meaning. To the one, the appearance constitutes the whole ; to the other, there lies far back a wonderful system of causes and relations, which explain in part the appearance. Whatever the knowledge of the one, or the ignorance of the other, the phenomenal aspect speaks the same great truth to both. To the multitude, this address by Nature to their senses is almost the only incitement to thought and reflection. It is about the only presentation of truth concerning God, from which men can not escape. In the presence of the senses, the lightnings will flash ; the planets will keep up their majestic march ; the winds will go and come ; the rain drops will fall ; and the earth put forth her fruits and flowers. No eye is so bleared as not to see the thousand lights which flash instruction ; no ear so dull as not to hear the thousand voices which fill earth, air and sky. Does not the Bible exhibit a deep insight into man's nature by presenting those scientific truths, which are incidental to its main purpose, in such a way as to strike all minds alike and command the assent of all? *By this means the Bible becomes a book for all ages.* Its phenomenal language was the first ever constructed by man, and was cotemporaneous with his earliest observations. It has held its place unchanged through all human history, is in every heart and book, and on every tongue. Obsolete it can never become, though nations and their languages perish ; nor can it be driven from the world, except by destroying man's senses and sensibilities. It is the language of the emotions : Poetry could not express her thoughts without it : it comes to the heart glowing with life. Man must use it. It is part of his nature to do so. Our first parents read it in the garden and in the smiling heavens. Noah read it in that terrible convulsion which left the world almost childless. The Babylonian astronomers read it in their night watches. The old Egyptians read it, and recorded it in the pyramids and on the zodiac of Dendera. The Magi saw the handwriting, and devoutly bent their steps to the cradle at Bethlehem. As a man, our Saviour read it with profound interest. The starry host that looked sympathizingly down on His midnight wrestlings, the dews that wet His sleeping form, the scorching winds of the desert and the chill blasts of winter,

all had a peculiar significancy to Him. Thus through the steady march of ages, to Adam in his innocence—to the ante-diluvians in their corruptions—to all the nations which, like waves of the sea, have chased each other across the ocean of time, has this phenomenal language of Science uttered its instructive lessons. Beautiful, most beautiful language, like God's sun light, manifested alike to all, felt and perceived alike by all! And is it not admirably adapted to a Book intended for all people and for all times; and which must remain fixed in its principles and in the aspect it presents to man, through all the changing tide of human life? Scientific works written a century ago are among the curiosities of the past: the text book of to-day will be laid aside to-morrow. We ridicule the scientific follies of our ancestors, and posterity will ridicule ours; but the last tearful eye which will hang with rapture over the pages of the Bible, will find its Science as true and as fresh then as now.

If the proposition discussed in this article, viz.: "That the Bible necessarily and appropriately expresses its scientific facts and allusions in phenomenal language," be accepted, then we must adopt it, with proper limitations, as a canon of interpretation for the Bible. With this as a guide, many of the scientific difficulties will, it is believed, disappear. It will not be deemed necessary to apologize for the Book and its writers, that the want of scientific accuracy and the absence of all explanation are evidences of imperfection in the work and ignorance in the writers. As regards our estimate of the work, it is of no consequence whether the writers were or were not ignorant, provided they have recorded what is true and appropriate to the occasion. They were required to do no more than state scientific facts phenomenally, and nothing more could properly or possibly be done. Any attempt to go beyond this would have shown that they were too ignorant to see that they had assumed an impossible task; that they were either deceivers or had misunderstood their mission. If the first chapter of Genesis be a true phenomenal record of the creation, whether in six long periods or six days, it proves the statements to be Divine; for no human eye was present to witness the transactions, and none but God could have revealed them. If the whole account was the mere guess-work of some shrewd mind, it is such guess-work as may well astonish the world, for there

is nothing else like it. With greater reason might the splendid astronomical discoveries of Kepler and others, down to the present time, be termed successful guesses, because they had facts sufficient to prevent very wild guessing, while the sacred writer saw nothing of the occurrences stated, and of course had no facts; and yet discoveries are constantly developing the fact that the writer had a marvelous insight into the work of creation. If he was a mere man, then Deity guided his pen.

The partiality which is shown for the literal interpretation of the word day, is perhaps natural, as the creation of every thing in six ordinary days is supposed to exhibit in a higher degree the power of God. But this is a mistake incident to finite minds. To execute a work in accordance with established laws, using what we call secondary agencies, advancing, step by step, through long periods to the great consummation, is quite as much an act of God as if the whole were performed in a moment. The slow changes which are now taking place in the earth—so slow that centuries are necessary to interpret them—accomplished through the agency of physical forces, are as truly and literally God's acts as those which spoke matter into being. We do greatly err and deceive ourselves by allowing laws to usurp in our minds the place of the Lawgiver, when they are but modes in which He operates, and always imply His personal presence. Many reject this view as belittling to God; because it represents Him as always at work, and, of course, enjoying no dignified leisure! Rest for the weak and the weary is indeed sweet; *but rest for God!* Shame on thee, O man, that thou shouldst make *thyself* the standard for thy Deity! The Divine Being did complete His great work of preparing the earth for man in six periods, and thus taught to man the necessity of repose for *him* on every returning seventh day. But it is a very grave error to reason from ourselves back to Deity, and thus make our nature and our necessities the standard of His. We thus reduce the Supreme to our own level, and remove from our contemplation that exalted standard which ever solicits the mind onward and upward. Indeed, the human mind never reaches its loftiest conceptions till it ceases to dismiss the Almighty unceremoniously from His works, and constantly recognizes in them the measured tread of His footsteps, unceasing, unfaltering, from eternity to eternity.

Whatever interpretation of the word day may be finally adopted, it will not affect our recognition of the Divine agency in creation. The operations are not less important or sublime by being prolonged through unnumbered ages. By admitting a long period to properly represent each day's progress, there is developed a correspondence between the two histories of the earth—one from Genesis, the other from Geology—which, to say the least, is very remarkable; and the wonder deepens when it is considered that the statements are phenomenal, though the events were witnessed only by the Divine Being. Will it be thought strange if the great generalizations of modern times in regard to the formation of planets and changes in them, should be found to be embodied substantially in Genesis? And will the statement be thought strange that Geology, amid all the follies imposed on her by friends and foes, is slowly, but with giant strength, constructing an argument for the Divine Authorship of the Bible, which will leave little or nothing to be desired? The moral argument in behalf of Revelation is already complete. The purity and sublimity of its doctrines and laws, the response which every Christian heart utters to its truths, are proofs invulnerable to every assault. They can not be strengthened, except by the intellect becoming stronger and the affections purer, so as to apprehend the truths more clearly. The only weak point in the evidence now is on the scientific and historical side. In clearing up these points, it is hoped, this article may afford some aid, by inculcating true views of the nature of the scientific statements in the Bible, and by supplying a general rule for their interpretation. The application of this rule would have saved the Church of Rome from a blot she can never wipe out. She not only set her authority above Scripture, but above Science; and refused to refer questions in the latter to the only umpire which could settle them, and denied to the great book of Nature the privilege to speak for itself. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, Bruno, a Dominican, taught the doctrine of a plurality of worlds and the rotation of the earth on its axis; and, when charged with heresy, defended himself on the ground that the Scriptures were not designed to teach science but morals only. His defense itself was pronounced a heresy, and for these and other opinions he was burned at Rome in February, 1600.

Twice, in the first thirty-three years of the seventeenth century, was Galileo compelled to abjure the heliocentric system of astronomy. Both of these distinguished men saw the truth that the Bible was not intended to teach Science, but they failed to perceive that phenomenal language was its glory, not its shame, and that the Scriptures could not properly, or even possibly, use any other upon scientific subjects.

If the position taken in this article be true, then explanations of scientific topics, phenomenally expressed, must be sought for in the Natural World. The explanations, whatever they may be, partial or complete, fixed in their terms or changing with every advance in knowledge, can not affect the phenomenal language of the Bible. Its mode of statement throws it entirely out of the field of dispute concerning secondary causes of scientific phenomena. Its phenomenal language lifts the Book, as to its Science, above all the changes through which the earth and its inhabitants may pass. Science may advance—the faster the better for the Bible—or it may decline, but its aspect, as presented in the Word, shall still abide in all its simplicity and beauty.

We have no apology to make for its phenomenal statements, but demand for them that homage which all candid minds yield to great excellences. The Bible is not only acquitted of imperfection, but stands credited, by the use of this language, with a profound knowledge of the mental constitution of man, of its law of progress, and of the future history of the race.

The time is, perhaps, not far distant when the work of defense shall be closed; when all minds, dazzled by the light which gleams from its pages, shall yield an affectionate or forced assent to its claims, and when no human being will have the effrontery to step forth and challenge the character of that blessed Book.

ART. II.—*The Borrowing of Jewels from the Egyptians.*

THERE are three passages in the Scriptures—two of them prospective, and the third historic—in which this transaction is referred to; and as we propose to discuss the subject somewhat extensively, it is proper that they should be fully cited at the outset. They are the following:

1. Jehovah, in appointing Moses as his Legate to Pharaoh, says to him, "And I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go, no, not by a mighty hand. And I will stretch out my hand, and smite Egypt with all my wonders which I will do in the midst thereof: and after that he will let you go. *And I will give this people favor in the sight of the Egyptians: and it shall come to pass, that, when ye go, ye shall not go empty: but every woman shall borrow of her neighbor, and of her that sojourneth in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment: and ye shall put them upon your sons, and upon your daughters: and ye shall spoil the Egyptians.*"—Exod. iii: 19, 22.

2. "And the Lord said unto Moses, Yet will I bring one plague more upon Pharaoh, and upon Egypt; afterwards he will let you go hence: *when he shall let you go, he shall surely thrust you out hence altogether. Speak now in the ears of the people, and let every man borrow of his neighbor, and every woman of her neighbor, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold. And the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians.* Moreover, the man Moses was very great in the land of Egypt, in the sight of Pharaoh's servants, and in the sight of the people."—Exod. xi: 1-3.

3. "*And the children of Israel went away, and did as the Lord had commanded Moses and Aaron, so did they.* And it came to pass, that at midnight the Lord smote all the first-born in the land of Egypt, from the first-born of Pharaoh, that sat on his throne, unto the first-born of the captive that was in the dungeon; and all the first-born of cattle. And Pharaoh rose up in the night, he, and all his servants, and all the Egyptians: and there was a great cry in Egypt; for there was not a house where there was not one dead. And he called for Moses and Aaron, by night, and said, Rise up, and get ye forth from among my people, both ye and the children of Israel; and go,

serve the LORD, as ye have said. Also take your flocks and your herds, as ye have said, and be gone: and bless me also. *And the Egyptians were urgent upon the people, that they might send them out of the land in haste; for they said, We be all dead men.* And the people took their dough before it was leavened, their kneading troughs being bound up in their clothes, upon their shoulders. *And the children of Israel did according to the word of Moses; and they borrowed of the Egyptians jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment; and the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto them such things as they required, and they spoiled the Egyptians.*—Exod. xii: 28-36.*

The Psalmist also refers to the same matter, as follows: "He smote also all the first-born in their land, the chief of all their strength. *He brought them forth also with silver and gold; and there was not one feeble person among their tribes. Egypt was glad when they departed; for the fear of them fell upon them.*"—Ps. cv: 36-38.

We have not the requisite facilities for tracing out and ascertaining precisely the meaning of our term *borrow*, at the time when our present translation of the Scriptures was made. The word is derived from the Saxon *borgian*, but the latitude of its usage, at the time referred to, is not sufficiently known to us to warrant our expressing an opinion thereupon; though we find the Hebrew term, which is thus rendered, in the forecited passages, translated by "*Aske*," in the previously existing Geneva Bible; and also in Barker's Bible, which was published in 1615. The terms could hardly have been considered equivalent. And whatever the then existing reasons, which may have induced our translators to prefer the former term, their course in so doing appears to us as unaccountable, as the ren-

* The word translated *jewels*, in these passages, is a term of much more general signification. It is often rendered "vessel." "The vessel of a potter"—Ps. ii: 9; Jer. xix: 11. *Vessel of earth*—Levit. xi: 33. *Vessels of the temple*—Ezra, i: 7; and even sailing vessel, "*vessels of bulrushes*"—Is. xviii: 2. It often is used also in the sense of *instruments*. Instruments of death, Ps. vii: 14. Instruments of wrath, Is. xlii: 5. Instruments of music, 2 Chron. xxxiv: 12. Harp instrument, Ps. lxxi: 22 (rendered *Psalttery*). Also furniture, (rendered *stuff*), Gen. xxxi: 37, and xlv: 20. Also *weapons* of hunting and of war, Gen. xxvii: 3, and Judges, xviii: 11, 16. In the forecited passages from Exodus, Gesenius renders it "*vessels of gold and silver.*"

dering itself is incapable of being sustained by any view, which it seems possible to take, of the actual facts in the case.

The radical meaning of the term *borrow*, in its now existing usage, is *to obtain any thing from another by his own consent, for the purpose of using it for a time, and then of returning it*. The obligation of such return, either of the thing itself, or of its equivalent in value, is always, and necessarily, implied in the transaction. And so, too, in regard to the reciprocal term *to lend*. It is, as Webster remarks, "To grant to another, for temporary use, on the express or implied condition that the thing, or its equivalent, shall be returned." And this meaning of the term being attached to it in the passages above quoted, has become a constant source of perplexity to Christians, and a ground for scoffing to Infidels. The question then arises, and it is a serious and important one: Is the English term *borrow* the equivalent of the Hebrew term which it is employed to translate?—to this extent, at least, that this too may convey the idea of *obtaining, with the expressed or understood obligation of returning?* We prefer to state the question in these decided terms, and so as to throw upon us the entire burden of proof, for we shall so endeavor to state all the facts in the case, as to enable the unlearned reader (not less than the learned and critical) to give an intelligent decision respecting them; and to say whether the Hebrew word can be fairly and properly translated by our English terms *to borrow* and *to lend*. For if the term has no such meaning, then, both the perplexity of the Christian and the scoffs of the Infidel are without foundation.

Our position, which covers the whole ground, and which we think can be fully maintained, is, that while the Hebrews (as other nations) had a variety of terms by which to express the idea contained in our English word *borrow*, and its reciprocal term *lend*, the word so translated in the aforesaid passages from Exodus (לָקַח *to ask, to demand*), was not one of those terms. Nor is it the word which our translators have rendered by these and other kindred terms in most other passages in the Old Testament. We trust our readers will exercise a little patience with us while we endeavor to exhibit the facts in the case.

Unless I err, the following are the only instances in which the terms therewith specified are employed in our translation of the Old Testament:

Borrow—Exod. iii: 22, and xi: 2, and xxii: 14 (Heb. 13), Deut. xv: 6, and xxviii: 12, 44; 2 Kings iv: 3.

Borrowed—Exod. xii: 35; 2 Kings vi: 5; Neh. v: 4.

Borrower—Prov. xxii: 7; Isa. xxiv: 2.

Borroweth—Ps. xxxvii: 21.

Lend—Exod. xii: 36, and xxii: 25; Levit. xxv: 37; Deut. xv: 6, 8, and xxiii: 20, 21 (Heb. 19, 20), and xxi: 10, 11, and xxviii: 12, 44.

Lender—Prov. xxii: 7; Isa. xxiv: 2.

Lendeth—Ps. xxxvii: 26, and cxii: 5; Prov. xix: 17; Deut. xv: 2, 6, 8.

We shall omit, for the present, any remarks on the term employed in the forequoted passages from Exodus, in order to consider the other terms and their usages.

The word primarily containing the idea of *borrow* and *lend* (in the English sense of the terms), is לָוֶה, as we shall show presently. Then there are two other words, נָשָׂא and נָשָׂא, which are also occasionally employed to convey the same idea, but which, as Gesenius remarks, are distinguished from the former, on the ground that these include the idea of *interest*, which the former does not. Other terms employed, though more rarely, in the same connection are, עָבַט, to *charge*; used in the sense of *borrowing upon a pledge given*; and נָשָׂא, to *bite* as a serpent, to *vex*, to *oppress*; employed in the sense of *exact-ing interest or usury*: and נָשָׂא, *interest, usury*, imposed or exacted. We shall consider all these terms in their relation to the subject.

The only instances in which שָׁאֵל (though employed a great number of times in the Old Testament) has been rendered *borrow* or *lend*, are the following: Exod. iii: 22, and xi: 2, and xii: 35, 36, and a few others; to all of which we shall call attention presently.

As to לָוֶה, which is simply to *borrow* and *lend*, the idea of interest not being included, it is translated by these terms and their derivatives in the following passages:

Deut. xxviii: 12, "Thou shalt *lend* to nations, and thou shalt not *borrow*."

Deut. xxviii: 44, "He shall *lend* to thee, and thou shalt not *lend* to him."

Neh. v : 4, "We have *borrowed* money upon our lands and vineyards."

Prov. xxii : 7, "The *borrower* is servant to the *lender*."

Is. xxiv : 2, "As with *lender*, so with *borrower*."

Ps. xxxvii : 21, "The wicked *borroweth* and payeth not again."

Exod. xxii : 25, "If thou *lend* money to any of my people that is poor," etc.

Ps. xxxvii : 26, "He is ever merciful and *lendeth*."

Ps. cxii : 5, "A good man sheweth favor and *lendeth*."

Prov. xix : 17, "He that hath pity on the poor *lendeth* to the Lord."

In all these instances (fourteen in number), except two, the Septuagint version renders the Hebrew term by *δανείζω*, which is employed likewise in Matt. v : 42, and Luke vi : 34, 35. The two instances in which this word is not, as stated above, employed by the LXX, are the following: Ex. xxii : 25, (24,) where *ἐκδανείζω* is used, and Ps. cxii : 5, where *κίχρω* (from *κρῶ*, from which *κρησσω*, in Luke xi : 5—"Friend, *I have need of three loaves*,") is employed.

In the foregoing instances, however, *δανείζω* does not seem to represent fairly the Hebrew term which it is employed to translate. For it (and *ἐκδανείζω* likewise) not only means to *lend*, but in preponderating instances of its usage, to *lend on interest*, and also at *usurious interest*, while its middle form, *δανείζουμαι*, means not only to *borrow*, but to *borrow on interest*; though the term from which the word is derived (*δάνος*) means a *gift* or *present*, as well as a *loan*, and *loan at interest*.

This, then, is the word by which the Hebrews, in the main, expressed the idea conveyed by our English terms, *to borrow* and *lend*. And this meaning flows naturally from the primitive acceptation of the word, which is, as Gesenius has illustrated, *to fold*, *to wreath*; and second, to join oneself to any one; and hence, third, to borrow, that is, to bind oneself to another; and hence, in Hiphil, to bind to oneself, *to lend*, as he that hath compassion on the poor becomes, thereby, a *lender* to the Lord. But when the idea of usury, or interest, was associated with borrowing and lending, they expressed that idea by one of the following terms:

לָוַי to loan, either on interest or usury. The primitive idea, as Gesenius remarks, may be that of *delay*, *giving time*, or

to *defer*, according to the sense of the Arabic term. It is employed to convey the idea of lending money or other things, often on a *pledge* (Deut. xxiv: 11), and on *interest* (Jer. xv: 10.) We add here a few instances of both its verbal and participial use. And our readers will bear in mind, in perusing them, that with the ancient Hebrews not only lending on usury, but even receiving interest for money loaned, was regarded as sordid, aggressive and disgraceful (a fact which, singularly enough, has become proverbially reversed amongst their descendants); and hence we find it adverted to not only by the employment of such terms as the one now before us, but in others, which express this idea with great severity, as we shall briefly show presently.

"When thou dost *lend* thy brother any thing, thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge. Thou shalt stand abroad, and the man to whom thou dost *lend* shall bring out the pledge abroad unto thee. And if the man be poor, thou shalt not sleep with his pledge," etc.—Deut. xxiv: 10-12.

"If thou lend *תלווה* money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as a *usurer* *כנשה*, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."—Exod. xxii: 25, (24.)

"I likewise, and my brethren, and my servants, *might exact* (*נשם* have lent) of them money and corn; I pray you let us leave off this usury."—Neh. v: 10.

"I have neither *lent on usury*, nor men have *lent to me on usury*; yet every one of them doth curse me."—Jer. xv: 10.

"Which of my *creditors* is it to whom I have sold you?"—Is. l: 1.

"Let the *extortioner* catch all that he hath."—Ps. cix: 11.

"The *creditor* is come to take unto him my two sons as bondmen."—2 Kings iv: 1.

"Every creditor that *lendeth* aught unto his neighbor."—Deut. xv: 2.

Such, too, is the import and usage of the kindred term *נשם*. (See 1 Sam. xxii: 2). "Every man who had a *creditor*." (Also Is. xxiv: 2.) In Hiphil it means *to exact*, and tropically *to vex* as a creditor. "The enemy shall not *exact* upon him, nor the son of wickedness afflict him."—Ps. lxxxix: 22, (23.)

The term *עבט* has likewise a similar usage. Its primitive sense is *to change*, *to exchange*, and then *to give a pledge*, that is,

for any thing borrowed, which, as Gesenius remarks, lies in the idea of exchange. Hence, to borrow upon a pledge given (Deut. xv: 6), and in Hiphil, *to lend upon a pledge* (Deut. xv: 6, 8.)

The same may be expressed, also, by שָׁאָל , but which conveys, more strongly than any of the others, the idea that the transaction which it expresses is dishonorable and detestable. It is employed to express the idea of biting like a serpent (Gen. xlix: 17; Numb. xxi: 6-9; Prov. xxiii: 32; Eccles. x: 11); and tropically to ravage and destroy, as a false prophet (Micah iii: 5), and hence, first, *to vex, to oppress*, as in Hab. ii: 7; and second, *lending on usury*. In Hiphil it has the sense of *taking usury, exacting-interest*, Deut. xxiii: 20, (21.)

שָׁאָל *usury, interest*, is derived from the same term, and is used in such connections as the following: "He that by *usury* and unjust gain increaseth his substance, he shall gather it for him that will pity the poor." (Prov. xxviii: 8.) "He that putteth not out his money to *usury*." (Ps. xv: 5.) (See also Ezek. xviii: 8-13.) Also to impose *usury*, or exact it (Exod. xxii: 24), and to take it from any one (Levit. xxv: 36, 37; Ezek. xviii: 17, and xxii: 12.)

The foregoing series of terms, unless I err, fully presents the Hebrew method of expressing the ideas of *borrowing* and *lending* in the English sense of those terms, and if I mistake not, exhibits all the instances of such usage except the following, in which שָׁאָל is employed (Exod. iii: 22, and xi: 2, and xii: 35, 36; and xxii: 14; 1 Sam. i: 28, and ii: 20; 2 Kings iv: 3, and vi: 5,) and as these are the instances which have been adduced as justifying the attempt to attribute the aforesaid meaning to this term, we shall give them a somewhat thorough consideration. But let us first proceed to examine the word itself.

The term, in its primary sense, as Gesenius, has shown,* means *to dig, to excavate, to hollow out* (hence שְׁאוֹל Hades), and from the idea of digging comes readily that of *searching out, exploring, inquiring*. Hence, also, the secondary sense, *to*

* The references to the Lexicon of Gesenius, throughout this article, are made from Dr. Robinson's Translation, the original work not being accessible to the writer.

ask, to inquire, to ask for, either by way of demand or entreaty. That is,

1. *To ask* in the sense of inquiring of, or interrogating; and it is highly important to notice in the connection that such is the meaning exactly of the corresponding Chaldaic term, while that of the Arabic is *to interrogate, to ask, to beg*; and the Ethiopic in its two corresponding terms, *to demand, to ask, to beg*. We advert to the point as to the meaning of the term in these ancient kindred tongues as an important one, which will be readily conceded, and therefore present our readers with the facts, not as ascertained by us, but as stated by Gesenius, the greatest of all the Oriental lexicographers. In none of these languages does the word, in its primary, and true sense, convey the idea which is conveyed by *לָקַח, נָשָׂא*, etc., or by our English terms *to borrow* and *lend*—that is, the granting or receiving of any thing under the implied or expressed obligation of returning either the thing itself, or its equivalent, or interest upon it.

The following examples may illustrate the usage aforesaid:

"Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and *ask diligently*."—Deut. xiii: 14, (15.)

"And I *asked* her and said, whose daughter art thou?"—Gen. xxiv: 47.

"When Esau, my brother, meeteth thee and *asketh* thee."—Gen. xxxii: 17, (18.)

"My Lord *asked* his servants, saying," etc.—Gen. xlv: 19.

"*Ask* thy father, and he will shew thee."—Deut. xxxii: 7.

"When any man doth come and *inquire* of thee."—Judges iv: 20.

"And when the king *asked* the woman, she told him."—2 Kings viii: 6.

"And I *asked* them concerning the Jews that had escaped."—Neh. i: 2.

From this usage naturally arises that of *consulting* or *inquiring*, as at an oracle; or of the Lord; as in Deut. xviii: 11, "an *inquirer* of familiar spirits," one who inquires of or consults them. Judges i: 1, "The children of Israel *inquired* of Jehovah;" a sense in which the term very often occurs. Hence, too, it is employed in the sense of *asking* or *inquiring* after one's health. "And he *inquired* as to their welfare."—Gen.

xliii: 27. (See, also, Exod. xviii: 7; Judges xviii: 15, and 2 Sam. viii: 10.)

2. *To ask for.* First, in the sense of *requiring* or *demanding*, as in the following instances out of very many:

"And God said, *Ask* what I shall give thee."—1 Kings iii: 5.

"And Elijah said unto Elisha, *Ask* what I shall do for thee." 2 Kings ii: 9.

"*Ask* of me, and I shall give thee the heathen," etc.—Ps. ii: 8.

"Burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not *required*." Ps. xl: 6, (7.)

"They tempted God in their heart by *asking* meat for their lust."—Ps. lxxviii: 18.

"They *asked* and he brought quails."—Ps. cv: 40.

"They that carried us away captive, *required* of us a song." Ps. cxxxvii: 3.

"*Ask* thee a sign of the Lord thy God. . . . But Ahaz said, I will not *ask*, neither will I tempt the Lord."—Isa. vii: 11, 12.

"The prince and the judge *ask* for a reward."—Micah vii: 3.

Second, *to ask* in the sense of *entreating*, *soliciting*, *begging*, as in the following:

"What doth the Lord thy God *require* of thee but to fear," etc.—Deut. x: 12.

"According to all that thou *desiredst* of the Lord thy God in Horeb."—Deut. xviii: 16.

"He *asked* water, and she gave him milk."—Judges v: 25.

"And Gideon said unto them, I would *desire* a request of you."—Judges viii: 24.

"Hannah bare a son, and called his name Samuel, saying, Because *I have asked* him of the Lord."—1 Sam. i: 20.

"He gave unto the queen of Sheba all her desire, whatsoever she *asked*."—1 Kings x: 13.

"He *asked* life of thee and thou gavest it him."—Ps. xxi: 4, (5.)

"One thing have I *desired* of the Lord, that will I seek after."—Ps. xxvii: 4. (See, also, 1 Kings ii: 20-22, and iii: 10-13; and 2 Chron. i: 11.)

We ask the special attention of our readers to this *usus*

loquendi of the word, since it is from the stand-point of this usage that Gesenius, and other lexicographers, have attempted to show that by an easy gradation the word may also signify *to borrow and lend*. Gesenius, in fact, proceeds to give this as its next meaning; and to sustain him herein, he quotes the fore-cited passages from Exodus (Exod. iii : 22, xi : 2, and xii : 35); and 1 Sam. i : 28; 2 Kings vi : 5; and 1 Sam. ii : 20; and further on alleges that in Hiphil the word means *to loan, to lend*, referring in proof to Exod. xii : 36, and 1 Sam. i : 28, and gives this as the second sense of the derivative **שָׁאֵל**. He refers, also, in illustration, to the Syriac term, and also to Rabbinic usage. We shall attend to all these matters presently.

The term is used likewise in the sense of *to ask alms, to beg*.—Prov. xx : 4. In *Niphal* it means *to ask for oneself, to ask leave*.—1 Sam. xx : 6, and Neh. xiii : 6. In *Piel* it means *to ask, to interrogate*.—2 Sam. xx : 18; and *to beg*, Ps. cix : 10.

These, then, are the well ascertained uses of the term. The idea of *lend and borrow*, in the English sense of these words, is not, we are thoroughly persuaded, to be found in connection with its use any-where in the Bible; and especially in the fore-cited passages from Exodus, to which Gesenius refers as giving this sense to the term. But a knowledge of the fact that many of the ablest scholars have always denied that the word here means *borrow* (that is, implying an obligation to return the thing borrowed or its equivalent), should have induced any recent lexicographer to institute a thorough exegesis of the passages in which it has been presumed to convey this meaning, before citing them in support of such an allegation. But Gesenius does not appear to have done this (as we think will appear from an examination of them); but his theological sympathies were not such as would have forbidden him to take the matter for granted on mere report. And hence his strange reference in support of his allegation, to the Syriac term, which is of little account in settling a question as to *early* Hebrew usage; and his stranger reference for the same purpose to Rabbinical usage: which is about as rational as it would be to cite the *usus loquendi* of the monks of the middle ages, in order to settle questions as to classical usage.

The ground on which Gesenius and others have been led to attach such a meaning to the term is obviously this: The

word is found frequently employed when alms are solicited, or leave of absence from a superior; or when petitioning in prayer; in all of which a return, or response, or grant of the thing solicited, is obviously expected by the petitioner. But the idea herein involved, is radically distinct and different from the one aforesaid; for in none of those instances is there implied, on the part of the one solicited, the *obligation* to make or grant such a return; except in a case where he, himself, may have authorized the demand to be made upon him, and so justified the expectation of a return. And this sense, therefore, we repeat it, Gesenius has superadded to the term without authority; or, at least, without sufficient reason, if we are to take the passages which he has cited as furnishing his reasons for so explaining it.

In treating the subject, we shall omit, for the present, the discussion of the passages cited in the beginning of this article; since the question is as to the meaning of the term in those passages themselves. The other passages, cited by Gesenius are 1 Sam. i: 28, and ii: 20, and 2 Kings vi: 5. And we shall now proceed to examine these, and also a couple of others, in which the word has been similarly rendered by our translators.

The first of these passages is 1 Sam. i: 28, and we here cite it in its proper connection, as given in our English translation: "And she (the mother of Samuel) said, O my lord, as thy soul liveth, my lord, I am the woman that stood by thee here, praying unto the LORD. For this child I prayed; and the LORD hath given me my petition which I asked of him; therefore, also, I have *lent* him to the LORD; as long as he liveth he shall be *lent* to the LORD."—1 Sam. i: 26-28.

The meaning of the term *lend* in English usage we have already explained. It is, to grant to another for temporary use, on the express or implied condition that the thing or its equivalent shall be returned. And we need only ask our readers whether such a sense is possible here? Did Hannah loan her son to the Lord *all the days of his life*, on the condition that he should be returned to her? To state the question is to answer it. The thought is wholly inconceivable and inadmissible. And if so, can the word "*lent*" here be a proper translation of the Hebrew term? Such a sense is clearly out of the question. And, as Gesenius has tacitly conceded that the word

is here employed in the same sense as in Exod. xii: 36, it is perfectly legitimate to conclude that no such sense should be attached to it in that passage. The "lending" was not, in either case, with any expressed or implied obligation of returning; and hence the term *lent* is alike equally inappropriate in both cases. A literal rendering of this last passage will make the sense perfectly clear. "For this child I earnestly prayed; and the Lord hath granted (וַיֵּן) to me my petition, which I have petitioned of Him. (שְׁאֵלְתִי אֲשֶׁר שְׁאֵלְתִי מֵעַמּוֹ) And hence I have presented him (הִשְׁאֵלְתִּיהוּ) to the Lord. All the days which he may live he is presented (שְׁאֵל) to the Lord."

The use of the term, therefore, in this passage, so far from proving the point in support of which Gesenius adduces it, makes directly against him. And if he really did examine the passage and the usage of the term, as therein presented, it is impossible to imagine on what principle he could have cited it in support of his hypothesis.

His next citation in support of that hypothesis is from 1 Sam. ii: 20: "And Eli blessed Elkanah and his wife, and said, The LORD give thee seed, of this woman for the loan which is lent (הַשְׁאֵלָה אֲשֶׁר שְׁאֵל) to the LORD." The event here referred to is the same with that in the preceding citation. Elkanah had united with his wife in this heart-felt consecration of their son to the service of the Lord through all his life. It was a heart-felt, life-long consecration. The term *lent*, therefore, in its true significance, can here have no application. For there existed no expressed or implied obligation on the part of the Lord to return what was thus "loaned" Him; and neither could Elkanah nor Hannah have expected any such return, since the "loan" was made during the whole life-time of the person "loaned." Here, too, the authority adduced by Gesenius decides directly against his hypothesis; for in no sense can the meaning of the Hebrew words here employed be expressed by the English terms *loan* and *lent*. The idea is simply that of a *presentation* to the Lord.

The only passage besides these which Gesenius adduces as furnishing such a sense of the term, is 2 Kings vi: 5. We shall present it likewise in its connection. The sons of the prophets who were attending upon the instructions of Elisha,

had found it necessary to enlarge their dwelling. They obtained permission of him to go down to the Jordan to procure timber for this purpose, and he being requested to do so, accompanied them. "But as one of them was felling a beam, the ax-head fell into the water; and he cried, and said, *Alas, master! for it was borrowed.* And the man of God said, Where fell it? And he shewed him the place. And he cut down a stick, and cast it in thither; and the iron did swim. Therefore said he, Take it up to thee. And he put out his hand, and took it" (vi: 5-7.)

Here the same participle (שָׁאוֹל) is employed which is found in 1 Sam. i: 28, above quoted, and it is a mere unauthorized assumption to suppose it to be employed in this latter instance in a sense different from the former. In that instance, as we have shown, the sense of *borrow* or *lend*, according to the English meaning of the terms, is clearly out of the question, and inadmissible. On what ground, then, is such a meaning to be attached to the term in the instance before us? There is nothing in the word itself to indicate any thing of the kind, and the narrative contains not the slightest clue to any reason which would require it. The following is the whole of the clause in which the word is found: וַיִּצְעַק וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֶּהָ אֲדֹנִי וְהוּא שָׁאוֹל, and there is nothing to hinder its being rendered, "And he cried, and said, *Alas, master! and it was sought after.* And the man of God asked, Where fell it?" etc.: or, "Alas, master! for it was presented;" that is, it was a present or gift. The Jewish translators render it, "Ὁ Κυρίου, καὶ αὐτὸ χερσὶν μόνον." "Alas, master! and it was hidden;" that is, had sunk out of view in deep water. Either of these renderings can be justified on better grounds than that of our English version; and, of course, there is no real ground on which to claim it as yielding the sense which Gesenius has here ascribed to it. Let the word here have the meaning that it has in the other passage above cited, and the idea that the ax had been loaned or borrowed, in the English sense of the term, can not be entertained for a moment.

It is true that ו may be rendered, as our translators have rendered it, in the very unusual sense of *for* (or *because of*), before a clause which specifies a *cause* or *reason*. But, in our

translation of the passage, what is there that is to be understood as really causal? "Alas, master! for it was borrowed." That the expression, "Alas, master!" was uttered by the young man, is clear; but are the remaining words to be attributed to him, as they often are? or to the historian? If to him, then, of course, they are, according to this rendering, to be regarded as assigning the cause or reason of his exclamation, "Alas, master!" If to the historian, then we are to understand him as assigning that cause, and gravely informing us that the ax had been borrowed. This latter supposition will, we think, hardly be entertained; and the phrase as translated, therefore, must be attributed to the young man, as assigning the reason for his outcry to Elisha. It is certainly true that the commendable conscientiousness which this would evince on his part, might well be held up to the borrowers of books and of other things in our day, as worthy of high consideration. But, still the question returns, were not the circumstances of the case sufficient to account for the exclamation without any such hypothesis? Axes in those days were not abundant, and were valuable. And this youth, by being deprived of his, must not only suffer the actual loss of it, but be thereby deprived of the privilege of aiding in the work which they were all desirous of completing. And then, moreover, the loss to him could be no greater in the one case than in the other; for, if borrowed, all he had to do was to replace it by another. The supposition, therefore, that it was borrowed, explains nothing, and assigns no stronger reason for his address to the Prophet than the supposition that it was not borrowed; but let the words have their obvious and native sense, as we have expressed it above, and there will be no occasion for introducing into the history any hypothesis as to whether or not the ax was borrowed. We have expressed that sense above. But as the passive participle in Kal of intransitive verbs (as well as in some that are transitive), has an active signification, the passage may with strict propriety be rendered: "And he cried out and said, Alas, master! And he was seeking it. And the man of God said, Where fell it? And he shewed him the place," etc. Such is, as it appears to us, the true sense of the passage, while the other rendering has nothing whatever to support it.

These passages, together with those which we have in the

beginning of this article quoted from Exodus, are all that Gesenius has cited in support of his attempt to assign the aforesaid meaning to the word in question; and so far are they from yielding any support to the attempt to assign such a meaning to those passages in Exodus, that wherever the sense is unmistakably brought out by the connection, they decide peremptorily against every attempt of the kind. There are two other passages, however, not cited by Gesenius, in which the word is so rendered by our translators; and these we shall now proceed to consider. They are the following:

"And if a man borrow aught of his neighbor, and it be hurt, or die, the owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good. But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good: if it be a hired thing, it came for his hire."—Ex. xxii: 14, 15 (13, 14.)

The principle of equity underlying this enactment is very obvious and simple: If a man hire an instrument or an animal, and harm befalls them, or the animal dies on his hands, he must make it good; but if he hire the owner together with either the one or the other, the owner himself is responsible for the death or breakage—for the instrument or animal goes with the hire of the owner; that is, it is taken into the account with his hire. The person who hires the man with his instrument or beast, is, in such a case, no more responsible for the harm which befalls them, than he would be for the harm which might befall the owner himself.

The transaction here referred to is obviously of the character which may be designated by the term *hiring*; and the proper rendering would consequently be, "If a man *hire* aught of his neighbor;" the word שָׂכַר, *to hire*, being, in this instance, really exegetical of שָׂאֵל. The inadequate rendering, however, of the last clause of the passage really obscures the true sense of it. It should be rendered, "But if the owner thereof be with it he shall not make it good. *Behold it was hired—it came with his own hire:*" that is, it was included therein. The words are, אִם-שָׂכִיר הוּא בֵּא בְּשָׂכְרוֹ. And that אִם is here used in its primitive and native sense as a demonstrative, is sufficiently plain from the passage itself. For, in the first place, the service referred to as rendered by the owner, or obtained from his animal or instrument, was in consequence not of a com-

pulsory, but voluntary arrangement. Every statement in the passage shows this to be the fact. Was it then gratuitous? Our English version, by its rendering of the aforesaid clause, seems to imply that it might be, for it supplies a condition: "*If it were hired, it came with his hire.*" But this is plainly absurd, since he was not to make it good in any case, if the owner were along with it, and thus the supplied condition is made to cover only half the case which it necessarily supposes, while the clause itself is designed to cover the whole case. And then, further: "*If it was hired,*" it, of course, came with his hire; and if injured, it was not to be made good. But if it were *not* hired, and did not come along with his hire (as this supplied condition supposes might by possibility be the case), and yet was brought out of pure benevolence by the man who had been hired, how then would stand the obligation for replacement in case of injury? And we suppose the answer would be, that it must stand in this case just as it stood in the other—the owner alone being responsible for the mishap, and having no claim on his employer for restitution. But, admitting this, we would merely ask, why suppose, as our translation here does, that a condition is supplied in the one case, when both cases stand in relation to the matter precisely upon a parallel? The Word of God never utters itself in any such style as that; and when it is apparently made to give forth such an utterance, it is only from a sheer misapprehension of its true sense; and so in the case before us. There is no condition supplied by the words employed, but a fact stated; and that fact is, "*Behold it was hired—it came with his hire.*"

The only remaining passage to be examined in the connection is, 2 Kings iv: 3, which we shall likewise quote in connection with a portion of the context. "*And there cried a certain woman of the wives of the sons of the prophets unto Elisha, saying, Thy servant my husband is dead; and thou knowest that thy servant did fear the Lord: and the creditor is come to take unto him my two sons to be bondmen. And Elisha said unto her, What shall I do for thee? tell me, what hast thou in the house? And she said, Thine handmaid hath not any thing in the house, save a pot of oil. Then he said, Go, borrow thee vessels abroad of all thy neighbors, even empty vessels; borrow not a few. And when thou art come in, thou shalt shut the door*

upon thee and upon thy sons, and shalt pour out into all those vessels, and thou shalt set aside that which is full." And she did so, and filled all the vessels. "Then she came and told the man of God. And he said, Go, sell the oil, and pay thy debt, and live thou and thy children of the rest"—v. 1-7.

Our translators have here (in v. 3) used the word *borrow* twice, though **לשא** is therein used but once; and the second clause is simply "*lent not*." And admitting that **לשא** may properly be understood after **טען**, the translation of that term should have been printed in *italics*. But the injunction of Elisha to the woman is simply, "*Go ask for, go procure* all the empty vessels you can obtain of your neighbors;" and the ground on which they were to be procured he does not prescribe, and says nothing about. She might purchase them under promise of payment; or hire them; or obtain them as a gift on asking; or as a loan; or even in all these ways: for where she failed in the attempt to purchase of a neighbor, she might obtain as a gift, or as a loan; and when she failed on these grounds, she might hire. Elisha prescribes to her no mode of procuring them, but leaves that with herself; he simply enjoins her to go and *ask* her neighbors for them on whatever terms they might be procured. She was known to be a God-fearing woman, and her promise to pay for what she might purchase or hire was quite as satisfactory to them, as her promise to return what she might borrow; for, in neither case, was it supposable that she would promise without sufficient ground to justify it. To render **לשא**, therefore, by *borrow*, is to make him prescribe what he does not prescribe, and to restrict the meaning of his injunction where he has not restricted it. And this is inadmissible. The term, therefore, in this place has no such sense as *borrow*.

We are now prepared to take up the forecited passages from Exodus (iii: 22, and xi: 2, and xii: 35, 36), which are, unless I err, the only remaining instances in which the term is rendered by *borrow* and *lend* in the English translation; and they are moreover cited by Gesenius as justifying his attempt to attach that meaning to the word.

The transaction referred to is, as we have seen, commemorated in a song of praise to God (Ps. cv: 36-38), and it was, more-

over, the subject of a promise made to Abraham four hundred and thirty years before. God said to Abraham: "And also that nation, whom they shall serve, will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance"—Gen. xv: 14. This, of course, does not exclude their flocks and herds, though it primarily does refer to this *spoiling of the Egyptians*. For the promise which God made to Moses at the outset was, "And it shall come to pass, that *when ye go, ye shall not go empty*;" which is explained by the subsequent phrase, "*And ye shall spoil the Egyptians*;" and then there are other apparent references to it as an illustration. As *e. g.* Prov. xiii: 22; Eccles. ii: 26; and, perhaps, Job xxvii: 16, 17, all tending further to show that God prompted and approved the act, as the history itself declares.

As to the meaning of *לָשׁוּב*, in the passages referred to, the facts stated in the historical narrative, in connection with the use of that word, are of such a nature as to forbid, absolutely, its being rendered by our English terms *borrow* and *lend*, even if such were admitted to be one of its ascertained meanings; and how utterly unlexical is it, therefore, to propound the usage of the term in those passages as furnishing the ground upon which such a meaning is to be attributed to it? In no part of the intercourse of Moses and Aaron with Pharaoh is the idea held out, in any form, that the people of Israel, after going forth to serve the Lord, contemplated a return to their galling oppression and bondage. The mission of Moses was to deliver them from that cruel and unrighteous servitude; and so Pharaoh clearly understood it. He entertained not the slightest idea that they contemplated a return. Nor does he appear to have had any idea whither they contemplated removing. They asked to go a distance of three days' journey, to offer a sacrifice and hold a feast to Jehovah; and there, for aught that transpired between him and Moses, they might conclude to remain. At all events, he knew that they contemplated no return to the cruel and oppressive bondage in which he had held them.

And then, on the night they left Egypt, the Egyptians were very urgent to have them leave at once, and unconditionally. In fact, "*they thrust them out*;" and said, "Send them away, or we shall all be slain." They moreover entreated them to be

gone. Nor was there held out, on either side, the slightest intimation or prospect of their return. And the pursuit of them by Pharaoh, early on the following morning, with the view of compelling their return, evinces the change which had taken place in his own mind, and in that of his people, on this point: "And the heart of Pharaoh and of his servants *was turned* (became changed, or perverted, *הִפְּסוּ*) against the people, and they said, *Why have we done this, that we have let Israel go from serving us?*"—Exod. xiv: 5. This, of course, is decisive. When they were urged to depart, and "were thrust out," all, on both sides, regarded it as a finality.

Now, it was in the very act of their being thus thrust out, and with no desire or expectation on either side of their return; and when the deep and overwhelming impression had been brought flashing upon the mind and conscience of their oppressors, the irresistible conviction that all the terrible calamities which had befallen, or were befalling them, were in consequence of those unrighteous oppressions, that the Israelites *asked or required* some recompense, or remuneration, for their long, and severe, and unrequited labors: and it was then and there that the Egyptians complied with this most reasonable demand. The moment was favorable for insisting on their rights, and they embraced it. God had given them their freedom, and had directed that they should, under these very circumstances, demand some compensation for the lengthened toils so cruelly and unjustly imposed. Nothing was more proper than that they should be remunerated; and they *asked* it, and received from their oppressors a small fraction of the immense debt which was justly their due. Such are the facts. And now let any one attempt to associate with this state of things, and with this mutual understanding that the departure from Egypt was a finality, the idea of *borrowing* and *lending* in our English sense of the terms, and he will at once be conscious of the absurdity of the effort, and of the flagrant injustice which has been done to the words of the Holy Spirit, by the attempt to render them in such terms as those.

But this inaccurate and thoughtless rendering has a far more extensive and pernicious sweep in its mischief-dealing power, than the perversion of a single term from its true signification; for, as the skeptic has ever seen with exultation, it tends to

throw suspicion over the whole claim of Moses to a Divine legation. God is about to enact and establish amongst His chosen people those laws and institutions which are to prepare the way for the revelation of His Son as the Redeemer of man, and as God manifest in the flesh; and in those laws and ordinances which He was just on the eve of enacting for this purpose, lying and fraud, and violation of promises, and deception in any and every form, are most strictly prohibited, and denounced under the sanction of severe penalties, and of the actual displeasure of Jehovah, Himself. But, according to this attempted rendering of לָקַח by *borrow and lend*, He prefaces the enactment of these laws and ordinances by requiring His people to obtain the property of the Egyptians under false pretenses: that is, He directs them to obtain, under the promise or implied pledge of restitution, "jewels of silver, and jewels of gold," and so strip them of their property under a pledge of returning it, when they themselves knew that they were never again to re-enter Egypt, and never should have an opportunity to render back what they had thus obtained. But we need not dwell upon so repulsive a feature of the subject. That Gesenius was willing to have this impression fostered, does not surprise us; but that the venerable translators of our admirable English version should have left the matter in such a shape, without any exegetical reason to sustain them, is as surprising as it is deplorable. But let us proceed to the passages themselves. We have quoted them fully at the head of this article, as given in our English version, and therefore need not repeat, formally, the quotation here.

The first passage states simply, what God enjoins: "And every woman shall require (לִקַּח) of her neighbor, and of her that dwells (בֵּיתָהּ, see Job xix: 15; LXX. σύσχητος) in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment, and ye shall put them upon your sons, and upon your daughters: and ye shall spoil the Egyptians." The last expression evinces, as we have already intimated, that this requirement on the part of Israel was an act of just retribution upon their oppressors. The promise had been held forth to Abraham more than four hundred years before, that the oppressive servitude of his seed in a strange land should not be always unrequited; and the time had now arrived when the account was to be, at least to

some extent, adjusted. Hence the word כָּצַל, in Piel, is here used (see, also, ch. xii: 36) to indicate this fact. Those who had been for so long a period plundering Israel, must now in turn *be spoiled*; and must yield to the righteous demand for a recompense. Herein, too, was fulfilled the promise of God to Moses that the people "*should not depart empty*;" that is, unrequited. The meaning of this phrase may be fully seen by its usage elsewhere. (See Deut. xv: 12-15, respecting the dismissal of the Hebrew servant.) And thus God appointed that Israel should be "*liberally furnished*" when they went forth free.

The next passage is of the same character (Exod xi: 2, 3), except that in it God commands that not only the women, but the men, should make this requirement of the Egyptians: "Speak now in the ears of the people, and let every man require of his neighbor, and every woman of her neighbor, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold. *And the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians.*" The sense of degradation and inferiority, with which they had been regarded by their oppressors, was now gone. They regarded them in their true character, and were prepared to listen to their demand.

The last passage, or that which presents the historic detail of the transaction, is Exod. xii: 35, 36: "And the children of Israel did according to the *command* of Moses; and they *demand*ed of the Egyptians jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment: and the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they *gave* unto them: and they *spoiled* the Egyptians."

Such, then, is the sense of these much abused and much misunderstood passages, as shown by the usages of the word itself, and by all the facts of the history. And the opposite meaning, as presented in our translation, is not only opposed to that usage and to those facts, but it has all antiquity against it. We shall cite a single fact illustrative of this, and then conclude our article.

The Greek version of the Scriptures, called the Septuagint, was made by learned men of the Jewish nation, some two centuries before the Christian era, and is the version which our blessed Lord and His Apostles seem to have almost constantly cited in referring to the Scriptures. How, then, did those ancient and intelligent Jews understand the transaction men-

tioned in these passages? and by what term do they express in Greek the word which our English version so unaccountably renders "*borrow*?" The term which they have chosen to represent the true sense of the Hebrew word in those passages, is *airéw*, the meaning of which is, to *desire*, to *seek*, to *require*, to *demand*; and in the middle voice, to *ask a person for any thing*. This, I repeat it, is the word here employed by which to translate the Hebrew term. And that all our readers may perceive how it is used in the Scriptures, I would remark that this same verb is employed in the New Testament *seventy-one times*; and of these seventy-one times it is translated *forty-eight times* by "*ask*;" *fifteen times* by "*desire*;" *four times* by "*require*;" *twice* by "*beg*;" once by "*crave*," and once by "*call for*." In no instance does the word mean *borrow*, or *lend*, or any thing like it. It is properly, in fact, the Greek equivalent of *לָשׂוּב*, though Gesenius, who is proverbially fond of introducing from other languages the equivalent or corresponding term of the word he is explaining, is careful not to advert to *airéw* as such, in the instance before us. It would have been fatal to his aforesaid exposition, if he had done so. And a very slight reference to it under one or more of the species of the Hebrew term, is all the allusion that he makes to it.

We are very unwilling to do even the slightest degree of injustice to the memory of this great Hebraist, to whose mighty and successful labors in the department of language, sacred literature is under so many and such high obligations. But, like other men, he was not too great to be above being influenced, more or less, by his prejudices; nor is it at all unlikely that his prejudices against the truth of God in the matter before us, did so operate upon his mind as to blind him to the absurdity of offering the citations he does, in order to justify his attributing to the word before us the meaning of to *borrow* and *lend*. He not only did not believe the Scriptures to be Divinely inspired, but ridiculed the idea; and was in no way desirous to extricate the character of God, or of His servant Moses, from unjust imputations, when those imputations chimed in with his own views and prejudices. The Professor in a Christian University, who, for the purpose of ridiculing the Institutions of Moses, could, in his lecture room, expose to the boisterous laughter of his class, a doll, fantastically attired, as

representing the Jewish High Priest, was not unwilling to have it thought that there was no impropriety in the act; and this infamous procedure Gesenius was guilty of repeatedly. Surpassingly illustrious as he was in the department of lexicography, and deeply and sincerely as we feel our obligations to him, we insist, most emphatically, that his great name and reputation shall not be allowed to give him authority in the decision of questions wherein his inveterate prejudices against the truth of God were plainly in operation, as they were in the case before us, and as all the facts evince.

Some excuse may be pleaded for our English translators, in consideration of the state of Hebrew lexicography two hundred and fifty years ago, though with all the allowance that can be made for them on this ground, the act must be pronounced unjustifiable and unaccountable. Nor can we imagine what can be pleaded in their defense, unless it be the fact that the Bible published by Beck, in 1549, had here rendered the word borrow, (though the Greek version had rendered it, as above stated, by *ask*; and the Latin vulgate by *postulo*, to *require*, or *demand*; and the Geneva Bible, whose renderings they follow, in thousands of instances, by *aske*), and the fact, moreover, that the pernicious dogmas of the Supralapsarian theology flourished in England somewhat extensively at the time when our translation of the Bible was made. Those dogmas taught that morality is founded in the will, rather than in the moral nature of God; and that, if he saw proper to do so, he could reverse all the requirements of the Decalogue, and make those reversions equally obligatory on the human race. To those who entertained such views, it would certainly appear to be a matter of comparative indifference whether the Hebrew terms, in the passages referred to, were rendered by *ask* and *give*, or by *borrow* and *lend*; since, according to those views, God might require His people to practice deception and fraud on one day, and on the next day prohibit their doing so. And this, we have thought, may, after all, be the true solution of the otherwise unaccountable procedure by which the Hebrew term in those passages has been so strangely misapprehended and misapplied in our translation.

LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, June 4, 1864.

ART. III.—*Struggles in Kentucky during Three Years succeeding the First Overthrow of the Secession Conspiracy in 1861.*

A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, Public and Private, in Kentucky; to serve as an Outline of the Struggles of Parties, Loyal and Disloyal, with their Relations to the Fate of the State and the Nation; commencing with the outbreak of the Civil War in that State, in 1861, and extending to the end of the Summer of 1864.

1. In the year 1862, the writer of this article published in this *Review*, in the months of March, June and September, three articles, which, in fact, constituted one historical paper, under the general title, "*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow.*" It was, in effect, a memoir of political events, public and private, in that State, commencing in the year 1859, when the Democratic party became predominant there, as well throughout the nation; and it extended to the breaking out of the civil war in Kentucky, in 1861. The period embraced extended over somewhat more than two years. Nearly three years more have passed since the date at which the political events disclosed in that memoir, stood at the point where it closed. In the mean time, the writer of that memoir, and of this continuation of it, has, on various occasions and in many forms, laid before his countrymen his views of public affairs, and of the duty of this great nation, and of every loyal person in it; as the immense convulsions of which we have been eye-witnesses, have exhibited aspects constantly varying, but always presenting one and the same alternative, the single terrible issue—namely, the utter destruction of our national life, or the utter conquest, by arms, of the insurgent States and people. It is not probable that we should, under ordinary circumstances—the ordinary circumstances even of a most bloody insurrection—have considered it necessary to recall public attention to the comparatively narrow affairs of a single commonwealth, while the fate of so many commonwealths, and of the mighty nation they constitute, was being worked out before us. But the circumstances of Kentucky are every way unusual and remarkable; the bearing of these circumstances, however local they may appear to be, is very nearly decisive on the progress of the war and its issue, as well as upon the future development of national politics; and the ultimate triumph in Kentucky of

the party of treason or the party of loyalty, is apparently obliged to have results intensely national, and of the widest influence. We propose, therefore, to resume the narrative of civil and political events in Kentucky, as connected with the cause of the nation and the rebellion, at the breaking out of the civil war in that State, in the autumn of 1861; and to bring it down over the three succeeding years to the present moment. Our object is that, for the present, all loyal men may understand our danger and their own, our hopes and their own duty, and that posterity may have the means of knowing, if they desire to know, exactly how this extraordinary episode, in the center of the nation and the revolution, was worked out, and with what effect upon the fate of the war, and the destiny of the American people.

2. At the close of the third and last portion of the first memoir, published in this *Review* for September, 1862, one year after the close of the history contained in that paper, we expressly declined to write the military history of the period which had elapsed between the summer of 1861 and the fall of 1862; the military history, we mean, of which Kentucky was the center. It was, nevertheless, a very glorious history; and the battles of Wild Cat and Mill Spring, the storming of Forts Henry and Donaldson, the terrible battles at Shiloh, and the operations before Corinth, were all illustrious for Kentucky, and for the nation; and all had a connection, more or less important and direct, with the facts disclosed in the memoir so often alluded to. It always seemed to us that after those victorious operations the war in Kentucky, and in central Tennessee, was, in effect, and upon every principle of the military art, ended. It always seemed to us, and we so published more than three years ago, that a column of thirty to fifty thousand men pushed into East Tennessee, at that time, or even much earlier, could not have failed to change, immediately and finally, the whole aspect of affairs south and east of that key to seven States. All men know how fearfully the reverse of these just and moderate expectations, has been the course of military affairs in Kentucky, in Tennessee, and in the whole of the vast region which, at the right time, and in the right way, it would have been so easy to overcome and hold, in large part, and from it to menace and overawe every thing, through seven States,

from the flanks of that great and loyal mountain region. Posterity will know who is to be held accountable for so much folly, producing so much danger and misery; as well as who is to be made illustrious for repairing and redressing the infinite errors which crowded months of disasters, after a year of victories. Nevertheless, we will not now, any more than formerly, write the military history of those times, nor introduce military events any further than is necessary to illustrate the subject we have in hand. We do not know the precise number of Kentuckians who have taken up arms during this war. On the Federal side, this State has furnished from sixty to seventy thousand soldiers; on the side of the rebellion, from twenty to thirty thousand; in addition to those on the Federal side, probably twenty thousand black troops; in the whole, from a hundred to a hundred and twenty thousand fighting men; being more, according to the usual estimates, than one-half of her entire fighting men, white and black. And it may be added, that her officers and white soldiers on both sides have not only fully maintained the martial character of their ancestors, but have proved themselves equal, in every warlike quality, to any troops that were ever brought into the field. For our part, while we condemn, without reserve, every act of treason, and every one guilty thereof, we know how to appreciate a hero, and to sympathize with gallant men who are ready to die for their convictions, even when they are wrong. Compared with them, there are men worthy to be abhorred, traitors who shrink from open danger, who resort to secret conspiracies, and deal in perjury; who are spies upon society, excusing robbers and assassins, leading lives of falsehood, and betraying every trust, public and private, which their habitual perfidy can seduce society to repose in them! These are the men, and not rebel soldiers in the field, whom the nation has most reason to dread. They are the sort of men who, by reason of a deplorable course of events, may, at this moment, be thrown into the commanding position of directing the leaders of factions, and so of holding the balance of political power in Kentucky.

3. The general *political* elections in this State, under the constitution of 1849-50, occur every second year, in August; the governor and the senators being elected for four years, and the members of the House of Representatives for two years; one-

half of the senators being elected every second year. Different arrangements exist concerning all *judicial* and *ministerial* offices, of which it is not necessary to speak at present. Governor Magoffin was elected in August, 1859; and the Legislature chosen at the same time, elected, before its two years expired, John C. Breckinridge, then Vice President, to be a Senator in Congress—Governor Powell, whose term of service will expire on the 4th of March, 1865, being already the other Senator from Kentucky. General Breckinridge sat in the called session of the Senate after the 4th of March, 1861, but was expelled by the Senate which met in December, 1861, and Garrett Davis, Esq., was elected to supply his place, by the Legislature which was elected in August, 1861. The term of Beriah Magoffin, Esq., extended from August, 1859, to August, 1863, four years. He did not, however, serve out his entire term of office. The latter part of it—about one year, perhaps—was filled by James F. Robinson, Esq., then and still a Senator from a central district in the Blue Grass region—supposed to be as decidedly pro-slavery, and as doubtful, politically, as any Union district in the State. It is probable that both of these considerations operated upon the mind of Governor Magoffin in causing him to designate Mr. Robinson, as it is said he did, as his successor, and this as a condition *sine qua non* of his own resignation. On the other hand, it is said that the resignation of Governor Magoffin was hardly voluntary, but the alternative to very serious proceedings against him on the part of the Legislature elected in 1861. The process was curious, at any rate. The regular Lieutenant Governor, who had been elected in 1859, and who was, *ex officio*, Speaker of the Senate, had died; and the Senate had elected one of its members to be Speaker, and, *ex officio*, Lieutenant Governor, in case the Governor should vacate his office. The Governor did not vacate—the Speaker resigned—Mr. Robinson was elected Speaker—the Governor resigned—Mr. Robinson became Governor, *ex officio*—the previous Speaker, who had so lately resigned, was thereupon re-elected Speaker. After a time a new Governor was elected by the people—(Col. Thomas E. Bramlette, in August, 1863)—and then Governor Robinson fell back upon his unexpired senatorship for the district of Fayette and Scott counties. Verily, the ways in which laws and

constitutions may be made to serve a turn, and yet thought to be sacredly obeyed; are hardly less singular and unexpected than the outcries against alleged violations of both, which those who suffer find to be used to serve a turn they dislike! Political managers ought to agree, with a common consent, to abolish the inconvenient apothegm, that a good rule will work both ways; or else they ought to be far more particular concerning the rules they work by.

4. Concerning the retirement of Governor Magoffin from office, before the end of his term, it seems to us he must have had abundant reasons for it, of a kind not specially derogatory to him. The general election of 1861 had resulted in making both branches of the Legislature decidedly hostile to his political views, and not very patient concerning his past acts, or concerning the various obstructions he had the power, and might have the inclination, to throw in their way. It was understood his impeachment would not be pressed, and that hardly the constitutional majority of the Senate could be got to convict him, if it was. Moreover, his course in office had been so far from satisfying the leaders of his own party that they had actually supplanted him as governor, by substituting another person as provisional governor of that part of Kentucky over which the Confederate States had extended their jurisdiction, and whose representatives sat—and still sit—in the Confederate Congress, at Richmond, Virginia. The will of the people, is the avowed democratic breath of life. Here Governor Magoffin had the will of the party he belonged to, point blank, that he should not be their governor; and the innuendo of every body else, that it was not fit he should be their governor. He might be pitied for getting into such a predicament, but was hardly worthy of severe censure for desiring to be out of it. As to his mode of escape, it was characteristic of the times, and we never could see that the Senate had any thing to boast of. We do not consider it important to dwell much on the short administration of Governor Robinson. That term in the Senate, not yet expired, and his short service as governor, constitute, we believe, the entire political career of this distinguished lawyer and advocate. His appointment of D. C. Wickliffe, Esq., to be his Secretary of State, is the key to much else; it was unfortunate for both of them, as

subsequent events have proved. And we suppose that the seeds of many things, that have borne bitter fruit already, and that may bring forth still greater evils, were scattered in the air and upon the earth during Governor Robinson's administration. We have been so long accustomed, however, to consider him an able and upright man, that we shall not be surprised if he should yet give a lead, which patriotic men may follow, in the crisis which he, perhaps, might have averted. We have a strong conviction that nothing will ever induce him to co-operate with any party, or to support any man for political or civil office, whose loyalty to the nation he thinks can justly be questioned.

5. Between the general election of 1861 and that of 1863, the tendency of events in Kentucky appeared to be, on the whole, decidedly favorable to the Union cause. At both of those periods, all the members of the lower House of the Legislature, and one-half of the Senators, were elected. At both, all the members of Congress from Kentucky were elected. At the election of 1863 the present Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State (Messrs. Bramlette and Jacob), were chosen for a term of four years. The Senate, renewed as to half its members in 1861, was renewed as to the other half in 1863. The lower House, as well as the Senate, was believed to be almost unanimously loyal. The entire Congressional delegation from Kentucky was believed to be thoroughly loyal; and it is perfectly certain, we suppose, that no man in the State could have been elected to Congress from any district in the State, if his loyalty to the nation had been seriously doubted. The representation in the Senate of the United States had been greatly strengthened, as was supposed, when the Legislature, elected in 1861, chose Garrett Davis, Esq., to be a Senator from Kentucky; and chose him, beyond a doubt, under the conviction that he was most decidedly and reliably loyal; and, to crown all, the popular majority in all these elections for Legislators, Senators, Congressmen, Governor, and all the rest, was large beyond all precedent. Now let us wake up from this dream of unity, safety, triumph, which Kentucky fell into *after* August, 1863; but let us remember that the dream came *after* the glorious and almost unparalleled triumph. The same policy that saved Kentucky, by means of the counter-revolution of 1861, which

our former memoir carefully explained, gave to Kentucky the complete triumph won at the general election of 1863. Between August, 1859, and August, 1861, an immense political and military revolution, favorable to Union and liberty, was wrought. Between August, 1861, and August, 1863, the State had been firmly established and rooted, in loyalty and security; and by popular majorities, several times larger than the whole vote cast for candidates believed to be disloyal, had filled almost every office with men believed to be faithful to the country, and resolved to live and die by it. Where stands the State now—in August, 1864—one short year after its great triumph? Where stand the men now whom the people chose as unalterable patriots one year ago? What voice will Kentucky utter in November coming, concerning her own fate and that of the great Republic of which she still forms a part? Questions more solemn, more significant, than these, may turn out to be, no people was ever asked to decide. It may be that God will settle the immense issues which are at stake, and save the nation, without any regard to the wishes or the vote of Kentucky, or absolutely against both. It may be possible, however, that her votes may decide the issue of the presidential election, and, possibly also, may decide the fate of the nation. We may, indeed, bring both ruin and disgrace upon ourselves. We may, on the other hand, save our country and cover ourselves with glory. Let us, therefore, clearly understand what we have already done, suffered, and acquired—let us know, with as much certainty as is given to mortals, what the future may have in store for us; let us quit ourselves like men, who know there is no safety, except in ways which God approves.

6. There was no general political election in Kentucky in the year 1862, and it might, therefore, seem impossible to decide whether the people of that State shared deeply in the excitement produced by the first Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln, which undoubtedly produced the great political reaction, so wildly manifested against the national administration, in the elections over the nation in the autumn of that year. Our belief is that there was no party, worthy of the name in Kentucky, favorable to that Proclamation, or to the policy on which it rested. And our belief also is, that if

the reaction which that Proclamation produced had been organized in a national and patriotic spirit, it would probably have resulted in the overthrow of Mr. Lincoln's administration. Two facts prevented this, both of which shocked and disgusted the nation. The *first* was, the ferocity with which the insurgents assailed every patriotic attempt to hold open a door for their return to the Union, and raved about their unalterable hatred of the nation, and their purpose and ability to conquer it. The *second* disgusting fact was, the eager attempt of the Democratic party, every-where, to turn the political reaction to partisan instead of national ends; and then the organization of the last and worst phase of Democracy, under this reaction, as a Northern party holding every stupid dogma and every fatal principle of the secessionists. The result was another popular reaction in the opposite direction; the first one against the Proclamation of the President, the second one against the disloyalty of the Democratic factions—the first one manifested in the elections of 1862, the second one in those of 1863. However strongly Kentucky may have sympathized with the reaction against the President's Proclamation of 1862, her general election of 1863 clearly showed that she sympathized still more deeply with the reaction against Democratic perfidy. Better preserve the nation, even at the expense of slavery abolished to save the Union, was the ardent cry that swept the State, than preserve slavery by means of restoring to power a party under whose dominion the nation was torn to pieces, and whose avowed principles would tear it to pieces again as often as it might be restored. Better any thing, than anarchy organized upon the idea and for the purpose of universal plunder. And this is the party which Kentucky is expected, after her glorious conduct in 1861, 1862, and 1863, to follow with shouts of joy and confidence in 1864! It may be possible for Kentucky to aid in the attempt to defeat Mr. Lincoln, by some respectable man whose general principles bear some resemblance to her own; or are, at the least, not utterly abhorrent to her. But it appears to us impossible that any anarchist, any secessionist, any traitor, or even any submissionist, can, by any combination, or any possibility, receive the vote of the men who saved the State, as President of the United States.

7. We do not forget that the party beaten in the decisive

election of 1863, first intimated, then asserted, then loudly proclaimed as a gross and cruel oppression practiced on them, that the State and Federal authorities had combined to prevent a fair election from being held. What ground there may have been for such an allegation—if any—is no doubt matter of proof and record in the archives of Congress, under the most favorable aspect of the case, for those making the allegation. For Colonel McHenry contested the seat of Mr. Yeaman, and pushed the contest to a decision of the House of Representatives, which decision was against Colonel McHenry, and therefore against the truth of the allegation. In central Kentucky, of which we know most, where the contest was expected to be particularly warm, we have no knowledge, nor any well grounded information, of any interference with the freedom of the election, unless the allowance of the right of suffrage to many disloyal persons, whom the law of the land had disqualified, be the interference intended. We suppose there is no doubt that many open and secret enemies, both of the State and Federal Government, voted in that general election, contrary to law; and we suppose that very few *legal* voters were prevented from voting by the authorities, civil or military—hardly one, we suppose, was *intentionally* prevented. The truth is, that the vote actually polled, was so nearly the entire vote of the State, in circumstances to be polled, that there remained nothing to be accounted for. Taking the whole number actually voting for Bramlette and for Wickliffe, the opposing candidates for governor, adding to this aggregate the soldiers in both armies out of their precincts, and the total made a sum so large as to leave a remnant no larger than is constantly liable to occur—not large enough to affect the result—not near as large as the number actually disqualified by law. Perhaps we should explain this disqualification.

8. The Constitution of Kentucky had contained, through all its changes, an express recognition of the right of the citizen to expatriate himself, and its laws had provided for its exercise. At an early stage of the war, the Legislature of the State had made additional provisions, determining the conditions on which disloyal citizens should be held to have exercised this right of expatriation, and to have forfeited all the rights peculiar to citizens of Kentucky. Touching the right of suffrage,

the acts which, forfeiting citizenship, forfeited it, were to be such as these, to-wit: taking up arms against the Government of the United States, or that of the State of Kentucky; holding office under the Confederate Government, or under the Rebel Provisional Government in Kentucky; giving aid and comfort to the Rebels in arms—and the like. The voter who fell under suspicion, might be called on to purge himself under oath, and the judges of election might not only disbelieve his testimony, on cross-examination, but might examine other witnesses, to confirm or contradict that given by the voter himself. This was an ordeal which, if strictly enforced, would disqualify nearly every secession voter in the State; while the case with regard to thousands of them, was too flagrant to admit of any swearing at all, with the pains of perjury in full view. To deter the officers of justice, threats of every kind are always resorted to, on such occasions; while to prevent riots, and to give security to the lawful exercise of their franchise by legal voters, the public force is the natural and necessary resort—ordinarily by means of a civil police, but by military force when the occasion requires it. This is the whole of the affair: the law determines the rule of proceedings; the proper officers execute the law; the public force supports the officers, and maintains public order; they whose illegal attempts are defeated—whose threatened violence is repressed—traduce the law, as well as those who make, who administer, and who enforce it. Of course, no one can say that no injustice, or wrong, is ever practiced in elections; nor will any good citizen deny, that when practiced they should be properly punished. But it is hard to say that any wrong or injustice, connected with the elective franchise, can be more flagrant than for armed traitors, and their abettors, to determine the elections in any community which they have renounced, and are endeavoring to destroy. In Kentucky, this dangerous crime assumes its most aggravated form, for these people have adhered to another General Government, at Richmond, and are represented in both houses of the Rebel Congress; and they have set up a Rebel Government in Kentucky, to which they adhere in secret, and which they are striving, by arms, to establish over the State. It is of the highest importance to the people of Kentucky to realize the exact posture of a matter, upon the practical man-

agement of which so much depends, and which, for years to come, as for several years past, their safety will require them to manage with vigilance and courage, not less than with justice and honor. Every thing that is worth living for in the State, demands that it shall be held firmly in the hands of the Union people of it. They are traitors, or they are madmen, who are willing for any thing else.

9. The intensity with which every disloyal movement in Kentucky has been constantly directed to an opposite result, is signally proved, and the facts we have just stated made manifest by the political acts of the secessionists, in concert with the rebel forces under General Bragg, during the invasion of the State, in the summer and fall of 1862. That was, by far, the most formidable invasion of the State that has occurred during the war. The rebel army, at least sixty thousand strong, entered Kentucky in two columns. The larger one, under the immediate command of Bragg—who was also commander of the whole—entered by the south, and marched across the State, in the direction of Louisville. The smaller one, under the command of General Kirby Smith, entered by the south-east, marched upon Lexington, and menaced Cincinnati. This great army occupied the State, ravaged it for several months, recruited some thousands of men, seized and sent away immense numbers of live stock, and quantities of cured meats and breadstuffs, and remounted great multitudes of soldiers with the best horses. The invasion was every way disgraceful to our arms and calamitous to our cause; and the murderous battle of Perryville, about the center of the State, fought early in October, 1862—achieved by no more than a moderate degree of military skill—might have been prevented some months before. General Buell is no longer in the army; General Nelson is dead; and General Wright, we believe, commands an army corps in the Army of the Potomac. Moreover, we are not writing a military history. Nevertheless, as an eyewitness of the events of which we speak, it is due to truth to say, that, in our opinion, Bragg's command could never have crossed Kentucky, if properly opposed by Buell; that Kirby Smith's command could never have entered Lexington, if properly opposed by the force commanded by Nelson, and then by Wright; that the junction of Bragg's and Kirby Smith's com-

mands would have been impossible, if either of them had been properly opposed; and that Kentucky could have been, and should have been saved from any serious evil from the invasion, and the national cause every-where—but especially there—from the incalculable damage, material and moral, it sustained from Bragg's campaign. Falling under the second of those heads—moral injury—the most palpable fact, perhaps, was the organization of a Rebel Provisional Government, by the joint action of General Bragg and the remnants of the preceding Government of the same sort, which had been previously organized under the military protection of General John C. Breckinridge, at Russellville. The Governor inaugurated there, George W. Johnson, Esq., was killed in the battle of Shiloh. General Bragg having, as he expressed it, "*come to stay, and brought his knitting with him*;" having, as he supposed, subdued the State; having convened his "chief captains," with his distinguished local friends and abettors; having arranged all things for a great demonstration; inaugurated the Rebel Government for the State, with *Richard Hawes, Esq.*, as Chief Magistrate, at Frankfort, the seat of Government. This is the Governor and the State Government still adhered to by the secessionists of Kentucky: these are they whom the Confederate authorities recognize, and for whom the rebel soldiers from the State fight. What was the extent of the permanent damage which Mr. Hawes and his fellow-traitors—aided by General Bragg and his troops—did to the Union cause in the State, and what permanent advantage they gave to the rebel cause there, we need make no attempt to estimate with exactness. All the evil that was possible, was done by all of them. Governor Hawes has published that he could have done much more than he did, if the General had been fit for his place—and that he really did a great deal. General Bragg has published very disparaging comments on the Kentucky secessionists, with special innuendoes against the Governor. Our impression is, they both have truth on their side. And this is all the worse for those, both civil and military, in whose hands the safety of the State lay at that period.

10. It was under a state of public opinion, formed amidst incessant commotions, agitations and raids, and marked by occasional events of very decisive character, that the two years

during which the Legislature elected in 1861 held power, began to draw toward their end, and special preparations began to be made for the general election of August, 1863. It was within this period, and chiefly in the early part of it, that Kentucky poured out so great a proportion of her fighting men, to uphold the national cause. All men understand that far the greater part of these heroic men will return no more to the land they loved so well. Let them also know, that the land they have soaked with their blood, and the country with whose dust their dust mingles, will never, with the consent of a single loyal Kentuckian, be given up to traitors. During this period, also, the course of public affairs, and the action of Congress with regard to them, gradually developed a difference of opinion, and a still greater difference of feeling, in the bosom of every political party, with a strong tendency, first in the Democratic party, then in the Conservative party, then in the Radical party, to use events for party, instead of national objects; a tendency which, as its fatal result, now seeks to combine every faction against the great loyal mass of the people. In this procedure, the public men of Kentucky, its newspaper press, its representatives in the Legislature, and in Congress, and, to a certain extent, society at large, gave symptoms of being unsettled in their principles, and less and less cordial in the support of the National Government. It is impossible to conjecture what course public affairs would have taken, if they had run freely on; or how large a portion of those formerly acting with the Union party, who divided and deserted it in the spring of 1864, would have forsaken it, a year or more earlier. The dispersion of the Democratic Convention, which met at Frankfort to organize the party for the election of 1863, put a sudden stop to machinations, the object of which could no longer be concealed, and could not be endured. Colonel Gilbert, acting in the name of the United States, and backed by adequate military force, walked into the convention—about the 18th of February, 1863—and very civilly, but decidedly, required the body to disperse. Enough was known to the authorities to make this proceeding a duty on their part; and the leading men of the convention understood their own position too well to believe that it was either their interest or their duty, to push an investigation into their affairs. Charles A. Wickliffe, Esq.,

who entered Congress as a decided Union man, but had nearly or wholly lost that character, became the candidate of this party for Governor, and was beaten in August, 1863, by a majority more than double as large, as well as we remember, as the vote he got. Neither the policy of the President, the sufferings of the State, the defection of the press, nor the example set the people by their old leaders, had shaken the steadfast loyalty of the great patriotic mass. It is well to remember this. It is well, also, to remember that the principles which sustain the course taken by Colonel Gilbert, justify a similar proceeding in every equally grave emergency, of the like threatening import. General McClellan had, before that, caused the disloyal Legislature of Maryland to be purged, till little but a loyal quorum remained. Colonel Gilbert dispersed a disloyal Convention, as one means of preserving public security in Kentucky. In the prosecution of this war, it is no less indispensable for the nation to hold Kentucky, than to hold Maryland. Whatever may be tolerated elsewhere, a local administration hostile to the National Administration in its endeavors to crush the rebellion, can not be allowed, either in Kentucky or Maryland, while the rebellion continues. Lieutenant Governor Jacob, of Kentucky, who is said to have emphatically explained how easy it would be for outraged Kentuckians to defeat Sherman's operations, by cutting his communications, expressed an unanswerable reason why the General Government dare not disregard possibilities of that sort.

11. Governor Bramlette, the present chief magistrate of the State, was not the first choice of the nominating convention of 1863 for that high office. That convention nominated Joshua F. Bell, Esq., after vigorous competition between his friends and those of several other distinguished Kentuckians, among whom was Colonel Bramlette. Mr. Bell had been the candidate for the same office against Beriah Magoffin, Esq., in 1859, and had been defeated, after a very vigorous canvass. The political principles upon which he conducted that canvass were, to a certain extent, in conflict with those of many, if not most, of the party which supported him; and the result was, in the first place, that he obliged Mr. Magoffin to profess, apparently with much hesitation, these peculiar principles; and, in the second place, that Mr. Bell was defeated. These principles were supposed to

tend very strongly toward those of the extreme Southern party, in much that related to slavery, the territories, and the powers and duties of the Federal Government, on those and kindred subjects. It is the more necessary to enter a little into this matter, as it became the occasion, after Mr. Bell's nomination for governor the second time, in 1863, of the secession of the leading Democratic paper of the State, and its chief editor, Mr. Harney, from the Union party. This movement of Mr. Harney, who refused to support Mr. Bell's nomination in 1863, because of the principles he had avowed in 1859, was one of the first public steps toward the formation of that party which, in 1864, rejoices in the name sometimes of "*Union Democratic*," and sometimes of "*Union Conservative*," and sometimes of both united. The *Journal*, for so long a period the leading Whig paper of the State, and its chief editor, Mr. Prentice, now so prominent in that Conservative party, attacked Mr. Harney and the *Democrat* warmly for their course in 1863, and still warmly sustained the course of the party Mr. Harney had abandoned. Within a very few days from the present writing, the Chicago convention will make its nomination for President; it is, therefore, needless to conjecture now what either of these distinguished gentlemen may do afterward. But there was another aspect of the political principles of Mr. Bell, before the nominating Union convention of 1863, much later than that presented in 1859, and, in our opinion, much more favorable. We allude to his distinguished support of the Union cause at its most critical periods—from the secession of the first State, and before, up to, and after the convention which nominated him for Governor in 1863. We were among those who took no part whatever in that nomination. But we were also among those who, after it was made, thought it was the duty of Mr. Bell, under the circumstances, to accept it, and we ventured to urge him to do so; and we now regret that he did not do so. We ought, perhaps, to state that a very common opinion among Union men at the time was, that Mr. Harney's grief over the principles of Mr. Bell of 1859, was much quickened by the failure of the convention to give him the nomination it gave Mr. Bell, and by the clear perception of the *Democrat* of the drift of its old party, which had so strongly set in another direction (as has been before explained), after the President's first Emancipation Proc-

lation, in the autumn of 1862. It ought also to be stated, that this nominating convention, on which so much depended, was generally considered at the time most decided in its composition; far in advance—of the notions of *neutrality*, and the notions of *conservatism* which followed them—and yet far short of the notions of *ultra radicalism* which have been so often charged; a simple, patriotic, resolute *Union* body, as near as possible as to the mass of its members, like the mass of those of the convention of May 25, 1864, which made the grand platform of a single sentence. Colonel Bramlette became the nominee of this convention, and so of the *true Union party* of Kentucky, by reason of the refusal of Mr. Bell to accept the nomination, and by being designated as the candidate in his place, by a standing committee of the convention, in whom this power had been vested. The propriety of this nomination was so far obvious, as that there appeared to be no doubt that the convention itself would have nominated Colonel Bramlette if there had been supposed to be the least uncertainty about Mr. Bell's acceptance. As far as Colonel Bramlette was known personally, or by report, to the Union men of the State, the general impression, we suppose, was, that his nomination was one eminently fit to be made. He had been a successful lawyer, a highly respectable judge, a gallant soldier; his training, therefore, seemed just what was needed, for the place, in the times. His devotion to the Union cause had been made manifest in every way that patriotic men could desire. Besides this, his personal character as a professor of religion and a strong temperance man—both of which he was reputed to be—gave additional security for his future public life, and certainly conciliated many, even if it may possibly have injured him with a few. We were among those who considered his nomination highly fortunate for the great cause we loved so well. So far from concealing this state of mind from him, or others, we frankly proffered to him any aid proper for us to render; and on every proper occasion and way, give him the benefit of whatever influence we possessed, to a degree wholly unusual with us for very many years past. The canvass he made, taken on the whole, was in the clear, if not in the extreme sense, of the unqualified Union sentiment of that day; and the result was the defeat of his opponent (Charles A. Wickliffe, Esq.), by a

vote of the people, more decisive by far than any one had expected. It is true, that when we recur to the incidents of that canvass, in the light of what has happened since, we are obliged to confess that painful indications can be seen of those points of Governor Bramlette's character which have subsequently given so much anxiety to the Union men of Kentucky, and which may yet beget so much trouble both to himself and to the State. At first, a generous people shut their eyes to what they hoped were transient weaknesses. Subsequently, a wise and considerate people, trustful in themselves, and therefore habitually slow to adopt unusual or extreme measures, have merely looked on, with resolute self-possession, and growing want of confidence in the Governor, as his successive acts are more and more inconsistent with what they expected of him, and with the safety of the State. One year of the four years' term of office of the Governor is not yet quite expired, and we believe we hazard nothing in saying that the great majority of those who put him in his high office, have materially changed their opinion of him within that year. What the three remaining years will bring forth, will depend materially on the Governor himself. His nomination for the Vice Presidency by the "*Democratic-Conservative-Union*," etc., etc., party of Kentucky, may *possibly* be ratified at Chicago, and by a great conspiracy and revolution throughout the North, he may *possibly* be declared elected; and as the presiding officer of a fragment of the Senate of the United States, he may *possibly* witness the last convulsions of the party of whose desperate schemes he had made himself the victim. This seems to us not a very seductive prospect. Most men, perhaps, being elected Governor of Kentucky by the loyal men of the State, and being loyal themselves, would have stuck by their loyalty, their friends, and their governorship, in the face of greater temptations than these.

12. The Legislature of the State elected in August, 1863, holding office for two years, had to elect a member of the Senate of the United States, to succeed Mr. Powell, whose term would expire on the 4th of March, 1865. It was, perhaps, natural that the persons having this important duty to perform, would be much occupied with it, and would desire, on many accounts, to discharge it promptly. It was also natural, that leading candidates for the high office, who supposed their

success was pretty certain, and their warm supporters, sanguine as themselves, should desire the early consummation of their wishes. There was also an important legal reason for haste; for by the Constitution of the State—made, like so many others of recent date, under the fervor of Modern Democratic rule—there were serious difficulties in the way of the Legislature sitting more than once in two years, or more than sixty days in all. It has always seemed to us a strange freak, that a great party, professing to hold extreme popular principles of government, should strenuously endeavor, whenever it held power, to reduce constitutional government as nearly as possible to imbecility; and that this rage against the force of free governments should be fiercest of all against the legislative department, through which the popular desires are most clearly expressed, and the most sure to be effectual. The principle on which all these recent Democratic constitutions seem to have been constructed, appears to be, that government, in itself, is an unnatural evil, and representative government a failure; and the only substitute for anarchy they seem to conceive of, is incessant elections by the people, which shall be, as nearly as possible, without any other result than to reward and distinguish party politicians. But the Legislature of 1863-4, after repeated trials, failed to elect a Senator. As the vigorous canvass among its members went on, it became more and more apparent that no man in Kentucky could at that time command the majority of the two houses voting separately, or even the majority of the two acting together; conditions widely differing from each other. And we presume, whatever changes the future may bring forth, that the revelations and events which speedily followed the adjournment of the Legislature, satisfied the majority of its members that nothing had been lost by their failure to elect. James Guthrie had been a candidate when Garrett Davis was elected Senator, and was beaten in the caucus of Union men—very decided Union men, as was supposed—by a very close vote. He had also been a candidate for the same office, not long before, when John C. Breckinridge—whom Mr. Davis succeeded—beat him before a caucus composed of any thing rather than friends of the Union. What, precisely, were Mr. Guthrie's particular views on the occasion of this third candidacy and failure, in so short a period of time, we could

not state without being contradicted on one side or the other. The *Louisville Journal*, about that time, seemed to consider it nearly felonious to doubt that Mr. Guthrie had been, not only a steadfast, but the confidential friend of President Lincoln; a plea which, we venture to suppose, is no longer urged. At the beginning of the canvass in the Legislature, Joshua F. Bell was, probably, the most conspicuous candidate—success being the criterion—next to Mr. Guthrie. Besides all other differences between the two, Mr. Bell had been a Whig, and Mr. Guthrie a Democrat, in former times. But we have already said enough of Mr. Bell on a previous page. He also failed in this election. The candidate who was supposed to be the choice of what was called the extreme Union men of the Legislature, was Curtis F. Burnam. But before his name was brought forward, the greater part of the members had probably committed themselves; so that, in the actual circumstances, the apparent strength he had could hardly be greater than the number of those who were not willing to see either Mr. Guthrie or Mr. Bell elected. He also failed. In this lock of parties, the name of Governor Bramlette, who up to this time was counted with the most reliable Union men of the State, was brought forward; and being supported by those who had voted for Mr. Burnam, and the greater part of those who had voted for Mr. Bell, and perhaps some others, he received at once more votes than either of those gentlemen had done, and appeared to have a fair prospect of being elected. But he also failed. And now the majority of both houses made it manifest that they did not desire his election, by postponing the election itself, to a distant adjourned meeting of the Legislature. The constitutional obstacles were overcome, and this Senatorial election—become doubly important by reason of the extraordinary course of Mr. Davis in the Senate of the United States—will come again before this same Legislature, at a future session of it. This singular contest and result, was very far from being capable of explanation on merely personal grounds. Elements of discord had come into the Union party, with every augmentation of its strength, and every decided act of the Federal Administration, and every signal event of the war. As long as the party would agree to act together upon the one grand and paramount idea and purpose, *that the national life must be*

preserved, cost what it would, the party went on from strength to strength, rapidly growing up from a handful of *coercionists*, as they were disdainfully called in 1860, to the overwhelming body which, in 1863, triumphed by a majority of 50,000 voters, after sending more than 50,000 patriotic soldiers into the Federal armies. But now incidental questions of various kinds, and, perhaps, above all others, questions connected with slavery, and the black race, had begun to assume, at first, a grave prominence, and then they came to be considered by many equally vital with the great national issue itself; and very shortly after the Legislature adjourned, they were used to tear in pieces the great party whose services had been so distinguished, and whose destiny might have been so glorious. The seeds of this terrible calamity had been working indistinctly, but powerfully, in the Legislature; and as this affords, perhaps, the best explanation of the senatorial canvass we have explained, and of its result, the brief account we have given affords an insight of the condition and drift of public affairs in Kentucky during the winter of 1863-4. If any thing is wanting to make the course of events more intelligible in its nature and end, it is found in the subsequent and widely different careers of Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Bell, Mr. Burnam, and Governor Bramlette, whose names have thus connected themselves with principles and tendencies, whose importance it would be well for all men to realize.

13. It is God alone whose word—whose mere will—is omnific. Laws do not execute themselves; they are only the mode in which forces act. Principles may be imperishable; but an active agent must give efficacy to them. Tendencies may be perfectly determinate; but to be realized in effects, they must be brought to the birth by another efficiency than their own. We have, therefore, but imperfectly explained the dangerous condition of public affairs in Kentucky, in the early part of 1864, when we have indicated the existence of certain perilous elements widely diffused through the body of the Union party, and especially among the eminent men whom that party had been accustomed to heed and to honor. Men were not wanting, qualified and anxious, to organize parties, or society itself, in whatever new form might promise them distinction, or their opinions triumph; for such times as we were passing through are always fruitful of such men, and such attempts. Occasions

were not wanting—rather they were constant—on which the weak, the timid, the self-seeking, the ignorant—even though we should seek such only among those who were, in a certain sense, well disposed to the Government—might be habitually assailed in their tender points, and led away by degrees from the staunch loyalty they once professed. The mode of procedure is always the same—professed devotion to the cause—but opposition, first, to every doubtful, then to every effectual means of carrying it on: violent support of the war for national existence, for example, but decided opposition to all confiscation of rebel property, all arrests of rebel persons, all suspension of privileged writs, all proclamations of martial law, and above all, every interference with the institution of slavery. Now let us observe, once for all, that this sort of advocacy of any cause whatever, may possibly be sincere at first—which generally it is not—but that, whether sincere or fraudulent, the result is, from the nature of things, obliged to be the same. We can not sustain a cause, and at the same time oppose the only power that can make the cause triumph, and the only means that power uses to secure that triumph. If the means thus used are such that we are obliged to resist them, by the very force of the statement we are obliged to end in opposing the cause itself. The peace Democrat was once loyal, if he was not always a hypocrite; but he preferred the triumph of his party to the safety of his country; and as soon as he thought he saw that the two things were incompatible, he turned against his country. The pro-slavery Union man was once loyal, but as soon as he thought he saw that the perpetuity of slavery and the restoration of the Union were incompatible, he had no alternative but to give up one or the other. Many gave up the slave; many gave up the Union. It is possible many still linger in an agony of doubt, seeking for some solution in a possible change of the settled purpose of the American people; and, therefore, in such a change of the National Administration as may produce the miracle of saving both. This is a type of human inconsequence, among the most singular and transient of all; for the rebels themselves continually declare, that slavery is nothing to them, without independence. Moreover, the result we have pointed out, is so clearly the only one that is compatible with common morality, any more than with com-

mon sense, that no one of ordinary intelligence and good morals can long persist in evading it. It is, therefore, the merest folly to suppose that so long as a great and good end is clearly set before us, and steadily kept in view by those we sustain—as, for example, the government which God has ordained, and we and it striving to crush fatal treason—we are, all the while, responsible for the motives of every one who co-operates with us, or bound to approve as wise, or applaud as right, or understand or know all the measures adopted by our Government in its arduous work. When we consider these things, and understand the course of events in Kentucky during the year succeeding the great loyal triumph in August, 1863, our astonishment at the immense change exhibited in the conduct and sentiments of so many professed Union men may greatly abate.

14. This great relapse was skillfully and vigorously organized, in the spring of 1864. The *Louisville Journal*, followed by nearly every political paper in the State, had diligently prepared the public mind. Suddenly, and almost simultaneously, three distinct, and apparently concerted movements, were made manifest. All three of them were directed immediately against the President and his Administration, his principles, and his policy, but were necessarily subversive of the supremacy of the Union party in Kentucky, just in proportion to their success, and by their unavoidable tendency, were calculated, perhaps intended, to prevent Kentucky from remaining in the Union, unless the American people would agree to a change of the National Administration, and to the perpetuation of slavery wherever it had existed. As to that part of the demands of these counter-revolutionists, which was leveled at Mr. Lincoln, it was the mere *caput mortuum*—the dross and dregs—of the personal spite of the original secessionists, who broke up the Union, as they declared, to hinder this man from ruling over them. As to the balance of the plot, it provided for Kentucky the greatest calamities which it was possible she could bring upon herself. *First*, it would divide, hopelessly, the Union party of the State; *secondly*, it would throw the State into the power of those hostile to the Government; *thirdly*, it would secure, in both houses of Congress, the permanent opposition of the State to the triumph of the national cause; *fourthly*, it would make Kentucky herself one of the bloodiest theaters of

the war; *fifthly*, it would secure the adhesion of Kentucky to the Southern Confederacy, in the contingency of the ultimate success of the rebellion—which success this entire conspiracy and counter-revolution would promote, just so far as its own success could be assured. We do not mean to say that the mass of the Union men of the State, who have adhered, or may adhere, to this so-called National, Union, Democratic, Conservative, etc., etc., party, joined it, or adhere to it, with a fair understanding and approval of these things. We suppose, on the other hand, that to a large extent they have been utterly deceived—have been misled by false appearances and cruel deceits—have been seduced by their personal devotion to certain presidential aspirants and their personal repugnance to Mr. Lincoln—have been betrayed by their passions—and, above all, have been outraged by what they conceive to be great and unjustifiable injuries, and gross indignities, perpetrated against them by the present Federal Administration, most especially, in the matter of their slaves. And candor obliges us to admit, that situated as they have been, they have been sorely tempted in many of these respects. One of the most remarkable features of the whole case, is to be found in the immense proportion of the active politicians of the State, and especially of those holding office, both under the State and the Federal Government, who openly united in this fatal movement, or have connived at it. Concerning many of these, we are, by no means, able to say what we have said of the mass of the Union portion of the new party. The frightful conspiracy which was so near destroying Kentucky in 1861, and which we fully exposed in our former memoir; the countless petty conspiracies, which have been attempted since; but, most especially, the wide-spread conspiracy in Missouri, in the States north of the Ohio river, and in the Eastern States, recently exposed, and one of whose principal branches ran into Kentucky, all confirm the assurance—as, indeed, every thing yet developed does—that the founders of this new party are knowingly guilty of every calamity which their plots may bring upon us. The views taken of these events by enlightened and patriotic supporters of the national cause in Kentucky, and their sense of their own duty with regard to them, and to every complication in which they may result, are all clear and decided. They will resist, to the last extremity,

every attempt to produce a conflict between Kentucky and the General Government; they will stand by the nation, while there is any nation to stand by; they will never, under any circumstances, agree to a division of the United States. The only catastrophe from which they shrink, as from a horrible calamity which offers no refuge but the grave, is the possibility—if there is any such possibility—that the nation may betray them! When that shall happen, the people of the United States become the most infamous of mankind—forsaken of God—the reproach of all coming ages. That it is the intention of the parties to the Chicago Convention, to produce this very result, by a national revolution, political or military, or both, will soon be apparent.

15. The three movements we have just explained generally, require a more particular notice. They may be classified, as consisting, *first*, of concerted attempts to stigmatize the President as a "*Tyrant and a Usurper*," at a critical moment, with reference to other parts of the general plan, making him and his supporters odious, and preparing the minds of men, and especially of the Kentucky troops, for any desperate attempt that the turn of affairs should require. These specific and technical accusations, mixed with unmeasured and ferocious abuse and threats, have their particular import fully explained, as soon as we look into the significance of the same terms, used at the same time, in the secret proceedings of the armed traitors banded every-where against the national cause, whose records and testimonies have been recently published. They mean, that the secession of the rebel States was lawful, and that it dissolved the Government, and that the assumption of Mr. Lincoln that he is President, constitutes him, *ipso facto*, a tyrant and a usurper—and it has become the duty of the *Sons of Liberty* to dislodge him by force. They mean, that even if he had been legally the President, his acts were the acts of a tyrant and a usurper, whereby having put himself out of the pale of law, he might be lawfully resisted by force, and ought to be deposed and hung by the conspirators. We do not know that Colonel Woolford was aware of the full import of the violent and seditious harangues he made in so many places, and for which he was first dismissed from the army, and at last arrested. Nor do we know that Lieutenant Governor Jacob had any worse

reason for his sudden change from the principles for which he had fought, to those he had fought against—than the violence of his passions, and the instability of his character. But every enlightened man knows there is no other country in the world, in which either of them could have made a single speech, like many they both made, without immediate and condign punishment. Nor could any man of the position of either of them, make such speeches any-where, without intending to accomplish some object, corresponding in violence with the character of their statements; nor without having some motive equivalent, in their own opinion, to the danger they professed to brave. Let it be remembered that the arrest of Colonel Woolford—upon sworn statements of those who heard him—extorted from Governor Bramlette a menace to the General Government, and to its friends—of arrests in retaliation; and that this menace was contained in a letter addressed to Lieutenant Governor Jacob; and no further proof is needed—though other proof exists—of the sympathy of the Chief Magistrate of the Commonwealth with proceedings which, every body saw, must be arrested, or must spread demoralization through the Kentucky troops—and which multitudes believed, at the time, and still more since, were designed to prepare the minds of those troops, for a collision with the Federal Government. Why any such collision could have been contemplated as possible; why it, or any thing looking in that direction, could have been contemplated with complacency, may be better understood, and credited, as we proceed. All that we are now proposing is, to illustrate the military aspect of that counter-revolution of 1864 in Kentucky, which was designed to transfer the Union party, and the State, to some new candidate for the presidency, and to make the salvation of the Union, and the continued adhesion of Kentucky to it, depend upon a change of the Federal Administration, and the security and perpetuity of slavery. After much delay, and after great, possibly irreparable damage had been done, the military authorities, having exhausted all gentler means, interposed directly. Certain military changes followed: Colonel Woolford was sent to Washington, and came back on parole; Mr. Jacob quieted; harangues of the "Tyrant and Usurper" type, we believe, ceased; Governor Bramlette published his menace; the soldiers are still fighting for their

country. The opportunity of making the military part of the counter-revolution as effective as, possibly, it might have been, was lost—partly, as we have seen, by the interposition of General Burbridge—partly, as we shall see, by the failure of another portion of the enterprise. The startling fact, however, remains, that a revolutionary movement looking for success to the demoralization of a part of the army of the United States, was on foot; and that it found, in the public mind, the seeds of those evils, explained in a previous paragraph, which both suggested the possibility of success, and produced the sympathy awakened by the movement.

16. The *second* movement, in logical order, was to be directed by Governor Bramlette in person, and officially. It was to consist in bringing the authority of the State of Kentucky directly in opposition to that of the Federal Government; the initiative to be taken by the Governor, in a proclamation. The collision of authorities was to grow out of the question of enrolling slaves, preparatory to military draft; the United States Provost Marshals attempting to enroll them, by act of Congress, and the orders of their military superiors; the Governor resolved to prevent their being enrolled and drafted, contrary, as he believed, to the laws of Kentucky. It is clear enough that the question of slavery was the bottom question. It is also clear enough, that if there was any conflict between the laws of Kentucky and those of the United States—the latter, by the very words of the Federal Constitution, were supreme and paramount. The only pretext for doubt, would be the constitutionality of the act of Congress; but, upon this subject, Governor Bramlette had openly and repeatedly committed himself, that Congress had constitutional power to take slaves for the public service, whether as soldiers, or any thing else; and in this opinion, the almost unanimous voice of the legal profession throughout the nation, and of all others competent to judge, fully sustained him. What motive, creditable both to his patriotism and his intelligence, can be imagined for *any one* in his position, pursuing such a course? Still less, how could any one, holding his political principles, and bound by his political obligations and pledges, think of such a thing? Least of all, when he knew personally exactly what Colonel Woolford was at, and had heard him make at least one of his violent

speeches (at Lexington), while he was himself in the very act of maturing and arranging his own opposition to the national authorities? Governor Bramlette had as determinately made up his mind as Colonel Woolford had made up his mind; and he pursued his part of the counter-revolution, up to the decisive moment, with great vigor. He had menaced the President in written correspondence; he had made known his intentions publicly and privately, without reserve; he had used the telegraph to operate on the public mind; he had notified at least one United States Provost Marshal (Captain Goodloe, of Danville), *that if the President did not stop the draft, he would*; he had even prepared his proclamation, sent it to the press, and had it printed! Still—we thank God—he did not issue it; it did not see the light at that time, and in that way. How this happened, we will state presently. If he had issued it, we should have seen immediately what had been the success of the military part of the counter-revolution; and whether Kentucky was then ready to take up arms against the Federal Government; and if she was, what good she would get by it. Governor Bramlette has, we believe, uniformly declared, that the only collision between Kentucky and the United States ever contemplated by him, was of a kind purely civil; and it takes away nothing from any thing we are now stating, to admit the truth of such allegations. For it would still be an obstruction to the Federal Government, that he was attempting; an obstruction that, if successful, would have cost the nation twenty or thirty thousand soldiers; an obstruction, whose very attempt showed how thoroughly a Governor recently elected as wholly loyal, had become perverted, and how strongly the Union slaveholders of the State were tending in the same direction. We must add, however, that the Governor strangely deceived himself, if he really supposed the course on which he entered, tended to any thing so directly as to immediate bloodshed; and every one else is deceived, in all that seemed clear at the time, including the contents of the proclamation itself, and the tone of the Governor's conduct from that time onward, if he really believed the course he had marked out could succeed by peaceful means. It is altogether idle and unbecoming in Governor Bramlette to allege, as he does, that any one has sought to provoke him to inconsiderate and hasty action, or that any one has desired that

an excuse might be furnished "for seizing military possession of the State, and crushing the civil authorities." Heaven knows many of his actions have afforded abundant reason for regret and surprise to all loyal men. But we ourselves were privy to at least one wise act he performed, under the inspiration of men, all of whom, we suppose, are now condemned by him, and, in turn, condemn his present conduct, and most of whom put themselves to much trouble, to keep him out of trouble. We allude to the suppression of his revolutionary proclamation of March 14th, 1864, and his issuing in the place of it, and, we believe, of the same date, a wise and patriotic proclamation, which, for the moment, secured obedience to those laws which the suppressed one denounced. The public in Kentucky knows very well, that the special supporters of the counter-revolutionary movement, to which the Governor was lending himself, first smothered up this business, and then openly lied about it, vouching the Governor himself, as the *Louisville Journal* did, without authority, we would trust. There never was, they declared with vehemence and constancy, but a single proclamation—the patriotic one issued. In the end, the tendency of the Governor, momentarily arrested, as we have stated, returned to the channel of the suppressed and denied proclamation, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Van Winkle, put an end to all denials, by procuring a copy of it, and publishing it along with a note from himself. Whoever will read Governor Bramlette's Inaugural, or any good report of any speech he made during his canvass; and then read his suppressed proclamation, his letter to Mr. Jacob, or his letter to Mr. Guthrie, declining to be a candidate before the Chicago Convention, but adhering to it, will easily see how great a revolution has been wrought in him, within about a year; and then they may readily understand the nature of the counter-revolution which has been fostered amongst the leading men of the Union party in Kentucky. It also becomes obvious how that part of the movement, directed immediately by the Governor, against the act of Congress for the enrollment of the black military population, broke down by the issuing his proclamation recommending obedience, instead of his proclamation recommending resistance. It is, of course, manifest how the break-down of the collision with the General Government, rendered the military part of the enter-

prise useless. The dismissal of Colonel Woolford from the army, and his arrest afterward for conduct subsequent thereto, followed the break-down of the collision about the draft. Those who understood pretty nearly the exact posture and progress of events, breathed more freely. They clung, indeed, to the hope that Governor Bramlette would redeem himself. They even desired, before the arrest of Colonel Woolford, that he might be restored to the army. At any rate, they saw that *two* of the counter-revolutionary movements had been encountered with success. We will now proceed to explain the *third* one. Before we do so, however, it is proper to make a slight personal statement, relating particularly to the contents of this paragraph. It is, in effect, that here, as in all similar cases, the writer of these lines has avoided, as far as possible, all statements about himself; and in doing so, in this instance, has omitted much that is confirmatory of what is herein stated. This silence, and this forbearance, however, may be grievously misunderstood by those who trespass on them.

17. The *third* counter-revolutionary attempt of 1864, upon the loyalty and safety of the people of Kentucky, was an organized movement in the bosom of the Union party to transfer it into co-operative, if not organic, union with every faction hostile to the Federal Administration; more especially with the so-called Conservatives of the North, and the so-called National Democracy. The general convention of this disloyal Democracy was called to meet at Chicago on the 4th of July, 1864, and was afterward postponed, under pressure of the turbulent agitators who controlled the numerous factions about to affiliate with it, till the 29th of August. This *third* movement was, in all probability, the main one of the three—the other two being chiefly relied on as aids to its accomplishment—or if it failed, then to bring about, by the disorder and violence they would produce, a state of universal confusion, almost equally fatal to the national cause. *First*, to turn over the State to a position immediately opposed to the Federal Government in its attempts to suppress the rebellion, and finally to throw the State into the Southern Confederacy, if Mr. Lincoln could not be defeated, and slavery restored. *Secondly*, to divide the Union party on the subject of slavery, and all other subjects by which mischief might be produced, so effectually as to throw that

party out of power, and paralyze its efforts to aid the national cause. *Thirdly*, to produce, by a collision with the General Government about slavery, a scene of confusion and violence every way hurtful to the national cause, and beneficial to the insurgents; in the midst of which the new party might hold the balance of power, and take advantage of events. These were the alternatives involved in the scheme of the three combined movements. *Two* of the attempts failed—the military movement and the collision—as we have shown. The *third* attempt—the transfer of the State—may prove successful; that is to be decided in future elections. The manner in which the *first* and *second* attempts were defeated, has been pointed out. The manner in which the *third* attempt was organized, together with the progress of the movement, and its present condition, may be sufficiently understood from the following statement: In the spring of 1864, there existed in Kentucky a committee of supposed Union men, who had been appointed by a previous State convention of that party, and who were known by the name of *The State Union Executive Committee*, or some similar designation. This committee, composed originally, as was generally supposed, of reliable Union men, participated largely of the same evil influences of which we have several times spoken, and the larger part of them were found to sympathize warmly with the movements publicly led by Colonel Woolford and Governor Bramlette, which have been explained. The only general election to be held in Kentucky in 1864, is that for electors for President and Vice President of the United States, appointed for November. With a view to the nomination of these electors, to the appointment of delegates to the national nominating convention, and to the usual declaration of principles and proper organization, it was necessary to call a State convention of Union men. There had been some doubt on this subject, for already the public mind had been deeply shaken, and the names of many persons, of many shades of opinion, had been canvassed every where as candidates for the Presidency on the Union side—some Union men simply, some Radicals, some Conservatives, some Abolitionists, some Democrats, some Whigs. In 1860, Mr. Lincoln had no party in Kentucky; but it had gradually come to be felt by the mass of the earnest Union men of the State,

that he was the best man for the place; and men like these, all over the nation, felt the same way, and nominated him in June, at Baltimore, without a struggle, and without opposition in their national convention. In our opinion, the safety of the nation demands that they should elect him; and if they fail to do so, it will be a grievous fault, which they will grievously atone. That portion of the Union men of Kentucky who were in doubt upon this subject, desired that no State convention should be called, but rather to await all nominations, taking no part in any, but finally voting for the best one offered. That portion of them who were satisfied that their duty demanded a more decided course, and who were favorable to the nomination of Mr. Lincoln, and utterly opposed to the backsliding movement; and its counter-revolution, demanded the call of a Union State Convention in order, among other things, to send delegates to the National Union Nominating Convention, however and whenever constituted. That portion of them whom events had made hostile to Mr. Lincoln, or whose passions were roused about the slave, or who were relapsed, or backslidden, or counter-revolutionists, made no particular objection to a State convention, for, as yet, they were generally in a state of ferment, rather than of organization and settled purpose. It was in this state of the public mind, that a few persons living about Louisville, and constituting a majority, we believe, of the old State Executive Committee, issued a call for a *State Union Convention*, to meet in Louisville on the 25th of May. The names of James Guthrie and George D. Prentice, followed by two or three others of less note, were attached to this call; two or three other members of the committee, who remained faithful to the Union cause, refused to sign it at all. The call contained in its terms a betrayal of the loyal party in the State, which its signers professed to represent. It settled, in its terms, that the convention it called was in aid of those who had turned their backs on the Government—and Chicago, and not Baltimore—the disloyal Democratic opposition, and not the loyal Unionists, had won the open adhesion of these, as well as all the other leaders of the counter-revolutionary party. An abuse of power more utterly faithless, more atrocious in its conception and objects, can hardly be produced from the history of party politics—which

is, probably, the most ignominious part of the history of free nations. And the necessary, and probably intended, effects of the movement are to be considered so many warrants for the execration of the betrayed party, and that of every honorable party that does not desire to be betrayed in turn. Of course, the effect of this proceeding was to rouse the indignation and contempt of the true Union people. These people, left without leaders, without organization, without support from the newspaper press—betrayed on every side—rallied spontaneously and at once. A cry, mostly from those without political influence—a cry at once temperate and heroic—resounded through the State, and the true men, who had all along upheld the cause from mere love of it, re-echoed it from the bottom of their hearts. On the 25th of May, on the very day and in the very place where the other convention met (we call it *Copperhead* in Kentucky, meaning a relapsed Unionist, with double venom against the national cause, and supreme devotion to negro slavery), a *loyal convention* also met! It represented as many counties as the Guthrie and Prentice convention; it had as many delegates to it, perhaps more that had been regularly chosen; it represented, so far as public meetings were a test, a much larger constituency; but that will be clearer hereafter. The loyal convention sent delegates to the National Union Convention at Baltimore; the other sent theirs to the disloyal Peace Convention at Chicago. Both organized in the usual way. Both issued a platform; the loyal one clear, brief and decided beyond all precedent; one single test—*for the Union—against the rebellion—both without reserve*: the other platform, an attempt to make professed devotion to the national cause and to the crushing of the rebellion, consist with co-operation for the defeat of the nation and the success of the insurgents. Their devotion to the counter-revolution was made signally apparent by recommending Governor Bramlette for the Chicago Vice Presidency. When the two conventions broke up, the old Union party in Kentucky was also broken up. And what remains to be decided in the future is, which of the three parties—Union, Copperhead, or disloyal Democratic—will acquire and maintain the supremacy in Kentucky; and what will be the effect of all this state of things on the national cause, there and elsewhere. We must not omit to state, concerning the

posture of the Democratic leaders in Kentucky, that they refused to meet in convention with the Guthrie-Prentice party, or to unite with them in sending a common body of delegates to Chicago. Their convention met separately, and issued a characteristic platform, distinctly the opposite of so much of the relapsed Union platform as could be construed in any patriotic sense; and more distinctly favorable to the insurgents than the disloyal portions of the other. It is known that the strong desire of many of the most active leaders of the relapsed faction, embracing the bulk of the Kentucky members of Congress, was for an organic union with the openly disloyal Democrats, but they were afraid to organize as Democrats, and the Democrats would not organize as Conservatives. Both delegations were admitted into the Chicago Convention, and, amalgamating with it, came forth as "*National Democrats*;" that is, with a platform which, in the actual state of the country, can not be enforced without giving complete success to the rebellion; with a candidate for Vice President on it, the representative of principles upon which no national life worth preserving could exist, either in war or peace; and a candidate for President, who can not accept the platform without repudiating and condemning all his own principles and acts that had any importance, or showing, by that acceptance, that the gratification of his vanity, and the chance of gratifying his ambition, have all along dictated his principles and regulated his conduct, and that they do so still. The Chicago Convention, in effect, exhibited most of the symptoms of a seditious conspiracy, in the midst of civil war; and barely coming short of avowals that they were ready to encourage open acts of treason, they provided, on the motion of Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, by a unanimous vote, for a called meeting, at which they would decide whether or not they would take arms against the Government. That is, having provided, as they thought, most effectually for the defeat of the national cause, and the elevation of the disloyal Democracy to absolute power over the ruins of the country, they closed their labors, for the time, with a menace to the loyal people, and to the Government, that if they fail by corruption and by conspiracy, the method by armed insurrection, already resorted to in the South, remains to them. Let us, therefore, crush the rebellion still raging in the South, all the

more effectually, that we may the more promptly crush the one preparing and openly threatened in the North. Or if they require the nation to crush both at once, she is fully able to do it, and is bound, by every consideration that can operate on a great, an enlightened, and a free people, to stake her existence on it. The nation would rot quicker, under the combined demands and doctrines of Charleston and Chicago, voluntarily submitted to, than she could be permanently hurt by the combined force of both the conspiracies, multiplied tenfold, and directed against her life.

18. Amongst other indications of the state of affairs in Kentucky, during the three years of which we are rendering account, one of the most decisive, is the necessity, on two occasions, of declaring martial law. The first occasion was in the summer of 1863; the second one in the summer of 1864—in which condition the State now stands. The fact that this extreme remedy was resorted to immediately preceding the election in which Mr. Bramlette beat Mr. Wickliffe, very naturally disgusted the latter gentleman and his party, and may account for some of the rage of his immediate friends in the Chicago Convention. But how Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Prentice, and other special adherents of Governor Bramlette—whether in or out of that Convention—and indeed the Governor himself—could, at the same time, co-operate with Mr. Wickliffe and his party, and be silent under his denunciations, and yet adhere to their own former declarations, and defend their former principles and acts, on this subject, is rather more than persons with only an average amount of brass, can understand. It throws light, also, on the impression which the first ten months of Governor Bramlette's administration, made on those whose duty it was to understand him as perfectly as possible, that it was supposed to be necessary then to declare martial law again. Martial law both precedes and follows him. It is true that Governor Bramlette tendered ten thousand volunteers to the United States, at the same time the States immediately north of the Ohio river, and some others, made and redeemed their tenders of much larger numbers. They tendered only hundred days men. Governor Bramlette's tender was for six months men; and although he publicly offered to lead them, the men were never gotten; not even one regiment, as far as we ever

knew; but instead of the ten thousand men tendered and not sent by him, what was *sent*, by the United States, was that declaration of martial law! The Governor has made anxious and abusive explanations of the affair. Perhaps those who had lost confidence in him, and had not quite forgotten the events recorded in several preceding paragraphs, thought that the election in the Second Appellate Judicial District in August, as well as the Presidential election in November, would be fully as fair for *Union men*, without any troops at all, as with ten thousand troops under the command of the Governor. And the menace of the Governor to General Burbridge, when the latter refused to permit Judge Duvall to be a candidate, and the terms of his recent cordial adhesion to the Chicago Convention, may be considered as excusing the notion of very many loyal people, that martial law by the United States is not much worse for us than a strong military force within the State at the disposal of the Governor; assuredly it is better than the devastations, robberies, and murders which traitors have inflicted on Kentucky habitually for three years, and always simultaneously with dangerous political schemes and agitations in the State, favorable to the rebels, and secretly or openly hostile to the Federal Government. This whole matter of martial law, military police, arrests without civil process, exile, imprisonment, impressment of property, retaliations, and all the train of evils incident to a bloody civil war, must be charged to those who create civil war. They can never be justified, except by their imperative necessity, in preventing or redressing evils greater than themselves. At least half, perhaps two-thirds, of the populated area of the United States *knows that there are evils worse than these can be*, when inflicted in the course of duty, by the responsible agents of a regular and humane Government. And we record our deliberate conviction, that the history of civil war, from the beginning of time, can not produce a single instance in which the Chief Magistrate of any State, situated as this nation is, was less cruel, less vindictive, less a tyrant, than Abraham Lincoln. It is possible posterity may decide against him, as, probably, the great body of his supporters now would, in respect of some lack of constancy in the adequate infliction of necessary punishment on the flagrantly guilty, demanded by the safety of the nation. But posterity will be just when it

declares, that with infinite temptations—almost the temptation of duty itself—his clemency never failed! A title so glorious to the sympathy of mankind, may well endure to risk losing something to the President, where so much is won for the man, and for human nature. And the heroic people over whom he presides, ought the more thoroughly to abhor the atrocious depravity which first commits—or connives at—the most terrible crimes against society, and against human nature itself, and then pretends to consider the inadequate punishment a small portion of those crimes receive, an outrage on law, and innocence, and virtue; and then systematically traduces the humane magistrate, who has spared their authors to the utmost extent, as if the conspirators believed him to be a monster; they having, for the chief motives of such diabolical corruption, the success of the crimes themselves, and their own impunity in the future guilt they propose. Can it be imagined that the American people will commit their destinies to the keeping of those who have conspired to make their way to power by means like these?

19. But it is history we are writing: the future will reveal itself. Within a very short time the people of the United States will utter the first, and the most important, of those decisions, upon which four years of their future, after the 4th of March, 1865, will so much depend. The decision which the people of Kentucky will make at the same time, must not only have its due weight in determining the general fate, but may act still more powerfully upon their own peculiar destiny. As a State question, the result of the Presidential election of November next, could be revised much earlier, and more frequently, than the same result could be as a National one! Still, however, we must not forget that the triumph of the Union party in the nation secures the continuance of Kentucky in the Union, even if Kentucky was not loyal, while the national triumph of the peace Democracy renders the future of Kentucky, and that of the Union also, utterly uncertain. The chances that the Union will be dissolved are augmented a hundred fold, if the Chicago candidates are elected; while the fate of Kentucky, if the Union should be dissolved, would be a hundred fold worse, after such a dissolution, under the rule of the Chicago factions, than under the rule of the Union party. Kentucky, therefore, never had a political interest more pro-

found, or more obvious, than that her electoral vote should be given, in November, to the nominees of the Union National Convention. It may save the Union from dissolution; it may save her from being forced into the Southern Confederacy; it may preserve her from the dominion of the relapsed Copperheads, who have so utterly betrayed her; it may save her from a domestic butchery, and desolation, far beyond any thing she has yet suffered. On the other hand, the triumph of the Chicago candidates in the nation, is not the triumph of any particular and distinct party, policy, or principle; but is the triumph, so far as the Executive Government of the nation is concerned, of a combination of factions heterogeneous and hostile amongst themselves, whose temporary co-operation is brought about by motives, the most respectable of which is malignant personal hatred to the President, and for ends the most obvious of which is ignominious surrender to rebels already virtually subdued. We limit the triumph, even if General McClellan could be elected, to the *Executive* Government. For the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Government of every loyal State, and emphatically the immense armies in the field, would each have to be separately revolutionized, in succession, and by means peculiar to each, before the horrible results of national infamy and ruin, which the Chicago movement aims at, could be consummated. The party which had long held power in the nation before it was crushed and scattered, in 1860, by reason of its own infamous conspiracies, now seeks, by combining with all factions as immoral as itself, and by every disloyal, violent, and fraudulent means, to seize the national power again. They thought they had destroyed the Government in 1860-1. They long to make their horrible work complete in 1864-5. Their total overthrow in November, 1864, is one of those supreme duties, which great and wise nations, to whom God reserves a future of glory, instinctively perceive. Safety, honor, prosperity, freedom, independence, civilization, peace itself; all duty to ourselves, to our country, to mankind, to posterity, and to God himself; every thing demands that this nation shall be preserved, that this insurrection shall be crushed, that every conspiracy which obstructs our course shall be swept away.

20. If a judgment may be formed from the spirit, the princi-

ples, and the intentions of the factions combined in the Chicago Convention, of the nature of the canvass of two months in Kentucky, which will immediately precede the Presidential election in November, it is very easy to comprehend our situation, and duty. But if we look to the platform adopted by the Convention, or to the candidates nominated by it, the total silence of that platform, and the total career, in the past, of both their candidates with respect to many of the most vital questions before us, it becomes difficult to guess what is to be the character they will give to the actual canvass here. The Union party in Kentucky preferred to make the canvass upon the broad question of putting down the rebellion and preserving the Union. The relapsed Union men, at first, seemed to discuss chiefly, whether the Union could be preserved, or was worth preserving, under the policy hitherto pursued, which, of course, might be discussed—but which, very manifestly, was a mere evasion, since every one knew that as soon as the military power of the rebels was broken, the Union was safe, and that this indispensable result was being rapidly brought about; and every one, also, knew that the American people could do with the Union, to make it valuable, all they pleased, after their triumph, as well as before the war. This faction, made up of the most violent, both of the original secessionists and of the backslidden Union men, which seems to have most clearly anticipated the feeling of the Chicago Convention, expected to succeed by habitual and unbounded abuse of every act of the Federal Government, and of every officer of it, from the President down, but more especially every act which embarrassed or punished the enemies of the country, or gave security or redress to loyal men. This appears to be the course intimated in the platform, as it undoubtedly is the one, long ago initiated by the leading newspapers, and speakers, and conspirators, who have assailed the Government here. It will probably be still attempted; the more especially since the Chicago platform sets the example of indecency; and that Convention threatens a resort to arms, if the voting (no matter how illegal) of its disciples, is attempted to be prevented by the public force. What might be apprehended, therefore, but for that martial law, of which we have spoken, would be a canvass of unprecedented insolence and disloyalty, enforced at the polls by armed rioting; and it will,

no doubt, be a new ground of ferocious abuse, if public decency is enforced during the canvass, and public order is preserved at the polls. The most exciting questions that have agitated Kentucky—and perhaps the whole nation—next to that of the civil war itself, were settled secretly at Chicago, and excluded from the platform. Not one word in it about negro soldiers; not even the remotest intimation in it about slavery, in any aspect, past, present, or future; not a syllable, even, about the right of secession, or the guilt of rebellion! An honest and patriotic party, convened in times like these, has three courses only open before it. It may sustain the Government and the cause; it may sustain the cause, and attempt to change the administrators of the Government; it may oppose both the cause, and the Government that has it in charge. The Chicago Convention did, *publicly*, neither of the three. It traduced Mr. Lincoln, and sought to defeat him, by the combination of all dissatisfied and all disloyal factions; it evaded all committals it possibly could, that *necessarily* signified any thing of serious importance, upon every topic that is vital to the safety of the nation. If it had openly said—what no one doubts it really felt—“we agree with the Rebels in principle; we are totally opposed to the war; we are in favor of the triumph and independence of the South; we are for peace, and desire the perpetuity of slavery on any terms; we are conspiring and arming ourselves to carry our reserved opinions into effect, by force, if we fail at the election:” if they had thus spoken, they would have lost nothing, in the public judgment, in point of patriotism, and would, probably, have gained something in point of honesty. In that event, we have no doubt they knew they would have lost the election in November. And they will still lose it, if the Union men every-where will take care that the people understand the monstrous fraud that is attempted to be practiced on them, and the monstrous consequences which would follow its success.

21. There are three parties in Kentucky clearly distinguishable, though two of them were fully represented in the Chicago Convention. The party that has from the beginning sympathized with the South, may, possibly, hold the balance of power in the State, as between the other two parties. This party is not now for McClellan, but for the Chicago platform. It is

probable that the bulk of those who may not have expatriated themselves, will stand aloof at the Presidential election. It is also probable that as many of them will vote for Lincoln, as for McClellan. It is also probable they may conclude that their interests require them to go in a body, one way or the other; but it is far from certain, at present, which way that will be. This is a state of things by no means anticipated, either by the party represented by Mr. Wickliffe, or that represented by Messrs. Guthrie and Prentice. Both the Union party and the backslidden party, profess to believe Kentucky will vote for them; and some excited, relapsed politicians, pledged the State, at Chicago, for enormous majorities, if McClellan should be nominated. We know of no reason, under the sun, why any peace man, or any pro-slavery man, should vote for McClellan, without any platform; nor any, why any body at all should vote for him, on such a platform; nor any, why any man who has any convictions at all, for peace or for war, for Union or for disunion, for slavery or for freedom, should vote for any body at all, in such a time as this, on such a platform as that. Therefore, our general trust in human nature, makes it incomprehensible to us, how, with that platform and that candidate, in the present state of parties, any possible combinations can carry Kentucky into that pit. We may, however, be much mistaken, by having more sympathy with human nature than it deserves.

22. Those are the parties and the elements out of which the result is to come. Two of those elements are the decisive ones, namely: the grand element of the Union, and the subordinate element of slavery. The vast majority of the people of Kentucky still profess an earnest love for the Union, and they have proved their sincerity in many ways, and by many sacrifices. As far as has yet been made manifest, there is no convincing evidence that the mass of the Union people will sustain the mass of the politicians, in their fatal desertion of the national cause, their monstrous amalgamation with the factions at Chicago, and their scandalous pretenses of saving the Union by means which necessarily give triumph to the rebellion, at the moment when its destruction is certain. Still less is there any convincing evidence that the mass of the people even continue to favor the perpetuity of slavery in the State, much less that

they desire this so fervently, that they will embrace every thing, even treason, and sacrifice every thing, even their country, in order to make so great an evil permanent. Still we must say, that if Kentucky is lost to the Union cause, it is slavery, which has been one principal cause of her unhappy change. And we must add that the blame of this sad result, due, in part, to the hereditary and constant unwillingness of the people to abolish the institution; and due, in part, to the intrigues of parties connected with a subject of such extreme difficulty; is due also, very essentially, to the action of Congress and the President in relation to it, and not less to the manner in which the immense and most costly and destructive social revolution has been made to fall on the slaveholders of the State, with little regard to their individual loyalty, and with none at all to the loyalty of the State. We trust in God, Kentucky will stand with unshaken constancy by the nation. But we are well persuaded, that if she still stands firmly to her glorious principles, under such trials and temptations, and dangers and losses, as are now accumulated upon her, she will deserve to occupy the highest station to which any people has been exalted, for heroic constancy and truth. Come, then, sons of this ancient Commonwealth, the first birth of the old Revolution and into the Federal Union; come, let us be the last to betray that Revolution, or to forsake that Union. There is our banner—*Union—Nationality—Freedom*. It is the only one we acknowledge. The hand that writes these lines has pointed, many a time, the way of duty and honor to you: never any other. The voice that utters this call to you, once when clothed with authority both from you, and from the loyal people of all America, pledged you, by all he held dear on earth, to live as becomes you, or to die like men. And the Nation, in like manner, is pledged to you, to the last extremity. Surely will God so deal with them and us, as they and we redeem, to our uttermost, these sacred pledges!

ART. IV.—*The Past Course and Present Duty of Kentucky.*

WE approve all the past course of Kentucky, in its principal points, since the beginning of our troubles. We think it has been right and wise, and has saved her from the fate of some of her sister border States. Kentucky was originally in favor of the Crittenden Compromise. The hearty adoption and honest execution of that Compromise, by both the North and the South, would have averted the unhappy contest, and given us tranquillity, as long as it was faithfully observed. But extremism* prevailed on both sides—moderation was thrown away. We sowed to the wind, and have reaped the whirlwind. Kentucky was in favor of neutrality. For this she has been severely censured; but this position was all that her loyal people could take, and successfully maintain, at that time. It was all that was practicable. Practicability is the measure of duty.

"Who does the best his circumstance allows,
Does well, acts nobly; angels could no more." †

It is not only foolish, but it is wrong, to attempt what can not be done. At that time, to have attempted more, would have been

* The emphatic weakness of human nature is to run to extremes. "Truth," said Ruskin, "is a noble column, with many sides." Men look, for the most part, upon but one side, and being deeply impressed with the aspect of truth thus seen, become extremists, if not fanatics, in its maintenance; if they would but take another step, and another, and another yet, until they have surveyed the golden shaft in all its aspects and in all its harmonious proportions, they would have the grand and glorious unity of truth in their intellects and their hearts, and would not be carried away into falsehood and fanaticism, by distorted and half-truths. A half-truth is almost as bad as a whole falsehood. These remarks apply equally to politics and religion. "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling," says Paul. That is the half-truth; but he adds, "for it is God who worketh in you to will and to do of His good pleasure." That is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The States are sovereign, within certain limits; that's a half-truth. The General Government is sovereign, and exercises national sovereignty within certain limits—that makes the whole truth: Sovereign States composing a Nation with national sovereignty. Each sovereign within its own sphere.

† There is no more fatal curse to a country than abstractions in its politics put into practice. Abstraction begets fanaticism. Statesmanship is altogether a practical art. Not that we would sever it from moral principle. Its measures

to plunge the State into the secession movement. Our loyal statesmen wisely did what they could, and bided their time. They waited until it was evident the rebels would allow us to remain neutral no longer, and then raised the Union flag. The people were then prepared, which they were not at the beginning, to support the loyal movement, and have sustained the cause ever since. It is useless to say that this was temporizing—that Kentucky ought to have declared her loyalty at the first—that she ought to have been outspoken from the beginning—that she ought to have taken her loyal position at once. We repeat our answer, and it is sufficient. She could not do it. Kentucky has thenceforward, heartily and fully, supported the Government, as it was both her duty and interest to do. When the President issued his Proclamation of Freedom, her loyal citizens, for the most part, condemned and opposed it. Yet they still clung to the Government, and while condemning, sustained the Administration—that is, obeyed and submitted to all its requisitions. When the President determined on the employment of negro soldiers, she again condemned and opposed the measure. But her fidelity was unshaken. She threw the whole blame upon the South, which had inaugurated the rebellion and fiercely persisted in it, whose inevitable consequences—consequences we, of Kentucky, so clearly foresaw and foretold—were so fatal to all the interests of slavery. Her position was taken and manfully announced by her Chief Magistrate and Lieutenant Governor—that *if slavery perished incidentally in the war, let it perish*. Kentucky, doubtless, wished to preserve the institution, but she wished to preserve the Union more. When, at last, the Administration has entered upon, and is prosecuting the enlistment of negro soldiers from our slaves, and forming negro camps in the State, what is our duty to the whole

should be founded on the highest morals—let its theories of abstract right be the loftiest, but it must be content with the attainable. Abstract and theoretical right is the object of desire and effort, both in private and public morals, and should be kept steadily in the mind's eye and the heart's purpose; but practicability in public affairs is the necessary limit of action and conduct. To be satisfied with nothing less than abstract and theoretical right, degenerates into fanaticism, when the surrounding and modifying circumstances are not taken into the view; or, at least, is mere silly obstinacy. The country is now ground into powder between the abstractions of Northern and Southern fanaticism and impracticalness.

country, and to ourselves in particular, but to submit to what we can not help, as we have hitherto done? Shall we madly enter into rebellion, too? Shall we resist? Grant that the whole course of the Administration is wrong touching the negro—is unconstitutional—shall we, therefore, bring ruin upon ourselves by forcible resistance? If the Administration has committed a wrong, it has been led to do it, and enabled to do it, by the rebellion and by the rebels. They are the party both first and last to blame. Shall we give aid and comfort, then, to the rebellion and to the rebels, by a useless, armed opposition to the measures of the Government, even granting them to be wrong and injurious? Surely not, if we are wise. Let us exercise the same prudence and wisdom as hitherto; let us submit to what we can not avoid; let us bide the time.

Resistance to the measures of the Government would inevitably result in a confederation with the rebels, whether intended or not, and however sincerely not intended. It would bring upon us, at once, all the armed power of the Government. The President's Emancipation Proclamation would be at once applied to us, and could be easily and at once executed, and certainly would be without hesitation. Every slave in the State would be instantly emancipated, and a sufficient force sent among us to enforce the decree. Nay, an army would be raised from among ourselves to enforce it, and we should, in a few months, exhibit the pitiful and contemptible condition of a people ruled over by their own slaves. This would be equality with a vengeance. This dreadful fate we can bring upon ourselves if we will, and we can successfully avoid it if we will. The Government will not give up Kentucky—that is certain. She holds it, and can retain her hold. Resistance to any of its measures may bring to our aid a rebel army; but that would only the more certainly insure our destruction. We should, then, become the common battle-ground; contending armies, like opposing winds and waves, would rush in wild and furious destruction across our territory. Every part and parcel of it should be repeatedly harried, until Kentucky became a desert. We should receive no favor from either party; and what is more, we would deserve none. Our folly would merit the chastisement we should receive. Both would regard us as just objects of rapine and vengeance. Our

tardy confederation with the rebels would be regarded and treated with contempt, and would be visited by our own Government with just and exemplary punishment. Our just fate would be that of the bat in the fable of the battle of the birds and the beasts. Our folly and misery would make us conspicuous before the whole world. We should gain an unenviable niche in the temple of fame, to be remembered by all coming generations. Kentucky would be but another name for folly—a Kentuckian for a fool. It may be questioned whether a portion of the Northern people would not like to see us take this course, and come to this end. Shall we gratify them? It would be a still greater gratification to the fanatical fire-eaters of the South. They would revel, like demons damned, just loosed for a season from the pit, in the rich fields of Kentucky, and place their heels upon the necks of her citizens with a special zest. Kentucky can gain nothing by resistance to any proceedings of the Government—we mean armed resistance, for civil opposition she has a right to, and ought to, use when she deems it right; but utter ruin, and the gratification of her enemies, North and South, would follow armed opposition. Shall we submit, then, to unjust and tyrannical measures? Certainly; when resistance would produce more evil than good—nay, when it would produce evil and no good.

And what would be the results of submission to the measures of the Government? Why, present safety, and the loss of no other property than our slaves; and if the Government put down the rebellion, future safety also, and prosperity, and the conservation of every other right and liberty we ever possessed in full exercise. For the Government has exercised, and undeniably, by any candid loyal man, designs to exercise, no extraordinary power to which she has not been forced by the stoutness, fierce violence and enduring persistence of the rebels. If the Government is a tyranny, it is a paternal tyranny, temporarily assumed to snatch the State from destruction; if a despotism, it is one forced upon it, and which will be gladly abandoned at the earliest moment. But, in truth, these terms are falsely applied to the few extraordinary proceedings of the Government, especially in Kentucky. Never, since the world commenced, has such leniency been shown toward men as has been extended to the rebel sympathizers of this State. By any

other power now upon earth, or that ever was upon earth from the institution of government among men, they would have been made to pay, with their blood, the forfeit of their allegiance, and for the comfort and aid, as well as sympathy, they have given the rebellion. Instead of this course—a course which has been unrelentingly pursued toward every Union man, and woman and child in the rebel States—they, the rebels of Kentucky, have been, of all her citizens, during the war, the most happily situated. Tolerated and fully protected in all their rights by the Government, they have been safe in the presence of a Federal army—at least, have suffered little more than loyal men. When the rebel forces have entered the State, at least since Bragg was here, who, for special reasons, treated the people of the State with forbearance, they have been the only persons that were safe. They enjoyed, to the core of their sympathizing hearts, the presence and favor of their friends. When they have been driven out, they again have come under the protecting ægis of the Union, and enjoyed as many, and claimed more rights than any other part of the population. No people, under similar circumstances, were ever so fortunate as the rebels of Kentucky. Well might they dispute the truth of the Scripture adage, "The way of the transgressor is hard." Nay, more: many of them have gone a soldiering South until they were tired, have returned, taken the easy oath of allegiance—easy, at least, for a traitor's conscience—enjoyed again the tolerance and protection of a paternal and too indulgent Government, until it suited some of them to try their fortunes again in the South. Rebels, men and women, by the hundreds, have fled hither from the avenger of their crimes in Missouri, and have here enjoyed this paradise of rebels to the full. Thousands of rebel men have left their wives and children behind, among us, to enjoy all the plenty and protection of the land, who are in constant intercourse by the public mails, as well as by the grapevine, with them, and publicly and secretly doing all they can to give aid to the rebel movements; welcoming raids into the State; rejoicing over rebel victories and Federal defeats with scarce any concealment; and yet complaining of intolerable and tyrannous oppression, if now and then, having overstepped the long forbearance of even this despotic Government, they are at last,

and after ten thousand offenses overlooked, made to understand that the governmental patience is not inexhaustible.

But to return to our course of thought. If the Government fail, nothing can possibly happen to us, in the present or the future, as bad as armed resistance would bring upon us. Government success brings with it probably the removal of slavery. What then? It is but the removal and end of an evil thing, which has long and grievously afflicted us; nay, which has brought upon us this great and destructive and deplorable conflict. Shall we grieve over its removal, even though it may be done somewhat forcibly and extra-constitutionally, in our estimation? Somewhat contrary to our wishes and our short-sighted interests? But we could and would submit to this result, and confess it a good thing, if the negroes were also removed out of the country. We acknowledge the benefit of a separation of the two races, if it could be accomplished, both to the negroes and to us. And it would not be an impracticable undertaking, if it were set about earnestly and perseveringly. Kentucky, at least, might be rid of the footsteps of the black man, and he might be sent back to his native land, bearing with him all the precious fruits of civilization and Christianity. We are not without hope that this will be her Providential mission. Our negroes are further advanced in improvement in every direction, as a general thing, than those of any other slave State. They are better prepared to be the pioneers of a Christian civilization to Africa, on a large scale, than those of any other State, and perhaps than the free negroes of the free States; and we hope that a gracious Providence may so order it that they may be. But they can not be removed in a day, a year, nor perhaps in a generation. Let us look, then, for a moment, at this deep-seated opposition to even their temporary freedom on the soil. Has it a rational foundation? It is simply a prejudice against race. We can not bear the idea of this enslaved people moving among us free men and women. We are unwilling they should live even in the same land on any other terms than those of master and slave. In short, as a race to live free among us, we hate them. This is unreasonable and wicked. If it were a question of their introduction among us, a foreign population of a different color and a degraded race, it would be reasonable and right. But they

were born here; their ancestors did not come here voluntarily. Our ancestors brought them here, and by violence enslaved them. They are now a partially civilized and Christian people, with manifest capabilities of improvement. They would still be highly valuable as laborers. And if they could be all at once removed, we should feel their loss severely, and deplore it. The land would be stripped of the body of its best laborers. We could not supply their places for years. No; it will be better for us and them that their removal should be gradual. Indeed, nothing else is possibly practicable, and therefore unworthy of a moment's thought by a practical statesman.

But we should have the same, or at least similar antipathy, if they were of the same color with us, but of a different origin, and had been our slaves. This same inhuman and wicked feeling has existed toward oppressed races in all ages and countries. The polished and civilized Greeks and Romans regarded all the rest of the world, including our own ancestors, as barbarians, and only fit for slaves—nay, the haughty Norman conqueror looked upon the Saxon serf with proud contempt; and the name of *Saxon*, in which we now glory, was once, and, for long centuries, in England, a term of as much contempt as *negro* is now among us. The negro has to live among us *volens volens*, and, if this war continue much longer, he will live here as a freeman. God intends, apparently, to make us drink this bitter cup, with whatever wry faces we may swallow it. Now, would it not be better that we should lay aside this unreasonable, unjust and inhuman prejudice, not against color merely, but against race—against condition and class, and endeavor to accommodate ourselves to this association, and look candidly and see what kind of an association it will be? We say, then, that if managed with humanity and wisdom, it may be one largely beneficial to both parties, and bringing no peculiar evil to either. 1. It will not be a political and civil association and equality. The political and civil power will remain in our own hands. We can give the blacks just such a political and civil status as we please. Some persons strangely jump to the immediate conclusion, that freedom on the soil implies political, civil, and also social equality, and with this horrid result before their visions, passionately and shudderingly oppose any sort of emancipation, and regard all the

favorers even of gradual emancipation, as Abolitionists; and not only so, but as promoters of civil and social equality, and even of amalgamation. Such views and fears are foolish, fanatical and absurd. The emancipation of every negro, old and young, in the State, to-morrow, would not advance their political position one inch, nor change their social status a single step. It would only separate the two races far wider apart than at present. Now they are in our houses, in the closest associations, brought up with our children, their nurses and playmates upon a perfect equality—sometimes exercising controlling influences over them, intellectually and morally, for many years, and that at an age when the character is rapidly forming. Now they are as near together as two races, which don't intermarry, can well be. In a condition of freedom, all this closeness of association would be broken up. Some would be employed as servants—the rest would live apart. Their children would no longer be brought up under the same dwelling with ours—would no longer play with them in the same yard, and often eat at the same table, and suck the same breast, and sleep in the same cradle. Even among free whites of different classes and professions, the intercourse is small; there is no social inter-visitation; their children are brought up apart; the intercourse is confined to business chiefly. How much smaller would it be between two such races, of such antecedents! It would be confined to the single association of employer and employé. 2. Freedom will never lead to social equality or social intercourse of any kind. The political and civil power being in our hands, the separation will be complete. As to amalgamation, freedom will break it up too. It flourishes only under slavery. It is emphatically and peculiarly an offshoot of slavery. To fear it under freedom, is absurd. When free, the black female will have a character to support; she will have no master to bring up her children for her; she will no longer be exposed to the same temptations as now. Her associations will be exclusively of her own race. She will have parents and brothers to watch over her, and to be injured by her lapse from chastity and character. It is absolutely insulting to suppose there will be any amalgamation between white females, of any degree of respectability, and black men; and to suppose white men, above the lowest degree of moral degra-

dation, seeking in marriage black females, is almost as unreasonable. Indeed, we doubt if the blacks will not be as much opposed to amalgamation as the whites. But if there should be here and there a few intermarriages, it would be no lower a degradation than many white men now attain in this and many other directions. That white men, constantly moving in good society—at least in general male society—have now black concubines, is notoriously not unfrequent. As to marriage, it can be made illegal by law. Fears of political and social equality between the races in a state of freedom, are, then, the rawhead and bloody bones raised in the imaginations of weak-minded people.

But free negroes will not work. This is said without sufficient reason. It is the slave who shirks work. A race who have been trained to labor, will work if paid for their work. Necessity will require and compel them to work; and, if necessary, the aid of law can be invoked to regulate and organize their labor. They will labor as much, at least, as they do now, and will waste a great deal less; while the whites will work a great deal more; so that the State, as a whole, will be the gainer. The present free negroes among us are not fair specimens of what the race would be, if freedom were universal. The most of the race being yet slaves, their improvement is impeded—their social and moral habits and status are fixed by those of the body of their people. They have opportunities of procuring the means of subsistence from the slaves, which would be cut off by general freedom. Yet, many free men are good workers, and almost all the free women. The latter are notable for their industry and good management, and often, nay, generally, with the assistance of their husbands, purchase, by their industry, a lot in the towns where they live, and erect comfortable dwellings, and live in them with their families in comfort—often in neatness and more elegance than was customary among laboring whites when the writer was a child.

Upon the attainment of freedom, it would become the immediate interest of the white race, as it would be their highest duty, to make efforts for the improvement of the black race, in every direction, that while they remain inhabitants of the country, they may be useful; and may be gradually prepared for emigration to their father land. The negroes are an

improvable race. Let it be admitted that at present they are inferior. What a thousand years of training—through thirty generations—might do for them, as it has done for us, we know not. The greatest hater of the negro race can hardly deny that it would do much, very much. But, at present, they are inferior; yet they make good farmers, good mechanics, good cooks, good seamstresses. They can learn to read and write. In short, there ought not to be a question of their making—if we would do our duty to them—a valuable class of free laborers. They will need employment, and we shall need their labor. Mutual wants ought to beget, and will beget, mutual kindness. If the President's measures, then, however unwarranted, shall remove slavery, it will remove an incubus under which Kentucky has been kept back in her advancement, while her sister border free States have shot ahead of her, and almost—to use the language of the race field—*distanced* her. Whatever may be the fate of the Southern States in rebellion—whether they are brought back to the Union or not—the duty and interest of Kentucky happily coincide in urging her to remain, under all circumstances, loyal to the Government. If her slaves are illegally taken from her, it is no more than the loss of any other species of property. In war, countries are unavoidably desolated; happy shall we be if we get off with the loss of slavery only. But there are many with whom that is every thing—it fills the whole horizon of their visions. It seems to be of the very substance of their souls. The loss of other property is borne with reasonable patience. A horse may be taken in a raid, cattle driven off, forage seized—lands might be confiscated, and, it would seem, even children or wives killed—without producing spasms: but the loss of their negroes is an inconsolable privation—they are the jewels of their affections—the Constitution is violated—their liberties are invaded—nothing is left worth living for, and they declare they will die in the last ditch. Alas! poor Yorick.

With the loss of slavery and the restoration of peace, the State will bound forward in improvement, and wealth, and prosperity. Free white labor will soon be introduced, and with it the introduction of the mechanical arts, now in the course of rapid extinction, [or, more fashionably, which *are now being*

rapidly *extinguished*,*] and of manufactures, and the development of our great mineral productions. We have now no manufactures, and the simplest mechanic arts are dying out

* We do hereby, by virtue of our critical authority as Reviewers, pronounce and denounce this construction as an absurd solecism—an awkward construction and bad English, and do hereby, within the range of our literary bailiwick, forbid its further use, under the pains and penalties of our severest displeasure.

Marsh says: "I have spoken of the ignorance of grammarians as a frequent cause of the corruption of language. An instance of this is the clumsy and unidiomatic continuing present of the passive voice, which, originating not in the sound, common sense of the people, but in the brain of some grammatical pretender, has widely spread, and threatens to establish itself as another solecism, in addition to the many which our Syntax already presents. The phrase 'the house is *being built*,' for 'the house is *building*,' is an awkward neologism, which neither convenience, intelligibility, nor syntactical congruity demands, and the use of which ought, therefore, to be discountenanced, as an attempt at the artificial improvement of the language in a point which needed no amendment. The English active present, or rather aorist, participle in *ing* is not an Anglo-Saxon, but a modern form, and did not make its appearance as a participle until after the general characteristics which distinguish English from Saxon were fixed. The Saxon active participle terminated in *ende*, as *lufgende*, loving; but there was a verbal noun with the ending—*ung*, sometimes written *ing*, as *clænsung*, or *clensing*, cleaning or cleansing. The final vowel of the participle was soon dropped, and the termination *and*, or *end*, became the sign of that part of speech. The nominal form in *ung* also disappeared, and *ing* became the uniform ending of verbal nouns." Between the verbal noun of action and the active participle, there is a close grammatical, as well as logical, analogy, which is exemplified in such phrases in French and English—*l'appetit vient en mangeant*, appetite comes with eating. Hence, the participle ending in *and*, or *end*, and the verbal noun ending in *ing*, were confounded, and at last the old participial sign, though long continued in Scotland, was dropped altogether in England, and the sign of the verbal noun employed for both purposes. . . . The earliest form in which the phrase we are considering occurs, is, 'the house is in building, or a building,' a contraction of the Saxon *on*, or the modern English *in*. Ben. Johnson, in his grammar, states expressly that, before the participle present, *a*, and if before a vowel, *an*, gives the participle the force of a gerund; and he cites as an example, 'a great tempest was *a brewing*.' The obvious explanation of this form of speech, is that what grammarians choose to call a present participle, is really a verbal noun; and, if so, there is nothing more irregular or anomalous in the phrase, 'the ship is *building*,' than in saying, 'be industrious in working,' 'be moderate in drinking;' for the verbal noun may as well have a passive as an active or a neuter signification.

"The preposition *on*, or *a*, was dropped about the beginning of the eighteenth century, but it is still understood; and in this construction, though the form is the same as that of the participle, the verbal noun is still as much a noun as it was when the preposition was expressed.

"But if this explanation is rejected, and it is insisted that, in the phrase in question, *building*, *making*, etc., are true participles, active in form, but passive in

among us, [or, to use another fashionable phrase, "in our midst."*] Not a hat is manufactured in the State—hardly a

signification, the construction may be defended, both by long usage—which is the highest of all linguistic authorities—and by the analogy of numerous established forms of speech, the propriety of which no man thinks of questioning. The active is passive in sense in the phrase 'he is to *blame*; I give you this picture to *examine*; he has books to *sell*; this fruit is good to *eat*.' . . . The reformers who object to the phrase I am defending, must, in consistency, employ the proposed substitute with all passive participles, and in other tenses, as well as the present. They must therefore say: 'The subscription paper *is being missed*, but I know that a considerable sum *is being wanted* to make up the amount; the great Victoria bridge *has been being built* more than two years; when I reach London, the ship *Leviathan will be being built*; if my orders had been followed, the coat would *have been being made* yesterday; if the house had *been being built*, the mortar would *have been being mixed*.' "[*Marsh's Lectures on the English Language*, pp. 649-654.]

We have made this long and learned extract, that henceforth our readers in particular, and the public in general, may no longer be in ignorance that they are violating sense and the most ancient usage of the English language, in the use of this abominable construction, which is now in danger of working a radical change in the language, and turning it into a vile patois of awkward nonsense.

While in the critical mood, we will nail to the counter another recent American innovation upon the fundamental construction of the English language. We allude to the foisting in the adverb between the sign of the infinitive mood to and the verb, as, to sorrowfully know; to hopefully conclude, etc. We first noticed this construction within two years past in the public prints; it is now to be seen every day, and has even entered into official communications. If there is any thing fixed in English construction, it is the inseparable connection of the infinitive mood and its sign; and it is rarely, if ever, allowable that an adverb should be intruded between them. Such an insertion is mere affectation, and now, at its beginning, we stigmatize it an inelegant solecism. These innovations in our language are to be resisted, as only less atrocious than rebellion. We are bound to hand down "the well of English undefiled" received from our ancestors, to our children. Simple Saxon English is now so overwhelmed with corrupt constructions, misty Germanisms, Anglicised Latin and Greekisms, that Shakspeare, and Addison, and Goldsmith, and even Johnson himself, a great corruptor of English style, could hardly read their mother tongue. They would not be able to understand a single page of some modern books without a glossary, so overloaded is the style with affectations and corruptions of every sort. Our beautiful and vigorous language is in great danger of becoming a babble of its own corruptions, intermingled with a disgusting *quantum sufficit* of Latin, Greek, French and German barbarisms and novelties. These writers seemingly try to reverse the purpose of Chaucer's Friar, whose effort was

"To make his English sweet upon his tongue."

* By the critical authority aforesaid, we do, *ex cathedra*, pronounce this phrase novel, inelegant and bad English. Marsh says: "In the transition from

shoe. The smith's trade is confined to shoeing horses, but the shoes are imported. Much of our clothing is ready made and brought to us; so is all our fine furniture: in short, most manufactured articles. All this will be reversed with the removal of slavery. Manufactures and the mechanic arts will everywhere immediately spring up. We shall cease to import from the free States what we can make for ourselves. Railroads will be extended, and our mineral regions worked. Our mountain region will gradually become, what it may be, among the richest portions of the Commonwealth.

Will not the people of Kentucky keep on, then, in the even tenor of their way? They have hitherto avoided much of the evils of the conflict by their discretion. Even our Southern sympathizers have been comparatively discreet. When Bragg and Morgan were in the State, few joined them—the rebel leaders were sadly disappointed. Their friends were too discreet. A few of the more ardent followed, the rest held back. We appeal, then, to the whole population, of every class, to remain at least quiet, if not loyal. Quietness and loyalty may confidently be expected to bring safety in the present, and deliverance in the future. If God has stricken slavery, let us not be found fighting against Him. The revolutions of nations

Anglo-Saxon to English, the genitive plural of the personal pronoun was dropped, and the objective, with a preposition, substituted for it. This change was made before the time of Wycliffe, and the use of the possessive pronoun, instead of the genitive of the personal pronoun, was a violation of the idiom of the language. This is shown abundantly by the authority of the Wycliffite translators themselves, for they generally make the distinction; as, for example, in Joshua vii: 13, where we read: 'Cursyng is in the midel of thee,' in the older text, and 'in the myddis of thee' in the later; and in Ezekiel xxxvi: 23, where one text has 'in the myddil of them;' and so in many other passages where those old translators agree with the authorized version. The vulgarism, 'in our midst,' 'in your midst,' 'in their midst,' now unhappily very common, grows out of this confusion. The possessive pronoun can not be properly applied, except as indicative of possession or appurtenance. The 'midst' of a company or community, is not a thing belonging or appurtenant to the company, or to the individuals composing it. It is a mere term of relation, of an adverbial, not a substantive character, and is an intensified form of expression for *among*. The phrase in question is, therefore, a gross solecism, and unsupported by the authority of pure, idiomatic English writers. Shakspeare, 2 Pl. Henry VI, IV, 8, has 'through the very midst of you;' and this is the constant form through the authorized translation of the Bible [our best authority for the English language in its purest and most beautiful state]."
Lec. on Eng. Lan., pp. 395-6.

are under His hand. He brought the African race here for a great purpose; we hope it is His purpose to remove, at least, a portion of them back to their native home, to civilize and Christianize it. It has been aptly and beautifully said, "America in Africa is the solution of Africa in America." God grant that it may be so. The African race, as we have said in a former article, is one of the great permanent races of the earth. The Scriptures teach us to expect the universal elevation of our race in all its divisions. In this elevation, the African will partake. He is quite as improvable as, and has equal capacity with, any of the races of men, except, perhaps, the Caucasian, upon whom the Creator has conferred the distinction of becoming the pioneer and teacher of civilization and religion to the other races. Woe to us, if we turn our great privilege into an occasion and a pretense for permanent oppression. As, perhaps, the only means of elevating, humanly speaking, the African, God has permitted him to be enslaved by the Caucasian. This was intended to be the occasion of a blessing to him; it will be also to us if we fulfill our mission faithfully—but of an unutterable curse if we are unfaithful stewards. The African will share in the common blessing of the Father of Nations. His elevation requires, perhaps, in the providence of God, his speedy deliverance from bondage here, which has been a discipline and means of introduction to the highest civilization known among men. If this should be so, we may bring destruction upon ourselves, as, indeed, it is most manifest to the most purblind, we are daily in danger of doing; but we shall not be able to thwart, or even retard the accomplishment of the Divine decrees.*

* Yet we have no right to take this accomplishment out of the hands of the Almighty into our own hands. If slavery shall perish incidentally in the course of the war, it is the Divine hand that slays it. Hence President Lincoln committed a fatal mistake in his letter addressed "To whom it may concern," in laying it down as a *sine qua non* to peace, that slavery shall be abolished. We have no right to do evil that good may come. It is the Divine privilege to permit evil that good may come out of it. But it is alike opposed to the Divine law as well as to the Constitution of the Union, for the President or Congress, or the people, to prosecute a war upon our rebellious brethren for the mere abolition of slavery. The war should be waged solely for the suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union—waged vigorously, and with every constitutional means in our hands, to crush the viper. Whatever perishes incidentally in so doing, is right—life, property, or any thing incident thereto. But after the rebellion has

An additional reason for President Lincoln's withdrawing from the extreme position assumed by him in his dispatch to Niagara, is prevented by the still further and more culpable one assumed by the pseudo-president Davis in his conference with Colonel Jaques. He will have nothing less than Southern independence, and announces that it is useless to approach him with any other terms. We do not believe that the mass of the people South would this day support this condition precedent to peace, if Mr. Lincoln would offer them the union and peace, provided they were free to exercise their suffrages; and we firmly believe that when we have overthrown their armies and

been subdued, and the rebel States have returned to their allegiance in good faith, the Government would have no further right, founded on Divine or human authority, to prosecute the war for any ulterior purpose; nor has it any warrant, human or Divine, for making the abolition of slavery a condition of peace. On the other hand, every consideration of every sort, drawn from every quarter, forbids any such condition being made. Believing, as we think we have good reason to do, that the President reluctantly yielded to the objectionable measures he has instituted, we trust he will not now, in opposition to the wishes and opinions of his best friends, and of a majority of the sober-minded people of the nation, persist in making such a condition as a preliminary to peace; the nation wants peace and Union. Every heart is raised to God in prayer—the nation is in an agony for peace with the Union—with nothing more and nothing less. The nation will endure every thing for the maintenance and integrity of the Union; with that she will be satisfied, and leave slavery to the providence of God and the mortal stab the rebels themselves have given it. We can feel its great heart beat—we can hear its words of supplication uttered from the deep recesses of the soul.

O! God of Hosts, is it Thy will
Quite to destroy our country fair?
From North to South, from vale and hill,
Comes up the wail of dark despair.

Brother with brother, grasped in death,
Lies stark upon the bloody field—
In hate each breathed his latest breath,
Wielding the bloody sword and shield.

All of one happy country born,
Above them one flag floated free,
The stars and stripes its folds adorn,
From Eastern to the Western Sea.

And now, alas! that flag is torn,
By her own sons trailed in the dust,
In words of bitterness and scorn,
At it is aimed the deadly thrust.

freed them from the cruelest tyranny that ever oppressed a people, they will gladly accept Peace, and the Union, and the Constitution.

It is certainly a most remarkable exhibition the rebel president makes of the human heart, when he said to Colonel Jaques and Mr. Gilmore, that he, with his hands all reeking with the blood of millions of souls, could look up, right into the face of God, and say with a clear conscience, "Thou canst not say I did it." We might believe Mr. Davis to be so blinded in his fanaticism as to be sincere, if he had not also said, that they were not fighting for slavery, and never had been, but simply for independence. This is sheer and arrant hypocrisy, and Mr. Davis knows it as well as all the world does. They are fighting to maintain slavery—the rebellion was instituted to make slavery a perpetual institution, and *proh pudor*, to make it the basis—the corner-stone of pretended republican institutions,

O! God of Hosts, to Thee we cry,
Our hope and faith are still in Thee;
To Thee we lift the imploring eye,
Who rulest both the land and sea.

This deadly strife, O! God, compose,
To our loved land restore sweet peace;
In flowery bowers let her repose,
And to Thy name ne'er praise shall cease.

Our glorious land again restore,
A happy and united land;
From North to South, from shore to shore,
One free, one God-united band.

Shall brother still with brother strive,
Father with son the battle wage—
Asunder shall we madly rive
Our father-land in deadly rage?

O! God, forbid; in mercy speak,
In mercy bid the storm to cease,
And let the bow of promise break
The cloud, and spare the land in peace.

Then shall to Thee, O! God, arise
One long, united shout of praise;
In Northern and in Southern skies,
Thy glorious banner shall we raise.

but really of the meanest form of oligarchy that ever disgraced and afflicted the earth. But the rebellion, if persisted in, will as certainly end in the overthrow of slavery, as that Effect is, by Divine decree not to be broken by any human effort, connected with Cause.

ART. V.—*The Peace Panic—Its Authors and Objects.*

1. WE have before us a small outline map of the United States, entitled "*Historical Sketch of the Rebellion*"—published at the office of the United States Coast Survey. It has, no doubt, been inspected by many thousands of persons, and could be studied, without much trouble, by every one. A new edition, bringing down the information it conveys to the time of the new issue, and widely scattered over the country, should do more to direct and satisfy the minds of men—both loyal and disloyal—than all the party documents that will flood the country during the impending Presidential canvass.

2. The waving lines drawn across this map, from east to west, and from the southern edge of the loyal States, as they stood when the war began, drawn south, present to the eye, most distinctly, the progress of the nation in subduing the rebellion, in the territorial aspect of the matter—during the two years and a half, extending from July, 1861, to January, 1864. The blue line divides the loyal States from those that had seceded; and shows that in point of territorial extent, the rebellious States were fully as large, if not larger than the loyal States, in July, 1861—the period at which all parties may be considered as having openly taken position.

3. No line runs north of this blue line. No conquest has been made by the insurgents. All their attempts at invasion have utterly failed. All their destructive raids have ended in defeat, and, probably, in the aggregate, the whole raid, invasion, and guerrilla systems of the rebels, have cost them a great deal more than they ever gained by them. The bare inspection of this map shows that the insurgents were never able to wage aggressive war with the United States. Their silly boasts, their insolent pretensions, their absurd demands, their boasted,

skill in war, are all exploded by this map. It is clear to every one who will look at this map, that the independence of the revolted States never was possible, by arms.

4. The red line shows the state of the territorial question, in July, 1863—two years after the war began. This red line embraces, adding the spaces blockaded, nearly the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast of the rebel States; they had lost it all. Then it embraces a country, extending from the Atlantic to the west, as far as the Indian country south of Kansas, a distance of fifteen hundred miles, or more. This red line runs, waving south, from both its eastern and western extremity, so as to embrace the country on both sides of the Mississippi river, and that on the Gulf shore, for some distance both ways from New Orleans. In its greatest width, from south to north, this conquered region is a thousand miles wide, or more, and its average width can not be less than five or six hundred miles. That is, a country fifteen hundred miles long, by five hundred miles wide, is conquered, overrun, occupied, and rendered useless to the rebels in their further attempts. Their whole seaboard is lost, the best half of their country is conquered; and the portion left is cut in two; all in two years. And yet, men who desire us to believe that they are not only loyal, but honest and truthful, profess to believe that the war has been a total failure, and that the safety of the nation demands the immediate cessation of hostilities, and the conclusion of peace on the best terms we can get.

5. The yellow line across this map, shows the territory we conquered from the insurgents, during about half a year, extending from July, 1863, to January, 1864—when the "Historical Sketch" terminates. This yellow line adds to our conquests a considerable territory, along its eastern course, and south of its western portion. So the territorial question stood at the commencement of the year 1864. The disgraceful reverse of our arms under General Banks, has temporarily lost us territory west of the Mississippi. The disreputable failures by General Sigel and General Hunter, have temporarily arrested our conquests in Central Virginia. But the glorious career of General Grant, General Meade, General Sherman, and Admiral Farragut, are extending and confirming our conquests in the very vitals of the rebel country. As far as can be clearly

understood at this moment, the fall of Richmond, of Mobile, and the destruction of the rebel power in Georgia—all three of which events are eminently probable, and near at hand—would put the whole rebellion at the mere mercy of our Government. On the other hand, our failure of complete success, for the present, in all three of those enterprises, which is utterly improbable, would leave the campaign of 1864 one of decisive success to the United States; and would leave the insurgents without the least rational hope from the further prosecution of the war. Yet, it is in these circumstances, when an outraged people have absolute triumph immediately in their grasp—triumph that secures for all time the greatest blessings—among them Union, independence, and freedom—and at the same time, punishes the greatest and most heinous crimes; that the most vehement efforts are made to alarm the nation into a disgraceful and ruinous composition with the rebels, under the false and base pretext, that we are ourselves ignominiously beaten! It is a mockery to speak of patriotism, or loyalty, as actuating such attempt.

6. There is another material aspect of this question of ignominious and destructive peace, so fiercely urged upon us, which is suggested by a population table, taken from the census of 1860, and printed in one corner of this map. The total population of the nation, by that census, was a little under 31,500,000. Of these, a little under 27,500,000 were free people; of whom a little over 22,200,000 belonged to the twenty-four loyal States, including Kansas and West Virginia—and including about 200,000 inhabitants of the Territories, and a little under 5,300,000 belonged to the eleven disloyal States. For a moment let us recount these eleven disloyal States, and fix in our minds what their 5,300,000 inhabitants have been able to do against the 22,500,000 inhabiting the twenty-four loyal States and the Territories, to justify the enormous clamor, that we must sue for peace. We have shown the case in the aggregate; let us see the details. Alabama—the northern part and the sea-coast conquered and in our possession; the southern part, the present seat of war. Arkansas—the western part still in arms—the northern and eastern parts conquered and held by us. Florida—all its sea-coast, and portions of its interior conquered and held by us; the rest a theater of war. Geor-

gia—occupied on the sea-board by us; its northern and western parts conquered—its central portion occupied by the army under Sherman. Louisiana—the greater part of it conquered and occupied by us—the western portion a theater of war. Mississippi—conquered and occupied; bands of guerrillas roaming over it, completing its desolation. North Carolina—its sea-board chiefly held by us—its frontiers, on all sides, partial theaters of war; its immediate fate depends on the operations of Grant and Sherman. South Carolina—portions of it held by us, including all its sea-board, its fate follows that of Georgia. Tennessee—conquered and occupied by us; still desolated in portions of it by rebel guerrillas. Texas—large portions of it have been conquered and occupied; the defeat of General Banks in Arkansas, in 1864, temporarily preserved Texas from complete subjugation. Virginia—poor Virginia, has lost the whole State of West Virginia, and has suffered more in three years of rebellion than all the rebel States would have suffered in three hundred years in the Union, even if every grievance they complained of had been strictly true. This completes the eleven States. And we demand, in the name of all that ought to be held sacred by truthful men, if there is any thing here to justify our alarm, even if we were all poltroons? There may be much to excite our wonder at the infinite folly of the insurgents—and our compassion for them; much also to excite our abhorrence of those parties in the loyal States that have habitually deceived the insurgents with false hopes, and habitually sought to dismay the loyal people with pretended dangers.

7. But this aspect of the case is not complete, until we have considered the slave element in the two sections, and its bearing upon this peace panic. There were, in 1860, not quite 4,000,000 of negro slaves. Of these, a little over 3,500,000 were embraced in the eleven States that revolted; a little less than 450,000 inhabited slave States that did not revolt. Observe, there were, therefore, eight negro slaves in the eleven revolted States, for every negro slave in the twenty-four loyal States. Observe, on the other hand, there were four free persons in the twenty-four loyal States, to every free person in the eleven revolted States. Observe again, there were two negro slaves to every three free persons in the eleven revolted States; while there were fifty-free

persons to every negro slave, in the twenty-four loyal States. If slavery was an element of strength, the revolted States had this element in an enormously preponderating ratio. And in this case, the loyal States had the clearest possible right to destroy it; for however clear might be the right of the slave States, under the Constitution, to hold slaves as property, their obligation was equally clear not to turn that property to the destruction of others, much less the nation itself; and the right to destroy the property was perfect, as soon as it was used in that manner. If, however, the existence of slavery was an element of weakness, then just to the extent of that weakness, was the one free rebel's hopeless inability to conquer four free patriots, made more hopeless from the start. But, in effect, all of the 4,000,000 of slaves, may be said, without exaggeration, to have been on the side of the nation, and against the rebels; which at once changed the ratio from four to one, to five to one, as between the loyal strength and the rebel strength, when the war began. From one hundred thousand negro soldiers, and upward, to whatever the number may grow, is one appreciable result of the change of ratio of strength, just stated; and it is but one amongst many such elements. We have no use to make, at present, of this entire branch of our great national question, except to bring it face to face with this ignominious peace panic. Utter contempt is the natural emotion, with which every soul capable of one brave throb might be expected to look upon the attempt to alarm us into a humiliating cessation of arms, preparatory to the independence of the insurgents. We do not feel inclined to offer indignities to brave men, because those who plead their cause, rather than fight for it, make it ludicrous. But we suspect, if the ferocious peace patriots of the loyal States had been put in the place of the 5,300,000 rebels, the 4,000,000 of slaves would have been nearer their match than the 22,200,000 free people. It is proper to say, before leaving this part of the subject, that we use, in all we have said, the nearest round numbers; and that in speaking of loyal persons and rebels by States, it is again as if speaking in round numbers. No considerable errors that it would be possible to guard against, could arise from this universal method; for whatever are inherent in the mode of statement offset each other, by occurring ratably on opposite sides.

8. There is, undoubtedly, no very inviting prospect to the authors of this peace panic, founded upon the complete triumph of the national cause by arms. Their past and present conduct is too conspicuously bad, in every sense, to secure them any thing but infamy, if they fail. The greater their disloyal endeavors may be, provided they come short of completely destroying the nation, and destroying with it all virtuous public sentiment, and all wholesome law; the more sure and the more signal will be the retribution which outraged public opinion will hereafter demand from them, and righteous laws enforce upon them, and national embarrassments they have created require of them. Their own alarm arises from the certainty that the nation will conquer the rebels, if the war goes on; from the certainty that all their own sympathy with the rebels in arms, and all the aid they can give them, even to the extent of armed insurrections in the loyal States—can not prevent, nor long delay, the crushing out of the rebellion. They, therefore, with a common accord, lift up this frantic cry for immediate peace on any terms—on the shameless pretexts that the war, which has been signally successful, has been a failure—and that its continuance, which is fatal to them, is fraught with nothing but our disgrace and ruin. Their alarm for their own fate, the obvious ground of which we have just explained, is manifested in another way, entirely inconsistent with the pretext that the nation is exhausted and defeated; but very pertinent to men conscious of their offenses, and dreading the consequences—when the nation completely triumphs. They say, when we have conquered the rebels, we shall have subverted the Constitution and the laws, in the process; and then they also will become the slaves of the despotism set up by loyal men. By despotism they mean, what every body else means by regulated liberty under just laws. What they mean by becoming slaves is, that their party should be out of power, and that they should be required to behave themselves, or be punished when they do not. The whole disloyal clamor against the public authorities, since this war began, about tyranny and oppression in all the varied forms, and innumerable instances charged, rests upon the insane assumption that the very end of a government of laws, is to protect equally violations of them, and obedience to them. If it has any other foundation it is the assumption, that it is

more pleasing to God, and far better for mankind, that all governments and laws should be destroyed, than that they should be used for any purpose whatever that does not tend to gratify, promote and honor the so-called Democracy, in every infamous caprice which vile and discordant factions successively combine to force upon society. In 1860-61, it was through secession that a political millennium was to be secured. In 1864—that millennium being exploded—it is by sudden and ignominious peace, sued for in the midst of a career of triumph, that a new millennium of impunity, and perpetual slavery, is to be inaugurated. All the time the nation is the victim, and the same priests officiate at her sacrifice.

9. There are two aspects united in this peace movement, which the parties to it seem mutually anxious to keep distinct, while melting into one. The platform adopted at Chicago is claimed, as far as yet appears, by all the factions in that convention, as *sufficiently* expressing a *view* in favor of peace, in which all can *sufficiently* unite to vote for McClellan for President, and for Pendleton for Vice President. But you must look at both of those candidates at the same time, or else you can not see the true sense of the Platform. If you shut the McClellan eye, that Platform changes its appearance very materially. If, contrariwise, you shut the Pendleton eye, the change is equally great, but in an opposite direction. Both eyes open are supposed to see both the candidates at first; and then, by steady looking, a new object, supposed to combine them, comes forth; this they call the *Platform*. The conception is ingenious, and the process cunning. Most of our readers have, no doubt, seen the handsome toy called stereoscope, and very pretty photographic cards, by which *binocular vision*, as they call it, is illustrated; and have been instructed and delighted by the beautiful manner in which some very curious and interesting truths are disclosed. We can not tell whether the inventor of that instrument took his hint from the time-honored practice of the Democratic party, so carefully illustrated at Chicago, or whether the Democratic party got the hint from the toy maker. Suffice it, the principle has been as well applied to the coarse art of politics for cheating adults, as to the fine arts for teaching children how they can cheat themselves. We the more readily comply with the desire of these factions to

be considered as only delusively supervened, one upon the other, under special circumstances; since, in effect, other circumstances might possibly occur, in which the safety of the nation might be promoted by the reappearance of each faction in its own distinct character.

10. The great difference to be conciliated in the Platform, by means of looking with one eye on McClellan, and the other on Pendleton, at the same time, was peace by war, or peace by panic. The panic party won the Platform and the Vice President; the pretended war men won the President. The Convention, the Platform, the factions, every thing, is for immediate peace of some sort. Some partial exception might once have been contended for, by obstinate disputants in favor of General McClellan, and the backslidden Union men of Kentucky. But we imagine, their transitory favor for the suppression of the rebellion is allayed by the danger of the "peculiar institution" in the latter case, and the temptation of the Presidency in the former. It is true that the first paragraph of the Platform appears to intimate that fighting was possible; it professes that all of them "*will adhere with unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution.*" But there are so many, and such mysterious conditions expressed and implied, that such a declaration, uttered by such people, under such circumstances, and with such excessive caution in the use of words, that the declaration may really mean *peace at any price*. Sincere men look upon the matter pretty much as the old Romans did on the straw that was tied to the horns of a bull. They were not afraid of the bull—they feared nothing; but that whisp of straw was the sign that the bull was vicious. There are many bad signs here, and the character was bad to begin with. They say they will adhere, etc., "*in the future as in the past.*" To which we reply, if that is all, their "unswerving fidelity to the Union" has already disgusted every loyal man in America. They limit, moreover, their fidelity to the Union, while under that special Constitution which now is, and as it is. Any change of it, to special pleaders like these, probably means that their pledge then fails, and they are no longer for the Union; especially if the change were detrimental to slavery—upon which, in Kentucky, they are risking every thing. At the best, the pledge is not the expression of

any devotion to American nationality, above, before, and beyond any particular form it may assume; but is such an adhesion as a secessionist might make, to a constitution actually existing. And besides, a very large part of this very Convention profess to believe, we are no nation at all, except so long as this Constitution exists; and another large part profess to believe that the secession of the Southern States destroyed the Constitution, and dissolved the Union; and another large part have actually conspired against the President as a usurper, on the ground that there is no longer any lawful Government. Considering all this, the Conservatives might profess that the pledge is distinct to a Union—at once popular and territorial—making a nation of States; while the secession peace-men might just as well contend that it is for a Union of sovereign States, by way of confederation. And, in fact, these factions, by their organs, appear to have already so professed and contended. Moreover, the two reasons they give for their devotion are every way suspicious. The first one, about the "solid foundation," etc., can last only so long as we are "*a people*;" which the bulk of these men either believe we never were, or believe we have ceased to be; while not one in fifty of them, if any one at all, appeared to have any idea that we should any longer maintain, by arms, our status as "*a people*." The other reason, about "*a frame work of Government*," etc., seems to mean, they are for the Constitution, because, and so long, as it teaches ultra States' rights doctrine. We do not pretend to say that this paragraph of the Platform can mean nothing different from what we have suggested; nor that any one, merely reading the words, without knowing the parties, or their special situation and objects, would, at once, see all we have suggested in it. But we believe no loyal man, on reading what we say, and reading this pretended profession of devotion to the Union, will consider it honest, and sufficient, in any patriotic sense. Undoubtedly the great body of the American people fully believe, that the Chicago Convention could not have *honestly* constructed and uttered a pure and simple profession of devotion to the nation and the Constitution; or *have honestly* declared their purpose to sustain either, by arms, against the insurgents. We do that body no injustice, therefore, in saying they did neither. They were not loyal; they were for

immediate peace; those who did not believe the war to be illegal from the start, because secession was a constitutional right, believed that the war was a failure, and its continuance infinitely ruinous. *Immediate peace, on any terms, is demanded.*

11. We have heard persons, respectable for intelligence, and occupying important positions in society, denounce the Union party, the Baltimore Platform, and the President, as being all committed against the possibility of peace, except the institution of slavery shall first be every where destroyed. Coupled with this, has generally been a defense of the peace panic party, and of slavery, on the ground that all they meant was peace, irrespective of every thing but the preservation of the Union and the Constitution, with a special rejection of any particular condition against slavery. We observe that this aspect of the matter has passed from private talk into the newspapers, the "*campaign documents*," and the enormous current oratory. It is proper, therefore, to disentangle the case.

12. The Baltimore Platform of the Union party, in its first resolution, declares for the maintenance of the integrity of the Union, and the permanent authority of the Constitution and laws; and for quelling the rebellion by force of arms, and punishing the crimes of traitors and rebels. The atmosphere we thus get into, is widely different from that of Chicago. The second resolution denounces all compromises with the rebellion, and repudiates "*any terms of peace, except such as may be based on the unconditional surrender of their hostility, and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States*," and an express demand is made "*upon the Government to maintain this position*," and from it to prosecute the war, crush the rebellion, and preserve the country. There is the *peace doctrine* of the Union party in the United States. They have never held or uttered any other, and never will. Peace, based on unconditional surrender of hostilities by armed rebels, and their return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

13. Now contrast this with the *peace doctrine* of the Chicago Platform. Its second resolution declares it to be the sense of the Convention, and of the American people, that we have had "*four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war*;" that is, we are whipped. It then proceeds to allege that

these four years of failure by war have exhibited what may be called a succession of usurpations and crimes, on the part of the Federal Government, and a prolonged season of suffering, oppression and disgrace on the part of the people. Then it demands "*that an immediate effort be made for the cessation of hostilities.*" Then it explains that what it had next in view is, "*an ultimate convention of all the States*"—including, of course, the rebel States, and to be held during the "*cessation of hostilities.*" If this can not be had—and it is pretty hard to get—then these patriots want some "*other peaceable means*" tried! No more war, of course; and this public notification is given to the rebels, that they may be made to understand they have the whole matter in their own hands, and will get whatever they demand. Then the end of all this atrocious and shameless infamy, the sound of which makes an honest and brave man tingle all over, is avowed to be, "*that at the earliest possible moment, peace may be restored.*" The meanest thing we remember to have seen in print, is the detestable hypocrisy which declares that all these seditious purposes, and traitorous desires, are "*on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.*" Our want of space renders it inconvenient, even if it was necessary, to show that the remaining portions of this Platform are of the same spirit, and all tend in the same direction, with the paragraph we have now analyzed. There, then, is the *peace doctrine* of the Disunion party in the loyal States: the war a failure—the nation whipped—an immediate cessation of hostilities—ultimate convention of all loyal and rebel States—any other *peaceable means*—to the earliest possible peace that can be got without any more fighting! And this is what we are asked to take in satisfaction of the blood of a million of our brethren—of the utter and eternal disgrace of being frightened into idiocy after we had triumphed—of the partition and ruin of the nation our immediate ancestors created—of three or four thousand millions of public debt—and of the everlasting destruction of human liberty, by proving that free governments are worthless, and human nature too base to be trusted with the care of itself! Even beyond all this horrible weight of shame and ruin, there is a self-pollution still deeper, if that be possible; for we are asked to put this detestable scheme into effect ourselves, by giving power to those who propose it!

14. Now it is to be seen how far the question of slavery modified the patriotic principles of the Baltimore Platform and the party that adopts it; and modified the scandalous principles of the Chicago Platform and the factions that adopt it: especially with regard to the question of *peace*—about which both platforms, as we have shown, speak with perfect distinctness. Taken in the mass, undoubtedly the Union party is hostile to the institution of slavery; and has become deeply settled in the conviction, that it was the chief cause of the secession and the rebellion, and that permanent peace and national security will be endangered, as long as slavery shall exist as the controlling political element, in powerful States of the Union. Undoubtedly it has been the openly avowed determination of the Union party, that no consideration connected with slavery, should obstruct the war for the maintenance of the Union and the Constitution; and that its utter destruction should be swift and certain, if that should be necessary to the conquest of the insurgents. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the great mass of the Democratic party was in close union with slavery as a political power, in every national success it obtained, from the close of General Jackson's second Presidential term, up to the rupture at Charleston, in 1860. The course of Mr. Douglas in the Presidential canvass of that year, established in the bosom of that party a powerful reaction against the Southern and pro-slavery supremacy in it; and the secession of eleven slave States, and the civil war, which followed the election of Mr. Lincoln, paralyzed, if it did not dissolve, the Democratic party in the North. By degrees, the party sought to re-establish itself; and its first signs of returning life were exhibited in its sympathy with the South—with its fatal political heresies, with its rebellion and its slavery. True to its deplorable instincts, it seized upon the wide reaction of 1862 against the Emancipation Proclamation of the President, issued in the fall of that year, and sought to turn it from any national, to the narrowest Democratic purposes. The reaction was far enough from meaning that, and the counter action in 1863 broke down the Democratic party once more. In 1864 we meet once more these disciples of Mr. Calhoun—these men so long in league with the political power of slavery—these fierce opponents of every

national effort to preserve the national existence—this time combining with every other turbulent, disloyal, or hostile faction—to regain power. We have seen, in part, what they did. True still to their old sympathies, they must, one would suppose, tell men plainly what they think, what they desire, what they intend to do, concerning this great and dangerous question of slavery.

15. Alas! that old doctrine of the Pharisees! At Chicago, "*they feared the people!*" Ignominious peace and perpetual slavery were too much for one platform. Something may be reserved for *private* agreement. But the National Democratic party, so long the city of refuge for American slavery, abandons it to its fate, closes its ears to the clamors of its friends, and in lofty silence passes by a subject upon which every political party has been successively wrecked, on which the immediate destiny of the nation essentially depends, and with regard to which foreign Governments direct their action, and distant nations push their inquiries. There is an immense significance in this; and we accept, with great satisfaction, the proof of the strength of our principles, furnished by this real and ominous panic. Widely different was the course of the Baltimore Convention. Their utterance was so distinct, as to render any collateral statement by us quite needless. We have already analyzed their *first* resolution relating to the maintenance of the Union and the Constitution; and their *second* resolution relating to the war and the conditions of peace. The *third* resolution relates to slavery. In it, they declare slavery to be the *cause*, and the *strength* of the rebellion—and declare that justice and the national safety, demand its extinction. They then declare their approval of the acts and proclamations of the Government, as aimed in *its own defense*—and as designed to be fatal to slavery. And, finally, they recommend such an amendment of the Federal Constitution, as shall terminate and forever prohibit slavery. Now, the question is, does this platform make the destruction of slavery a *condition precedent* to peace—or bind the Union party to any such course? Its terms of peace are distinctly and previously stated, in the preceding resolution, to be, on the part of the rebels, "*unconditional surrender of their hostility, and a return to their allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States.*" On the part of the

Government, it demands the maintenance of this position; and, if the terms above stated are not complied with by the rebels, "to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of the rebellion." Beside all this, which is perfectly clear of itself, the remedy by which they propose to "terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery, within the limits, or the jurisdiction of the United States," is a remedy wholly incompatible with the idea of a condition precedent to peace, and utterly beyond any power in the Government, or in any department of it, to enforce. It is by "*an amendment of the Constitution, to be made by the people, in conformity with its provisions.*" It is undeniably true, that the Baltimore Platform, the Union party, and the American people, desire to put an end to slavery in the United States. It is undeniable, that the mode proposed is both legal and effectual; and that abundant cause exists to apply that remedy, whether the war continues or peace is made—and that it is increased both in strength and the certainty of its ultimate application, every day the rebellion in the South and the conspiracies in the North, more and more unite and enlighten all loyal men. But it is a willful untruth, or a gross and needless mistake, to allege that we are only *conditional* Union at last, like Copperheads and Peace Democrats, the only difference being, that they are for the Union if slavery is preserved—we if slavery is abolished. The true difference is, that they want peace, that their country may be deprived of the just fruits of so much sacrifice; we want peace, as soon as our country can enjoy that fruit. They want peace, that treason may not be crushed, and rebellion utterly extinguished; we want peace, as soon as treason and rebellion are destroyed. They want peace as the means of new conspiracies, and as a refuge from the consequences of their past offenses; we want peace for the blessings it should confer, and as soon as those blessings can be enjoyed in security. They have robbed us of this unspeakable blessing—let us so recover it, that they will rob us of it no more.

16. We do not deem it very essential to discuss this question of the relation of slavery to peace, with reference to the relative claims of the two Presidential candidates, to the support of pro-slavery men. Without immediate peace, slavery must become extinct—if, indeed, it must not do so in any event; and

we suppose that the vote of every slave State that will vote, except Kentucky, is as certain to be for Mr. Lincoln as if it was already cast. Moreover, General McClellan is as much committed against favoring slavery at the expense of the safety of the Union, or even at the risk of protracting the war, as Mr. Lincoln is. There is, indeed, a discreditable sentence in his letter accepting his nomination, in which he appears to intimate some denial of his notorious advice to Mr. Lincoln, to attack the institution of slavery, as well as his notorious "*arbitrary arrests*." He says the preservation of the Union ought to have been the sole object of the war; and then adds, that if the war had not been thus conducted, "*the work of conciliation would have been easy*." No one knows better than General McClellan, that the work of conciliation was, from the beginning, utterly impossible. No man knows better than he, that it is impossible now, except by wholly destroying the military power of the insurgents. No one can possibly know, as well as he knows, that if the conciliation he speaks of was ever possible, he is fully as responsible as Mr. Lincoln for defeating it. As to Mr. Lincoln's past course, nothing can be more clear and decided than his repeated avowals that his sole object, in every instance and method in which he has acted against slavery, or refused to act against it, was so to act, or refuse to act, as seemed to him most conducive to the preservation of the Union—and always in accordance with what he believed to be his constitutional powers and duties. It has not been our fortune to agree with Mr. Lincoln in some of his views on this most difficult question. But, cordially approving his grand object, we did not understand either the patriotism or the common sense, of traducing him as a man, or resisting him as magistrate, or conspiring against him as the military head of this great war, when the only possible effects of such conduct would be to strengthen the rebellion. It is alleged that the short publication made by Mr. Lincoln, dated July 18, and addressed "*To whom it may concern*," is totally inconsistent with what we have shown to be conditions of peace laid down in the Baltimore Platform; and proves that "*the abandonment of slavery*," is with him a condition *sine qua non*, to the admission of any rebel State once more to the exercise of all the constitutional rights possessed by any other State. But it is manifest that

the publication has no such meaning. It would be contrary to his *hearty approval* of our platform on the 27th of June. The logic and intent of every previous act and declaration of the President, on the subject of slavery and the Union, are directly hostile to the deduction his enemies make from this short publication. He does not speak in it, at all, of the restoration of any *State*, nor of its rights, nor of any arrangement with any State. He speaks of "*any proposition which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war with the United States.*" This, it is certain, no State could do. Perhaps General Lee, in certain eventualities, might do it; perhaps Jefferson Davis might do it now. The phrase objected to is one of four, (peace, union, slavery, power over rebel armies), embracing conditions—not *sine qua*, but such as "*will be received and considered.*" Nothing can be more absurd, under all the circumstances, than to speak of this publication as binding Mr. Lincoln to keep a revolted State out of the Union till it would do any thing whatever except obey the Constitution and laws of the United States, and faithfully discharge all its duties under both. The Government of the United States has no more power to repudiate a State, than a State has to secede from the nation. Nevertheless, we must not encourage this over-sensitiveness about slavery, as if we had not, even yet, outgrown the dread of it. The nation is bound to respect every constitutional right of every State, and to protect every vested right of every citizen. But the nation also has rights, which every State and every citizen must be made to respect. And among these, the first and greatest of all is the right to exist; in presence of which the right to hold our fellow creatures as slaves would be ludicrous, if it were not insulting.

17. The origin of this *peace-at-any-price* platform issued at Chicago, by the combined factions in the loyal States, is as shameful and traitorous as its spirit is fraudulent and hateful. The New York correspondent of the *London Times*, under date of August 8th, informs his employers that the Clifton House (in Canada, at Niagara Falls), had become a center of negotiations between the Northern friends of peace and Southern agents. This British publication is dated twenty-one days before the meeting of the Chicago Convention; and at that period this foreign agent, and probably spy, was accurately informed of

what the compact contained, which these Southern agents and the Northern friends of peace had agreed on after negotiation. An armistice—a convention of the States—the withdrawal of the arbitrament of the sword—the nomination of a president on this platform—and the defeat of Mr. Lincoln by all possible means; this is the compact, as stated by the British agent twenty-one days before the Chicago Convention met. This is the essence of the Platform actually adopted by that body—in proof of its complicity—and ratified by its partisans everywhere. The peace patriots, and the British agent, and the Southern traitors, all mutually furnish proof against each other, of the audacious proceeding. For while the proof against the whole of them is complete, Mr. George Saunders, the companion of Mr. Holcombe and Mr. Clay, makes a special record as to the complicity of the peace patriots with the Southern traitors, after the fact. As soon as the doings of the Chicago Convention were completed, he telegraphs from St. Catherine's, Canada West, on the 1st of September, to Mr. D. Wier, of Halifax, that the Platform and Presidential nominee were unsatisfactory (that is, were not bad enough—nor possibly quite up to his notion of the contract); but that the Vice President and the speeches were satisfactory. This Mr. Wier is said to be a Confederate agent at Halifax, and an accomplice of the patriots and traitors in conference. Mr. Saunders desires Mr. Wier to tell Philmore not to oppose the result reached at Chicago. Mr. Philmore is said to be the conductor of the insurgent organ, in London. Mr. Saunders seems to have still confided in the fidelity of the factions who had cheated him and his colleagues a little—had cheated each other a great deal, and had combined to cheat the nation out of its honor, its safety, and perhaps its life; confided in them, that is, far enough to trust them for the full execution of the terms agreed on at Chicago; though the Chicago aspect of these terms was not so good, for the rebels, as the aspect of them agreed on in Canada. Every one understands that General McClellan's acceptance is considered by the peace panic men an attempt to take the platform for substance only—while he takes the chance of the Presidency, without the least equivocation. How Mr. Saunders and his accomplices, how that portion of the Democracy which is conspiring in the North for the portion fighting in the South—

in short, how all the affiliated patriots, traitors, and conspirators—will digest their mutual and multifarious cheats, intrigues, exposures, and perils, we do not pretend to understand. But we do perfectly understand, that every American heart that is in the right place, will turn with horror from a conspiracy, at once so black with treason, so base in design, and so degrading in the manner of its execution, as the one we have developed—and of whose existence and action we consider the proof conclusive.

18. It adds another shade of turpitude to this peace fraud, and furnishes another damning proof that the real object of this peace conspiracy was to aid the rebels, even by the destruction of the nation; that every one engaged in concocting it and in indorsing it, knew perfectly well that it was impossible to make any peace with the insurgents in the way they pretend, or in any other way, except by conquering them, or by giving them independent national existence. From the very beginning, this is what every rebel State, what the Confederate Government, what every rebel who has spoken or written, what every important event in the history of the revolt—has continually proclaimed. To separate from the United States and make a new and independent nation—for what purpose, or for how many purposes, is immaterial here—was the very object of their whole thirty years of treasonable efforts, preceding the civil war; of the secession of every one of the eleven States that united in that war and in the Confederacy that has waged it; and of all their sacrifices, cruelties and crimes during that war. Every man who forfeited his life by treasonable conferences with the rebel agents at Chicago, knew this, and knew that this was still the frantic and unchangeable purpose of every rebel authority to which peace could be proposed. Every man who has forfeited the confidence of his country, by taking part in organizing the Democratic party, and arming secret bands of traitors, and menacing war upon the Government, and raising this turbulent and seditious clamor, all for the express purpose of forcing us to base, cowardly, and fatal attempts at peace, knew all this with absolute certainty. We are obliged, therefore, to say that a most fatal and gigantic fraud is attempted upon the people of the United States, by means of this peace panic; and that the object of the fraud can be no other than to

gain power through our national humiliation, and ruin, or to co-operate with the insurgents in establishing their treason. What *special motives* might actuate American citizens to seek power thus, or to use it thus when obtained, is an inquiry which throws open to us all the passions, the interests, the weaknesses, the corruptions of the monstrous period in which we live. Our duty is to defeat the terrible design; to prevent the attainment of the fatal objects proposed; to hold the authors of such attempts responsible for them; to extirpate, root and branch, the dangers which threaten the nation. After that, peace.

19. It is the common outcry of the Northern section of the rebellion, that the Southern section will change their minds as soon as their Northern friends come in possession of the Federal Government, and will agree readily to make peace without independence. If they believed these, why did they attempt to make a double-faced platform? Why did they concert with rebel agents in Canada, the execrable terms contained in that platform? Why do the agents of the rebel Government, and all peace panic accomplices, distrust General McClellan—and why do all sincere sympathizers with the insurgents dread the incompatibility between the candidate and the platform? Why does not some whisper of peace, without independence, come from some rebel Government, General, or State, to help their Northern accomplices in this moment of impending wrath? And yet, if some mixture of truth lurked in these fraudulent professions, it is easy to understand that there are, in the nature of things, terms on which such traitors as the Southern conspirators, and such accomplices as their Northern supporters, might substantially accomplish what they desire, if the Northern conspirators can only obtain power. Thus—a new confederacy might be formed, embracing all the States, but uniting them in a *league*, as if each State was a nation—instead of being united, as now, into one nation—made up of States and people, under a common *government*. Or, there might be three or four great confederacies carved out of the nation, the nation itself being destroyed, and each of the new confederacies being only a *league*. Or these *leagues*, each constituted of many States, might be again united into one *confederacy*, in which the great *leagues* only would stand related to each other. And very

obvious conditions might be added against us, and for the benefit of the successful party, in the unjust war which this peace party asserts that we are urging. As, for example: that we pay their expenses of the war; that we pay for the lost negroes and the destroyed property of every kind; that we guarantee the restoration and the perpetual security of negro slavery in all the States where it existed, and in all the Territories; with many more of a similar character—all very honorable and satisfactory in the view of such Americans as will agree to put into power a party capable of such disinterested compliances. We wish every sane man who reads this paragraph, would stop and consider what the men deserve, who desire such things—or things having the very least resemblance to them—to happen to this great and free nation! We wish he would try to make his mind up, as to what must happen to a mighty and heroic people, before any such things as any of these can come to pass! We wish he would determine within himself, what such a nation, such a people, will do after any such things have been put upon them, by force or by fraud—and they have waked up to the tremendous reality!

20. But suppose we agree to believe that the war is an utter failure, on our part, and also agree to believe all the other declarations, dependent on that one; which any one can believe, who sees nothing to be true unless it suits his purpose, and nothing to be false unless it stands in his way. Suppose, moreover, we agree to see that our duty as brave, wise, and patriotic citizens obliges us to give our adhesion to the peace panic party, and crown their seditious and anarchical movement with triumph; which any one can attempt as soon as he has lost the power of distinguishing between good and evil. The peace party obtains power. But it professes to be loyal to the Constitution and the Union. And it knows the rebels will conclude peace *with them* by giving up their mad purpose of independence, and returning to their former *status* in the Union. Now we encounter at the threshold of every attempt to put these principles into practice, constitutional difficulties, on both sides, which are inseparable, and in the face of which all negotiation is absurd. Mr. Davis is the President of a Confederate Government of sovereign States, with specially defined powers. He has said continually, and most truly, that he had no power

at all to destroy that Confederacy, by treaty; no power to mar it, by surrendering any one of these sovereignties to the United States; no power to negotiate with the United States, on the subject of slavery, or any other subject exclusively belonging to each of these sovereignties; no power to stipulate that either of them shall unite in the convention of States, demanded by the Chicago Platform. Mr. Davis continually asserts, that he has no power to treat about any of these matters; that if he had full power, he would not treat about any of them, and that the complete recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, is the *sine qua non*, preliminary to any treaty stipulation with any power on earth. On the part of the rebel Government, there stands the first practical lesson to be studied by these crazy devotees of States rights, as soon as their fraudulent promises are to be conciliated with their anarchical doctrines and their traitorous desires. The whole secession theory explodes—or every Democratic promise of peace, with reunion, by treaty, and without rebel independence, explodes. Nor is the impossibility of peace, by treaty, with or without reunion, less absolute on the part of the Federal Government. This matter does not lie in the domain of the treaty-making power of the Federal Government. The President and the Senate can not compound a rebellion, which the Constitution and the laws require to be suppressed. These confederates are neither more nor less than rebels in arms. The President might pardon them, on their returning to their obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States. He might do this, in behalf of any individual, after conviction—*possibly* before that; he might do it, on the latter supposition, in behalf of every individual in any particular State; and therefore, in behalf of all, in all rebel States. But if he were to do so, except upon condition of their return to obedience, he would prostitute the powers of his great office. His only alternative is to quell them by every proper means at his disposal, and in the exercise of every power vested in him, by the Constitution and the laws. What these are, and how far a state of war warrants, *by the Constitution and the laws*, innumerable acts demanded by the safety of the State, which would be monstrous under other circumstances; there is no occasion to examine here. Whoever will carefully examine the Constitution of the United States, will be struck

with astonishment at the boundless comprehension of the powers bestowed by it on the Government and its different departments, so far as regards the ends for which the "people of the United States" did "ordain and establish" it. And those ends, great beyond all precedent, involve all that is now at stake, "*in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure DOMESTIC tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.*" But not a word, not a syllable, about changing the Constitution otherwise, or for other objects, than is provided in its own terms. Not a word about the destruction, the dissolution, the division or the reconstruction of the nation. Not a word about a treaty by or with any State, or with or between any combination of States, *except that it is directly forbidden* (Article I, Sec. 10, p. 1); thus rendering the very idea, as well as the mode of existence of the Confederate Government, a Constitutional nullity, and forbidding the Federal Government, whose first duty is to suppress it, to make any composition with it concerning its crimes or its continued existence, or with any State that adheres to it. Let the reader observe that these insuperable difficulties, on both sides, which no mode of construing human obligations and rights can evade, are rendered more and more potent as the doctrines of *strict construction* and *State sovereignty* are more stringently held. It is curious to see how these secessionists and their allies are swamped, at the first crisis, by the operation of their own political extravagance.

21. The doctrine of the peace panic proceeds thus: The war is a failure; the Constitution is set aside "*in every point,*" under the pretense "of a military necessity or war power;" "public liberty and private right (are) alike trodden down;" "the material prosperity of the country (is) essentially impaired;" on which accounts, "justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand, *that an immediate effort be made for the cessation of hostilities.*" This cessation of hostilities is, therefore, meant to be, and will be, necessarily the end of all further war—as the platform of the united factions immediately proceeds to declare, as we will see presently. It is one of the ludicrous effects of putting a war candidate on a peace platform, that General McClellan, while accepting the statements of the Con-

vention why the war *should* cease, and accepting also the method proposed by which it *must* end at once, should be obliged, by respect for himself, to repudiate the infamy involved in the inevitable conclusion. The temptation is too much for him; so also is the degradation they united with it. When he is beaten, it will be a consolation to him to reflect that the temptation which overcame him, did not make him degrade himself. If he should chance to be elected, his country ought to be that much safer in his hands, that he has repudiated the infamy of a disgraceful peace, as the end of a just, necessary and successful war. But these statements, on which unconditional peace is made the basis of the platform on which he runs—which he must be held to indorse, while he refuses to indorse their conclusion—are, in part, palpably false, in part utterly absurd, and as to all that are true in any sense or degree—the Chicago Convention, and those they represent in the North, and those they co-ordinate with in the South, are a million times more to blame than those they accuse. And the first result they seek, and which he must be held to accept—*immediate cessation of hostilities*—is conclusive against the party that supports him, and against his fitness to hold a military commission in our army, much less to be President and Commander-in-chief. What can the nation possibly gain by an ordinary cessation of hostilities, that will relatively weaken the rebellion or strengthen the nation? Absolutely nothing. On the contrary, in the present state of the war, and the parties to it, any change produced by a general cessation of hostilities would necessarily be favorable to the rebellion, and damaging to the nation. If the rebels were to ask for such a cessation of hostilities, with the openly avowed purpose of returning at once to their allegiance as loyal people and States, the unconditional and immediate granting of their request would be a subject requiring grave consideration—certainly it would require that we should be fully satisfied they were acting fairly and in good faith. But so far is any temper of this sort from being found in them, that, from the highest to the lowest, they scoff at the idea of a general cessation of hostilities, unless, as connected with it, our armies should be withdrawn from all their territory—our fleets should cease to blockade their coasts—all their captured cities and forts should be given up, all the

border States claimed by them should be turned over to them! Our deliberate judgment is, that any American citizen who favors a single one of these propositions, knowing what he does, is a traitor; and that any officer of the Government of the United States, from the President down, who attempts to grant any one of them to these armed insurgents, deserves death. We can not conceal from ourselves, that the leaders of the factions represented in the Chicago Convention—some more, some less, but all of them in some degree—did mean to embrace these damning propositions in their demands, if they were necessary in order to obtain peace; that they did know, sufficiently to make them deliberately guilty, the horrible nature and effects of what they demanded, and that they now expect, and intend, to make an armed insurrection, in the North, in support of these shameless demands, if they fail of success at the impending presidential election. We have, in effect, pretty nearly conquered the rebellion. Now, if their accomplices in the loyal States put to the American people the alternative of conquering them also, or of stopping short in our career of duty, safety, honor, freedom, and national independence, wrought by our arms upon Southern traitors; even let them get ready—for the American people will, when need requires, conquer them also, by arms. They can do what seems good in their own eyes. But they had as well reflect, that what they are now doing, may bring destruction on themselves, and possibly much injury upon their country, but can never bring independence to the rebel States, or peace to us.

22. The constant profession is, that the great end is peace; the time, the earliest practical moment; the means, any that are peaceable, but explicitly immediate efforts for a cessation of hostilities, "*with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States.*" It is the remedy contained in these last words which we have italicised, which is now to be considered. The slightest examination of the subject makes it apparent that this mode of obtaining peace is proposed in mere ignorance and recklessness, or that it is proposed as the means of dissolving the Union. It may be naturally supposed that it is proposed in the former way, if we reflect that the Constitution of the United States does not permit peace to be made by a convention of the States; and does not allow such a convention to

divide the Union. There is no power, by the present Constitution, for a convention of the States to assemble at all, except by act of Congress, passed at the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States; and then the single object of this only lawful convention of the States, is to propose amendments to the Constitution, which must afterward be ratified by three-fourths of the States before they have any validity. (Article V.) Very clearly, these madmen might say, that it might be proposed to amend the Constitution, by dividing the nation into two or three parts. But in that case, we suppose, it would be very clear *that their intention was to divide the Union*. But that intention fraudulently carried out, in contempt of the Constitution, would be far enough from proving that they destroy the Union constitutionally. Every one can judge of the probability of getting two-thirds of the State Legislatures to demand of Congress this convention of the States; every one can see, after all this is done, and all proposed by the plotters is carried through Congress, and through a convention of the States; how soon and how certainly three-fourths of the States would ratify those amendments which profaned and defeated every object avowed in the Constitution itself, for its very existence, and then pretended—not to amend the Constitution, but to dissolve the nation itself! And all this we are to accept as the means of *immediate peace*, on the basis of the Union and the Constitution! Of course, therefore, what this call of a convention of States means, by the leaders of this peace-panic conspiracy—is the immediate dissolution of the Union. The cessation of hostilities once carried out—those hostilities never to be renewed; the project of the convention of the States dragging along for years, futile as to the professed object of it, full of all manner of danger and mischief in the hands of the parties using it—means only an instrument of ruin confided to the hands of traitors. The mischief was accomplished in the first act. The Chicago Convention menaces the Government with resolutions nothing short of a conditional declaration of war; and then, after the fashion of most revolutionary tribunals, refuses to dissolve itself, and declares its existence permanent. Its other acts were perfectly in keeping with these deliberate schemes for the overthrow of the Constitution, for the triumph of the avowed

enemies of the nation, and for the universal reign of disorder. It is natural that in launching upon such a career, they should feel some solicitude about escape if it failed. They should, therefore, consider it a friendly act on our part to warn them that the Constitution of the United States makes the way to peace narrow and difficult for all who force war upon us, and internal anarchy does not tend at all to help our enemies to get rid of just punishment. To foreign enemies in arms against us, the only way to peace is to satisfy the President of the United States, and two-thirds of the members of the National Senate; that is, to satisfy the army and navy, through their Commander-in-chief, and to satisfy two-thirds of the States and people of America, through their Senators in Congress. On the other hand, if these public enemies be armed insurgents, in rebellion, the way to peace for them, as they are far greater criminals, could hardly be less decisive. It lies, absolutely, in their first ceasing to be traitors and enemies; and then, in their returning simply and in good faith, to their loyalty to the United States, and to their obedience to its Government, its Constitution and its laws. If they will not do this, it lies in the conquest of them by arms, and the just punishment of so many of them as duty to God and the country may demand. Besides these two there is no other way, except an appeal to the clemency of the President; in the exercise of his power to pardon under the Constitution. To be a nation, to have a government, to live under the dominion of laws, absolutely demands, in substance, what our own noble institutions require. And what we are now about is, in effect to determine the sufficiency of free institutions, in protecting human society and human civilization; the compatibility of personal freedom, under republican institutions, with sufficient power in the Government to prevent anarchy, and sufficient strength to preserve independence. The first aspect of the great trial, was rebels relying on foreign nations; the second aspect is, disloyal factions taking part with the defeated rebels, in proportion as foreign nations withdraw their countenance. The new disorder only shows how deep and malignant was the poison of the old one. Both are but proofs that the malady was working our death without our heeding it. Now that we know all—if we are worthy of the mission God has appointed us unto—we will

not do His work deceitfully, but gird ourselves up to its perfect accomplishment. The motives to an opposite course suggested at Chicago are degrading in themselves, and founded upon a view of the nature of our situation, our duty, and our destiny, wholly absurd. Those motives which spring up in our own minds and hearts, arising from the ties and the hopes these relentless insurgents have despised, are such as outraged but loving parents, and kindred, and friends, can not disown without anguish. But in presence of the exalted demands of duty, and the majestic dictates of reason—the way before us all is clear, like light.

23. We must bear in mind, that the *peace portion* of the supporters of General McClellan and Mr. Pendleton, have continually and clamorously denounced the war, and the coercion of the rebels, both in its origin, and at every step of its progress; and professedly agreed to support General McClellan only upon the conditions of his being placed on a platform consistent with their principles, and of having as his Vice President a man holding these particular principles. Both conditions, now, in effect, set aside by the letter of General McClellan, if he means what he says, were apparently secured to them at Chicago. Whether they agreed, by a secret and corrupt bargain with the Copperhead Union men, to take McClellan, knowing he did not agree with them, or with Mr. Pendleton, or with the platform; or whether those Copperhead Union men, who have continually and clamorously professed to desire the suppression of the rebellion by arms, privately and corruptly agreed that both they and McClellan should *act* on the peace principles of Mr. Pendleton and the platform, after he was *elected* by the help of his own principles; is of small consequence to any one, except the parties concerned. And it is not of much consequence to them; for in a proceeding so fatal to the character of all engaged in it—what the people have to do is not to parcel out the guilt, where there is no possibility of any being innocent—but promptly to repudiate the whole. For our part, it exceeds all idea we had of human effrontery, that men should stand up with the Chicago Peace Platform in one hand, and the Louisville Conservative War Platform of May 25th, in the other hand, and ask the public to confide in them, after they had adopted both, in about ninety days. With

such facility of reconciling light and darkness, there need be no surprise that, upon a little exercise of their great gifts in holding opposite principles, in quickly succeeding platforms, they should be able to express opposite principles in the same platform, and expect to be credited when they say they sincerely hold to all. It is, therefore, quite like them to expect the public to accept as sincere and sufficient some general professions of continued devotion to the Union and the Constitution scattered through their last platform, when, as we have demonstrated, the Constitution would be suppressed, and the Union dissolved, *ipso facto*, by the object they propose and the means they adopt. As if to make this clear beyond all doubt, they add a general declaration to all their special ones, which embraces every possible evil that might chance not to be embraced before. If their resolute purpose to cause the war to fail—their making their disloyal convention a permanent revolutionary tribunal—their actually menacing the Federal Government with war—their demand of an instant cessation of hostilities against the rebels—their declared purpose to call a convention of all the States, in some unexplained manner, and for palpably unconstitutional and disloyal objects—if all these schemes of anarchy and rebellion fail, then, finally, they are for any means, provided they are *peaceable* toward the rebels. “Or other PEACEABLE means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.” “On the basis,” etc. Can any one read the fearful wickedness detailed in the speech of Ashdod, summed up with these few closing words in the speech of Canaan, and imagine any prevarication more shameless! General McClellan says it appears to mean, that the rebels *must* return to their loyalty and obedience. If he is elected, we trust in God, he will hold the peace men to that meaning, and the rebels to that duty. We are not a candidate for the Presidency, nor therefore under immense temptation “to see what is not to be seen,” and the obvious and intended meaning appears to us to be, that we are not to be allowed to fight the rebels any more—for any purpose or on any pretext. It is a full and deliberate judgment against the nation, the Union and the Constitution—if force is required to save them, as every body knows it is. The American people have two effectual remedies in their hands. The *first* is, to

renounce and overwhelm such horrible principles, together with all who maintain them. The *second* is, to crush the rebellion and all who give it aid and comfort, so thoroughly and so quickly, that the authors of this atrocious peace panic will have no armed accomplices left. Then what a career of security and glory will the nation run!

24. It has always seemed to us, to be a thing unworthy of the American people, as well as wholly mischievous in all its effects, to agitate the question of peace at all. We have already shown abundantly, that in the nature of the case, there was no way to make peace with armed insurgents, except to pardon them, to conquer them, or for them to return voluntarily and in good faith to their obedience to the laws, and their true allegiance to the nation and its government. Every imagination contrary to these great truths, is utterly futile, and can end only in making our condition worse. Moreover, nothing can be more notorious than that the rebels never have been in state of mind to listen to any conditions of peace, even if there had been any authority in the nation that had power to offer them, which were consistent with the safety, the honor, or even the continued existence of the United States as a great and free nation. We have not considered it worth the space it would occupy to expose the deceitful intrigue of the rebel agents at Niagara—whose real objects were to organize a military force amongst the refugees in Canada, and concert a better understanding with the traitors scattered amongst ourselves. Nor can it be necessary to cast any additional contempt upon the mock mystery and palpable conceit and folly, worked out at Richmond between Mr. Davis and Mr. Benjamin on one side, and two of our meddlesome citizens on the other. Such attempts ought to be punished, if they can not be prevented; for they agitate the public mind and encourage the rebels in fatal hopes, which can never be realized. The truth, no doubt, is, that God will give us peace just as soon as the insurgents, and their accomplices among ourselves, and, perhaps, we loyal Americans also, are in a condition to accept it as a real and lasting mercy—among the greatest He bestows. At present we deem it perfectly certain, that the peace which those united in the principles of the Chicago Platform propose to give us, would be the cause of far greater and more protracted misery, bloodshed, and confusion, than that they vainly imagine their

shameful remedies would arrest. And it is not, by any means, improbable that while their success would disgrace, and possibly destroy the nation, their defeat may re-enforce the rebel armies by the addition of many thousands of them; or may even result in their general insurrection throughout the loyal States. Let the will of God have way and fully accomplish itself. It is better, far better, if traitors will have it so, that the land be drenched in a universal baptism of blood, and come out of it pure, glorious, and free, than to sink down under the ferocious dominion of rebellious mobs, to whom all law is an unnatural restraint, and whose supreme idea of regulated liberty is accomplished in tearing down every thing above them and trampling on every thing beneath them.

25. Up, then, faithful men of this great Republic, and stand for the vast inheritance which God has given you. Since the beginning of the world, no insurrection has ever been crowned with triumph. In all time, no insurrection was ever heard of so little deserving to triumph as this. To the end of the world there never can be another whose triumph would be more deplorable than this. Are we brutes, that we should be thought capable of allowing this one to triumph? Are we lost to all the inspirations of our race and our condition, that we will permit such a combination of such factions as now assail us, to take our crown of freedom and break our scepter of renown? Are we so unspeakably base as to desert our children in the moment of victory?—so utterly undone as to give up the glorious heritage won by their valor and made sacred by their blood? The shades of your ancestors call to you from the mighty past. The loud cry of freemen all over the earth rings upon your hearts. The latest posterity will bless you if you are faithful to them now.